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Information Security Policy (ISP) compliance is crucial to the success of healthcare 
organizations due to security threats and the potential for security breaches. UNIX 
Administrators (UXAs) in healthcare Information Technology (IT) maintain critical 
servers that house Protected Health Information (PHI). Their compliance with ISP is 
crucial to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI data housed or accessed by 
their servers. The use of cognitive heuristics and biases may negatively influence threat 
appraisal, coping appraisal, and ultimately ISP compliance behavior. These failures may 
result in insufficiently protected servers and put organizations at greater risk of data 
breaches and financial loss. The goal was to empirically assess the effect of a focused 
Security Education, Training, and Awareness (SETA) workshop, an Interactive Security 
Challenge (ISC), and periodic security update emails on UXAs knowledge sharing, use of 
cognitive heuristics and biases, and ISP compliance behavior. This quantitative study 
employed a pretest and posttest experimental design to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
SETA workshop and an ISC on the ISP compliance of UXAs. The survey instrument was 
developed based on prior validated instrument questions and augmented with newly 
designed questions related to the use of cognitive heuristics and biases. Forty-two 
participants completed the survey prior to and following the SETA, ISC, and security 
update emails. Actual compliance (AC) behavior was assessed by comparing the results 
of security scans on administrator’s servers prior to and 90 days following the SETA 
workshop and ISC. SmartPLS was used to analyze the pre-workshop data, post-workshop 
data, and combined data to evaluate the proposed structural and measurement models. 
The results indicated that Confirmation Bias (CB) and the Availability Heuristic (AH) 
were significantly influenced by the Information Security Knowledge Sharing (ISKS). 
Optimism Bias (OB) did not reach statistically significant levels relating to ISKS. OB 
did, however, significantly influence on perceived severity (TA-PS), perceived 
vulnerability (TA-PV), response-efficacy (CA-RE), and self-efficacy (CA-SE). Also, it 
was noted that all five security implementation data points collected to assess pre- and 
post-workshop compliance showed statistically significant change. A total of eight 
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The healthcare industry is a complicated network of hospitals, providers, 
independent laboratories, payers, pharmacies, imaging centers, and public health 
departments centered on patients and their health (Dixon, 2016). The ability to safely and 
efficiently store, process, and exchange information about patient care between the 
healthcare industry participants is key to improving patient medical outcomes and 
lowering the cost of healthcare (Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology, n.d.; Steinbrook, 2009; Thieme, 2016). The United States 
federal government has encouraged the implementation of IT. The United States Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 provided incentives to organizations 
to apply technology to the healthcare system. Additionally, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 allocated $145B for health care spending which 
included $30 billion to modernize the IT infrastructure of health care organizations 
(Ajami & Bagheri-Tadi, 2013). Federal laws contain provisions defining the privacy and 
security requirements necessary to protect PHI (Steinbrook, 2009; Thieme, 2016). The 
goal of these laws was to encourage the use of technology to reduce healthcare costs by 
improving efficiency, reducing medical errors, reducing care duplication, and improving 
coordination of care among medical providers (Amarasingham et al., 2009; Office of the 
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, n.d.). The move from paper-





organizations, however, has resulted in substantially greater risk of data breaches and 
violations of PHI and personally identifiable information (PII) (McFarland, 2012).  
While many organizations’ servers are Windows based, a significant number of 
larger, back-end systems are UNIX based to capitalize on increased server processing 
power, reliability, security, and clustering technology (Bajgoric, 2006; Beuchelt, 2017a; 
Hussain et al., 2015). Epic and Cerner, the two leading EHR applications, represent 61% 
of the market for implementations in inpatient hospitals in the United States (Newman, 
2019; Shrivastava, 2018). The Epic EHR application, an industry leader for hospital EHR 
systems, only supports UNIX based operating systems for its database and processing 
servers (Epic, 2018; Newman, 2019). Larger Cerner EHR customers use high-end UNIX 
and Linux servers for the back-end databases while many smaller hospitals may use the 
Windows server based version of the Cerner EHR product (Shrivastava, 2018). As of 
October 2020, Linux/UNIX servers represent 71.2% of all active Web servers worldwide 
(W3Techs, 2020). In the Amazon cloud, Linux/UNIX images represent 94% of the 
servers and Windows servers represent 6% of the servers out of a total of 1,368,288 
images (Cloud Market, 2020). In Microsoft’s Azure cloud the number of Linux virtual 
machines (VMs) exceeded the number of Windows VMs in 2018 (Vaughan-Nichols, 
2018). When considering the total distinct known vulnerabilities from 1999 to 2020, the 
top six operating systems are Linux-based and Linux variants (CVE Details, 2020). As of 
October 2020, the top six Linux variants have 13,862 known vulnerabilities and the top 
four Windows operating systems have 4,865 vulnerabilities (CVE Details, 2020). Clearly, 
there are significant vulnerabilities with Linux and UNIX systems that need to be 







The research problem was that some UXAs fail to completely implement 
organizational ISP due to the use of cognitive heuristics and biases that cause them to 
perceive the threat of server breaches to be primarily a problem for Windows 
administrators (Siponen et al., 2014; Tsohou et al., 2015). This failure may leave UNIX 
servers open to potential systems disruption and loss of proprietary or confidential data 
leading to harm to organizational reputation, potential loss of revenue, or financial loss 
due to litigation or fines (Donaldson et al., 2015; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). The use of 
OB, CB, or the AH can lead to a fundamental underestimation of risk and result in 
reduced ISP compliance (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012). It is vital to understand how SETA 
programs, developed to address the unique job functions of UXA, influence their use of 
cognitive heuristics, biases, threat appraisal, and coping appraisal (Pfleeger & Caputo, 
2012; Vance et al., 2012).  
Most research in ISP compliance has focused on the end-user compliance 
intention (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Dang-Pham et al., 2017; Hanus & Wu, 2016; 
Ifinedo, 2012; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016). While end-
users are critical to organizations reducing the threat of Information Security (IS) 
breaches, server systems administrators have the highest privilege levels and access to the 
vast amount of confidential PHI and PII stored on their servers (Beuchelt, 2017a; 
Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). Systems administrators are super users and are responsible 
for operating system installation, configuration, patching, user management, monitoring, 





servers (Beuchelt, 2017a; Inshanally, 2018; Santara, 2013). Common IS threat vectors for 
servers include network, security, operating system misconfiguration, unpatched 
operating systems or device firmware, privileged account escalation, and unsecured data 
or backups (Caballero, 2013; Donaldson et al., 2015).  
Human factors have gained prominence as a significant risk factor for information 
systems security (Bauer & Bernroider, 2017; Colwill, 2009; Ifinedo, 2014; Ki-Aries & 
Faily, 2017; Safa et al., 2015). To strengthen the human aspect of IS, ISPs are developed 
by organizations, which enhance security, decrease vulnerability to security breaches, and 
ensure legal compliance (Bauer & Bernroider, 2017; Bélanger et al., 2017; D’Arcy & 
Lowry, 2019; Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009). Unfortunately, 
researchers have found that employees frequently circumvented information systems 
policies when workload increased (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Guo et al., 2011; 
Kraemer & Carayon, 2007) or when they felt the information systems policies were a 
nuisance or perceived to be irrelevant to them (Renaud, 2012; Sedighi et al., 2016). 
Siponen et al. (2014) identified employee failure to follow ISPs as a key threat to the 
security of an organization. An additional risk is that employees can make errors due to 
cognitive limitations, task demands, as well as organizational, social, or environmental 
factors (Dismukes et al., 2007; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017; Safa & Von Solms, 2016). Most 
of these studies have evaluated end-user ISP compliance intention. Behavioral 
compliance of UXA, however, can be even more crucial as the data housed on the back-
end UNIX servers frequently contains PHI, PII, financial data, or intellectual property 
(Beuchelt, 2017a; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007).  





organizations have not developed an effective ISKSprogram (Belsis et al., 2005; Flores et 
al., 2014; Safa & Von Solms, 2016). Additionally, organizational silos, where there is a 
rigid functional division between teams, can negatively impact social interaction and 
knowledge sharing (Oparaocha, 2016). The most effective way of increasing security 
knowledge sharing, and cyber skills is through effective SETA programs (Oltsik, 2017). 
Wash and Cooper (2018) found SETA programs to be the most effective means of 
changing the security behaviors of end-users. Bauer and Bernroider (2017), in assessing 
the impact of IS awareness on end-user compliance behavior, found that security 
awareness significantly positively influenced attitude toward compliance and provided a 
weak negative relationship to neutralizing behaviors. These studies have been limited to 
the effectiveness of SETA programs on ISP compliance of end-users. Although ISP 
compliance of UXA is crucial to protecting the organization’s data, it appears very little 
attention was provided in the literature review on the effectiveness of focused SETA 









The proposed research model, based on the literature review, can be found in 
Figure 1. It integrates the security knowledge sharing portion of the Information Security 
Organizational Knowledge Sharing Framework (Flores et al., 2014), cognitive heuristics 
and biases (Kahneman, 2011; Rhee et al., 2012; Tsohou et al., 2015; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 
2010; Guo et al., 2011; Ifinedo, 2012; Posey et al., 2015). 
Dissertation Goal 
The goal was to empirically assess the effect of a focused SETA workshop, an 
ISC, and periodic security update emails on UXAs’ knowledge sharing, use of cognitive 
heuristics, biases, threat appraisal, coping appraisal, and ISP compliance behavior.  
Research Question 
The following research question guided the investigation: 





UXAs, influence their ISKS, use of cognitive heuristics and biases, and ISP compliance 
behavior? 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
H1: Formal knowledge sharing arrangements, in the form of a focused SETA 
workshop and ISC, will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ use of the 
AH.  
H2: Formal knowledge sharing arrangements, in the form of a focused SETA 
workshop and ISC, will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ use of 
OB.  
H3: Formal knowledge sharing arrangements, in the form of a focused SETA 
workshop and ISC, will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ use of 
CB.  
H4a: The AH will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PS.  
H4b: The AH will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PV.  
H5a: OB will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PS.  
H5b: OB will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PV.  
H5c: OB will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’ IS CA-SE.  
H5d: OB will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’ IS CA-RE.  
H6a: CB will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PS.  
H6b: CB will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PV.  
H6c: CB will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’ IS CA-SE.  





H7a: UXAs security TA-PS will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’ 
ISP compliance behavior. 
H7b: UXAs security TA-PV will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’ 
ISP compliance behavior. 
H8a: UXAs’ security CA-RE will have a significant positive influence on their 
ISP compliance behavior. 
H8b: UXAs’ security CA-SE   will have a significant positive influence on their 
ISP compliance behavior. 
Relevance and Significance 
In 2019, in the United States the average cost of a single data breach was $8.19 
million, which included the costs of detection, notification, response, fines, litigation, and 
lost customer revenue (Ponemon Institute, 2019). In 2018, Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability (HIPAA) penalties and settlements levied on 18 healthcare systems 
and insurance companies totaled $13,501,400 (HIPAA Journal, 2020). Given the potential 
financial liabilities associated with data breaches and privacy violations it is imperative 
that healthcare organizations secure their computing resources by following the HIPAA 
and Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) 
guidelines.  
From November 2017 to October 2020 66,707,070 patient records have been 
breached in 50 states and the District of Columbia impacting physician practices, health 
plans, and hospitals (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil 
Rights, 2020). During the same period, server related incidents resulted in the loss of 





Office for Civil Rights, 2020). Server related incidents were due to hacking and IT 
incidents (89.7%), unauthorized access and disclosure (10.2%), and theft/loss/improper 
disposal (<1%) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 
2020). Server breaches were responsible for 75.4% of all healthcare PHI breaches from 
November 2017 to October 2020 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office 
for Civil Rights, 2020). These statistics demonstrate the importance for server 
administrators to consistently follow organizational ISP to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of healthcare systems, and the PII, and PHI contained therein. 
The complexity of the U.S. healthcare industry’s technology infrastructure, and 
the push toward widespread electronic sharing of PII/PHI, make securing servers and 
data crucial (Dixon, 2016; Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology, n.d.; Steinbrook, 2009; Thieme, 2016). The HIPAA Security Rule provided 
specifications and standards that covered entities should implement to help ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI (Koch, 2017). Three categories of 
safeguards including physical, administrative, and technological were defined to direct 
organizations in how best to protect PHI (Avancha, Baxi, & Kotz, 2012). Administrative 
safeguards include policies, procedures, and administrative actions related to security 
management, vulnerability and risk assessment, workforce security training, incident 
reporting, and contingency planning (Koch, 2017). Physical safeguards include facility 
access controls, computer controls, and device and media security controls (Avancha et 
al., 2012). Technical safeguards include access controls, audit controls, integrity 
management, authentication, and transmission controls for PHI (U.S. Department of 





and criminal penalties for the privacy violations (McFarland, 2012). These policies and 
guidelines, however, will not protect PII/PHI data if they are not properly implemented 
within the technical infrastructure (Dixon, 2016; Office of the National Coordinator for 
Health Information Technology, n.d.). Employees are frequently considered the weakest 
link in the IS chain (Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Gardner & Thomas, 2014).  
Cognitive heuristics are mental shortcuts that individuals use to quickly assess a 
situation and determine an adequate, though frequently flawed, conclusion (Kahneman, 
2011). Cognitive biases describe how information framing and context may influence 
decision making, which departs from normal rational theory (Gilovich & Griffin, 2013). 
The influence of heuristics and biases on decision making has been studied in many 
contexts; however, their use in the IS research has been minimal. There are a number of 
heuristics and biases that may negatively impact threat appraisal and coping appraisal 
including the AH, OB, the representativeness heuristic, the affect heuristic, and CB 
(Kahneman, 2011; Pennycook et al., 2013; Tsohou et al., 2015; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Use of these biases can result in inappropriately low judgment of risks and 
vulnerabilities as well as over inflated estimation of coping skills (Kahneman, 2011; 
Tsohou et al., 2015; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). With the proliferation of UNIX 
servers, understanding and addressing the cognitive heuristics and biases used by UXA 
may improve security awareness, enhance cyber skills, and increase compliance behavior 
thereby reducing healthcare organizations’ potential for data breaches.  
PMT was developed by Rogers (1975) to understand how fear appeals influenced 
health behaviors of patients. Rogers (1975) theorized that environmental and 





health. PMT is frequently used to understand compliance with ISPs and security 
procedures (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Safa et al., 2015; Siponen et al., 2014). Coping appraisal 
is an assessment of how the individual can cope with, adapt to, and change behavior to 
avoid danger (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). The factors related to coping appraisal 
include an individual’s CA-SE and CA-RE (Posey et al., 2015). CA-RE is an evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the proposed behavior to reduce the probability of the negative 
event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). CA-SE is the belief that one is capable of the 
adaptation necessary to mitigate the negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). 
Fear influences the evaluation of severity and vulnerability and indirectly influences 
behavioral intention (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Siponen et al. (2014) found 
perceived threat severity and TA-PV to be positively correlated with ISP compliance 
intention. Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1997) noted that there are numerous cognitive 
heuristics and biases that can influence both appraisal processes in the PMT model. UXA 
may perceive server threats as Windows problems leading to inappropriately low threat 
appraisal and excessively high coping appraisal. These erroneous cognitive assessments 
may lead UXA to resist ISP implementation on UNIX servers leaving their organizations 
at considerable risk. 
Posey et al. (2015) investigated the impact of SETA programs on PMT. SETA was 
positively correlated with both perceived threat severity and perceived CA-RE indicating 
that SETA programs are an effective way of encouraging secure behaviors (Posey et al., 
2015). Appropriately designed SETA programs can help reduce the human IS risk to 
organizational assets (Van Vuuren, 2016; Whitman & Mattord, 2012). Although 





of failures that result in IS breaches costing organizations substantial financial loss (Safa 
et al., 2016). The human aspects of IS must be understood to reduce the risk of IS 
breaches (Van Vuuren, 2016). Users’ ignorance, apathy, resistance, and mischievous 
nature can result in human error and cause IS breaches (Bélanger et al., 2017; Safa et al., 
2016). Compliance with ISP can help to mitigate IS risk (Ifinedo, 2014). Unfortunately, 
employee’s noncompliance with ISP is “the key threat” for organizational IS (Siponen et 
al., 2014, p. 217). Given the vulnerability of organizational data and the significance of 
human behavior in protecting data, developing an understanding of what factors 
encourage and discourage ISP compliance behavior will help to protect organizations 
(Bélanger et al., 2017; Carlton & Levy, 2015; Van Vuuren, 2016). 
It can be challenging to evaluate actual ISP compliance given the risk of social 
desirability bias that can occur in interviews and self-reported surveys (Redmiles et al., 
2017). There are techniques that can be used to remove the focus on the participant such 
as scenarios, which may provide better insight into non-conforming behavior (Crossler et 
al., 2013). When evaluating intention to perform security behaviors, researchers are 
challenged to determine if participants have responded with over or under-reported 
counts as compared to actual behaviors (Egleman & Peer, 2015). Given these risks, the 
present research studied actual secure behaviors rather than relying on self-reported 
intention to comply (Crossler et al., 2013). Developing a model that integrates SETA 
knowledge sharing, cognitive heuristics, and biases, and PMT provided insight into the 
effectiveness of a focused SETA workshop and ISC in improving UXA ISP compliance 
behavior.  





with UXA. Additionally, the effectiveness of an ISC was assessed to evaluate the impact 
on UXA ISP compliance behavior. Finally, this study investigated actual UXA ISP 
compliance behavior by evaluating key server security changes made by the 
administrators to their UNIX servers. These checks were done by running security checks 
on the servers. Boss et al. (2015) also found that intention differed significantly from 
actual implementation of security controls. Using security scans of security measures 
implemented by UXA following the SETA workshop and ISC afforded unique insights 
into the effectiveness of the training in terms of actual implementation of security 
controls and ISP compliance behavior. This research was needed as implementing 
mandated security and compliance with organization ISP is key to the successful 
protection of healthcare organizational assets, including patient PHI and PII (Koch, 2017; 
Ng et al., 2009). 
Barriers and Issues 
There are several barriers and issues that were addressed. First, establishing 
access to the UNIX servers for the baseline security metrics was challenging due to the 
limitations placed on root logins and accessing servers not owned by the researcher. 
Ultimately, many data points were successfully collected using the tools made available 
by the security team (i.e. Tenable, Splunk). For other metrics scripting was used to gather 
evaluated data points for each administrator’s servers. Second, engaging participation of 
the UXAs dispersed throughout the organization was challenging. Including the CISO, 
however, may mitigated this risk. Additionally, contacting the UXAs managers to advise 
them of the coming workshop and the potential benefits to their UXAs and the 





impact of scans and scripts run on servers. To minimize impact, scans and scripts were 
performed after hours and only after sufficient testing was completed to establish the 
server performance impact. 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
The following were assumptions for the present research: 
- Study participants participated in the workshop, ISC, and read the periodic 
security update emails. 
- Participants answered pre-experiment and post-experiment survey questions 
honestly. 
The following are the limitations for the present research: 
- The study was conducted in a single healthcare institution in the mid-Atlantic 
region of the US. 
- Males represented the majority of participants (97.6%). 
- The population size of 60 UXA was very small. Only 42 individuals completed all 
of the study protocols.  
Definition of Terms 
The following definitions are for terms used in the present research: 
Cognitive biases–Cognitive processes that allow individuals to make seemingly flawed 
decisions, which depart from normative rational theory of decision making (Gilovich & 
Griffin, 2013). 
Confidentiality–The property that ensures that information is not made available without 
the explicit permission or authorization from the information owner (Committee on 





Coping appraisal–A self-assessment of how an individual can cope with, adapt to, and 
change behavior to avoid some danger (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). The factors 
related to coping appraisal include an individual’s CA-SE and CA-RE (Posey et al., 
2015). 
Cybersecurity–The ability to protect cyberspace from potential cyber threats and attacks 
(Committee on National Standards, 2010). 
Cyberspace–The total of the global computing infrastructure including computing 
devices, the Internet, telecommunications devices, controllers, and embedded computing 
mechanisms (Committee on National Standards, 2010). 
Cognitive heuristics–Mental short cuts used to make inferences about situations 
(Gilovich & Griffin, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). The use of heuristics reduces cognitive 
load by eliminating the consideration of all causally relevant data (Kahneman, 2011; 
Toplak et al., 2011). 
Integrity–A property defining prevention of unauthorized medication of an entity 
(Committee on National Standards, 2010). 
Interactive Security Challenge–An online, interactive, security exercise running in a 
Linux VM with the goal of developing specific cybersecurity skills. 
Risk–A measure of the probability (likelihood) and impact (organizational functional, 
reputation, mission, assets, individuals) of a potential event on an organizational asset 
(Committee on National Standards, 2010; Meyers & Jernigan, 2018). 
Security controls–The technical, operational, and management safeguards defined to 
protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of an information system 





Systems administrator–Users with the highest privilege levels on servers that are 
responsible for operating system installation, configuration, patching, user management, 
monitoring, data backup, implementation of security controls, disaster recovery, and 
testing (Inshanally, 2018; Santara, 2013). 
Threat–An action that can be taken by a threat actor against a vulnerability (Meyers & 
Jernigan, 2018). Any event that can negatively impact an organization’s operation or 
components in an organization (people or property) or nation by destruction, 
modification, or unauthorized access (Committee on National Standards, 2010). 
Threat appraisal–An assessment of risk which includes the positive factors of extrinsic 
and intrinsic rewards offset by negative factors of the perceived severity and TA-PV to 
potential threats (Posey et al., 2015; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). 
UNIX–An interactive, highly portable, multiuser operating system developed by AT&T 
(Ritchie & Thompson, 1978).  
Vulnerability–A weakness in a computing asset that can be acted upon by a threat 
(Meyers & Jernigan, 2018). Weaknesses can occur in procedures, processes, controls, 
information systems, or implementations (Committee on National Standards, 2010). 
Acronyms 
The following acronyms are used in the present research: 
AC-Actual Compliance 
ACA–Affordable Care Act  
AH-Availability Heuristic 
ARRA–American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 







CET–Cognitive Evaluation Theory  
CRT–Cognitive Reflection Test 
CTF-Capture the Flag 
CVE-Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
CVSS-Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
EHRs–Electronic Health Records  
HIPAA–Health Insurance Portability and Accountability  
HITECH–Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health  
HTMT-Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio 
IS–Information Security 
ISC–Interactive Security Challenge  
ISKS-Information Security Knowledge Sharing 
ISP–Information Security Policy 
ISRMP–Information Security and Risk Management Plan  
IT-Information Technology 
NIST-National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NVD-National Vulnerability Database 
OB-Optimism Bias 
PHI–Protected Health Information 
PII–Personally Identifiable Information 





PMT–Protection Motivation Theory 
PWC-Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
SETA–Security Education, Training, and Awareness 
TA-PS-Threat Appraisal-Perceived Severity 
TA-PV-Threat Appraisal-Perceived Vulnerability 
TRA-Theory of Reasoned Action 
UXA-UNIX Administrator 
VIF-Variance Inflation Factor 
VMs–Virtual Machines 
Summary 
 UNIX servers, like their Windows counterparts, are vulnerable to IS breaches 
(CVE Details, 2020). Organizations are at substantial risk of employees do not follow 
ISPs and breaches occur (HIPAA Journal, 2020; Ponemon Institute, 2019; Yoo et al., 
2018). The use of cognitive heuristics and biases can negatively impact threat appraisal 
and coping appraisals (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Being blind to 
actual risks facing their servers can result in insufficiently protected UNIX servers due to 
failure to comply with ISPs (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017; 
Renaud, 2012). While generalized SETA programs are useful in organizations for staff-
wide training, developing a focused SETA program, ISC, and security update emails 
aimed specifically for the job tasks of UXA, improved engagement and ISP compliance 
(Chen et al., 2018; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). Additionally, this research helped to develop 
an understanding of how the SETA program, ISC, and security update emails influenced 





and following the SETA program, ISC, and security update emails, a true indication of 





Chapter 2  
Review of the Literature 
 
Overview 
Flores et al. (2014) as well as Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010) emphasized the 
importance of knowledge sharing processes in organizations. SETA workshops and 
online training provide formal means of ISKS within organization (Safa & Von Solms, 
2016). These processes provided a starting point for the present research’s cognitive 
model of ISP compliance. Security knowledge sharing processes are theorized to directly 
influence the three studied cognitive heuristics and biases used by the UXA (Kahneman, 
2003; Pennycook et al., 2013). Heuristics and biases influence threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal from PMT (Kahneman, 2011; Pachur et al., 2012; Rhee et al., 2012; Rogers & 
Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Tsohou et al., 2015). The key components of PMT, threat appraisal 
and coping appraisal, are significantly influenced by SETA programs and are therefore 
critical to research into ISP compliance (Safa et al., 2016). Finally, threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal influence UXA compliance behavior (Safa et al., 2016). The four key 
areas of study for this research include: SETA; heuristics and biases; PMT; and ISP 
compliance behavior. These four areas can help to develop a combined cognitive 
behavioral theory that can help understand the factors that influence UXA ISP 
compliance behavior.  
Security Education, Training and Awareness 
SETA programs are a means for organizations to minimize the risk of insider 





an important antecedent and positively influence IS behavior, and appropriately designed 
SETA programs can help reduce the human IS risk to organizational assets (D’Arcy et al., 
2009; Whitman & Mattord, 2012). Users are the weakest link for IS and SETA programs 
can help to reduce the potential attack surface of organizations by improving the ability 
of users to identify and prevent IS breaches (Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Gardner & Thomas, 
2014). Engaging and audience appropriate SETA programs positively influences IS CA-
SE and ISP compliance (Chen et al., 2018; Ifinedo, 2014; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). 
Effective SETA programs should increase awareness of organizational ISP, individual 
responsibilities, security risks, vulnerabilities as well as potential system monitoring and 
sanctions (Chen et al., 2018; D’Arcy et al., 2009). Generalized SETA programs, while 
helping to improve security conscience behavior, may not be as beneficial for highly 
technical server systems administrators (Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). Additionally, general 
SETA programs may not address specific security behaviors that are unique and crucial to 
server administrators (Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). Schroeder (2017) found that customized 
security training programs improved engagement and information retention. Tailoring 
SETA to the job responsibilities of the participants is key to a successful and well-
received program (Herold, 2011).  
The sharing of IS knowledge, experience, and insights can improve organizational 
performance and help to ensure the security of data (Safa & Von Solms, 2016). 
Development of a formal means for ISKS can help to foster sharing of ideas, experiences, 
tools, and processes to improve security and protect an organization’s information 
systems assets (Flores et al., 2014). Making users aware of the current and evolving IS 





propagate, and the potential impact to the organization is crucial to ISP compliance (Guo 
et al., 2011; Safa et al., 2016; Siponen et al., 2014). Dang-Pham et al. (2017) found that 
security awareness also improved the diffusion of IS practices (knowledge sharing) 
throughout the organization. Safa and Van Solms (2016) found that ISKS benefitted 
business, increased employee IS CA-SE, and improved ISP compliance.  
 The development of an ISKS culture is an important goal for any organization 
that has critical information systems assets (Flores et al., 2014; Razmerita et al,  2016; 
Safa & Van Solms, 2016). End-user education is important and developing knowledge 
sharing processes that include the IS team and UXA is crucial to any organization that has 
UNIX servers hosting business critical data (Bauer et al., 2017). It is beneficial to build 
both formal and informal knowledge sharing networks within organizations as they have 
been found to be significant contributors to awareness and mitigation of IS risks (Dang-
Pham et al., 2017; Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Yoo et al., 2018). Encouraging relationships 
between employees across team boundaries is also helpful to developing and enabling an 
effective social network that fosters knowledge sharing (Bauer et al., 2017; Ifinedo, 2014; 
Oparaocha, 2016). Connelly and Zweig (2015) found that distrust was a predictor of 
knowledge hiding behaviors, which are detrimental to effective knowledge sharing in 
organizations. Consequently, it is important to encourage trusting relationships between 
the IS team and the UXA for an effective ISKS culture (Dey & Mukhopadhyay, 2018; 
Rutten et al., 2016).  
 Posey et al. (2015) found that SETA programs were positively correlated with 
both perceived threat severity and CA-RE indicating that they are an effective way of 





the dynamic nature of IS threats and vulnerabilities (Posey et al., 2015). Yoo et al. (2018) 
found that the psychological flow factors including feedback, immersion, challenge, 
autonomy, and social interaction significantly improved psychological ownership and 
SETA program effectiveness. Yoo et al. (2018) suggested using relatable security 
scenarios that challenged employees could improve ownership and ISP compliance.  
Bauer et al. (2017), in a study of ISP compliance at banks, found that developing 
a comprehensive, multi-modal IS awareness program was key to successfully 
establishing an IS culture in an organization. The goal of their research was to define 
specific propositions that could be used by IS management in banks to establish and 
maintain an effective IS awareness (ISA) program (Bauer et al., 2017). Also, Bauer et al. 
(2017) sought to develop an understanding of how users’ perceptions of the ISA program 
influence their ISP compliance. The three banks studied had implemented ISA programs 
but with very different processes and procedures (Bauer et al., 2017). The most 
successful bank, in terms of IS awareness and employee engagement, conducted regular 
ISA campaigns using different modalities, which encouraged high levels of interaction 
and dissemination of critical security knowledge (Bauer et al., 2017). Bauer et al. (2017) 
found that some individuals used different neutralizing behaviors to justify ISP non-
compliance. The third bank Bauer et al. (2017) studied had just begun an ISA program 
and provided little insight into SETA effectiveness. Two primary areas of design for ISA 
were proposed by Bauer et al. (2017): structural design and communicational design. 
Recommendations relevant to this study include customizing the ISA programs toward 
the recipients and driving for two-way discussions about IS (Bauer et al., 2017). Bauer et 





help improve security awareness and compliance. This is relevant to the present study as 
it builds the foundation for the workshop, ISC, and security update emails. The study 
conducted by Bauer et al. (2017) evaluated the effectiveness of SETA on a general user 
population. The present research evaluated multimodal SETA on UXA. 
Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010) developed and tested IS workshops where 
security personnel acted as facilitators for end-users to discuss relevant security 
scenarios. This small group atmosphere lead to collaborative, two-way dialogs and 
fostered participation and collective reflection to gain insights from one another 
(Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010). Safa et al. (2016) found that knowledge sharing, 
collaboration, intervention, experience, commitment, and personal norms were all 
correlated to attitude toward compliance with ISP. Sedighi et al. (2016) found reputation, 
reciprocity, altruism, and knowledge CA-SE were all positively related to quantity and 
quality of knowledge sharing while effort and time were negatively related to both. Each 
of these studies demonstrated the need not only to develop customized SETA aimed at 
improving awareness but also to build relationships amongst participants and the 
organization (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2011; Safa et al., 2016; Sedighi et al., 2016). 
Organizations spend significant capital on SETA programs in the hopes of 
increasing employee ISP compliance and engagement, but employees continue to cause 
significant security breaches due to their failure to comply with ISP (Yoo et al., 2018). 
Managers need to understand what psychological antecedents may improve the 
effectiveness of SETA programs and increase employee compliance (Yoo et al., 2018). 
Yoo et al. (2018) sought to identify the factors that influence psychological flow and how 





components of flow (feedback, immersion, challenge, autonomy, and social interaction) 
all significantly influenced psychological ownership and SETA effectiveness (Yoo et al., 
2018). An important detail found by Yoo et al. (2018) was that training must be at an 
appropriate level to challenge but not overwhelm the participant to support engagement. 
Psychological ownership and SETA effectiveness significantly influenced security 
behavioral intention (Yoo et al., 2018). Yoo et al. (2018) suggested using relatable 
scenarios to help in connecting employees to the SETA content. Yoo et al. (2018) brought 
the concept of flow into the knowledge management realm in terms of the impact that 
flow has on SETA. The present research integrated relevant, real-world information into 
the workshop, ISC, and security update emails to assess the impact on UXA compliance 
behavior. 
Dang-Pham et al. (2017) noted that employee IS failures could lead to security 
breaches causing substantial financial loss for organizations. SETA programs are 
effective in reducing the cost of breaches but cannot eliminate the problem of employees 
not following ISP due to negligence or malicious intent (Dang-Pham et al., 2017). 
Developing a security knowledge sharing culture may help employees gain the IS 
knowledge, develop an informal knowledge sharing network, and further reduce breaches 
caused by human error (Dang-Pham et al., 2017). Encouraging regular interactions 
between employees is important as some ISKS occurs during those informal dialogs 
(Dang-Pham et al., 2017). Also, developing trusting relationships with individuals 
increased formal and informal sharing between employees (Dang-Pham et al., 2017). 
Educating users regarding the benefits of ISP compliance, rather than just how to comply 





(Dang-Pham et al., 2017). 
Ifinedo (2014) also studied ISP compliance and found that socialization, personal 
norms, social norms, CA-SE, and group dynamics positively influenced ISP compliance 
intention (Ifinedo, 2014). These results suggest that managers should encourage both 
formal and informal socialization of employees to increase trust and establish 
relationships that influence positive behaviors and discourage negative or malicious 
behaviors (Ifinedo, 2014). Developing a better understanding of the organizational and 
social factors that influence ISP compliance allows organizations to prepare for and 
encourage appropriate behavior to safeguard security. By adequately managing the IS 
knowledge and social norms of the organization managers can better control the 
antecedents of positive behavior while applying social pressure to curtail negative 
behavior. 
Chen et al. (2018) developed a model of ISP compliance based on an Awareness-
Motivation-Capacity perspective. The significant influencers of ISP compliance intention 
included IS awareness (awareness of the ISP and potential threats), capability to comply 
(CA-SE and controllability), and motivation to comply (penalty and reward) (Chen et al., 
2018). Educating employees about the importance of IS can be achieved through SETA 
programs (Chen et al., 2018; Dang-Pham et al., 2017). These same programs can also 
inform employees about the organizational ISP and introduce them to the potential 
security threats facing the organization (Chen et al., 2018).  
Development of interpersonal relationships and social networks are significant 
contributors to knowledge sharing within an organization (Oparaocha, 2016). SETA 





knowledge, the development of collaborative relationships, and the building of trust 
(Dang-Pham et al., 2017; Oparaocha, 2016). Supportive social networks can also improve 
relationships and encourage fostering of both cognitive-based and affective-based trust 
(Dey & Mukhopadhyay, 2018; Rutten et al., 2016). Trust is key for knowledge sharing 
relationships and the development of those relationships through an effective SETA 
program can be beneficial to the organization and encourage IS engagement and 
compliance (Dang-Pham et al., 2016; Safa & Von Solms, 2016).  
The benefits of developing SETA programs that are tailored specifically to the 
audience were demonstrated to improve both security awareness and ISP compliance 
(Bauer et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). Bauer et al. (2017) 
emphasized the effectiveness of multiple training modalities on the success of SETA. The 
present research focused on a UXA oriented SETA workshop, ISC, and security update 
emails to evaluate their effectiveness in improving UXA ISP compliance behavior.  
Cognitive Heuristics and Biases 
Kahneman (2011) referred to the two cognitive systems of decision making as 
System One and System Two. System One is the intuitive, implicit, involuntary, and 
nonverbal cognitive system (Kahneman, 2003). According to Kahneman (2003), intuitive 
judgments may harken to evolutionary history and occur “between the automatic 
operations of perception and the deliberate operations of reasoning” (p. 697). The 
intuitions provided by System One come to mind quickly with little reflection—they are 
automatic once a stimulus occurs (West et al., 2012). Intuitions, which rely on similarity 
and accessibility rather than true logic or probabilities, can be flawed due to the use of 





mental short cuts used to make inferences about situations, and they require a minimal 
amount of cognitive processing power (Gilovich & Griffin, 2013; Marsh et al., 2004; 
Roberts, 2004). As opposed to cognitively taxing, analytic means of solving a problem, 
heuristics, by their nature, do not guarantee a correct answer (Gilovich & Griffin, 2013; 
Roberts, 2004). Heuristics provide a means of finding an adequate solution to a problem 
without having to consider all possible causally relevant information (Marsh et al., 2004). 
Heuristics, however, help to reduce constrained working memory (Kahneman, 2011; 
Toplak et al., 2011). Examples of heuristics that influence decision making include 
anchoring, availability, illusion of pattern, subjective confidence, the law of small 
numbers, prediction by representativeness, and the illusion of understanding (Kahneman, 
2011).  
System Two, the reasoning and analytical system, is where deliberate thought 
occurs (Kahneman, 2011). System Two is activated whenever a problem presents itself to 
which System One cannot provide a fast and reasonable answer (Kahneman, 2011). 
Unfortunately, System One frequently will answer a difficult or challenging question with 
an associated question (heuristic) that is easier to draw from memory (Kahneman, 2003). 
Attribute substitution can allow System One to answer a question that was not asked 
resulting in faulty decision making (Gilovich & Griffin, 2013). One of System Two’s 
responsibilities is to monitor System One to ensure correct decisions are made 
(Kahneman, 2003). To reduce cognitive load, however, System Two may accept faulty 
System One responses due to what Kahneman (2011) terms lazy monitoring. If System 
Two is engaged it may reject potentially biased System One intuitions, but that activation 





individuals made aware of their use of heuristics were able to correct their intuitive 
judgments. Education and practice can improve the reliability of System One’s intuitions 
(Kahneman, 2003). An example of learned intuition can be found in chess masters who 
can quickly evaluate a chess board, analyze possible outcomes, and make moves 
seemingly instantaneously (Kahneman, 2003). Kahneman (2003) demonstrated that 
training improved intuition. This demonstrated the potential for improving the intuitive 
responses of UXA through an effective and engaging SETA workshop and ISC. 
Epstein (2014), in the field of cognitive psychology, defined the two cognitive 
systems as the experiential system and the rational system. The experiential system 
functions outside of an individual’s awareness and influences interpretation of feelings, 
behaviors, and events (Epstein, 2014). The experiential system is non-verbal, and 
activation requires minimal cognitive demand (Epstein, 2014). A key feature of the 
experiential system relevant to the current research is that it has the potential to learn 
from experience (Epstein, 2014). The rational system reflects an individual’s personal 
understanding of logic and is uniquely human (Epstein, 2014). It represents conscious 
reasoning, verbal thought, tends to be affect free, considers cause and effect, is slower 
processing, and requires higher cognitive load (Epstein, 2014).  
Toplak et al. (2011) analyzed the use of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to 
assess cognitive performance. They found that the CRT predicted an individual’s 
propensity toward cognitive errors (Toplak et al., 2011). Toplak et al. (2011) studied 
intelligence and working memory and found both were moderately predictive of rational 
thinking skills and cognitive performance. The conclusion was that the quick acceptance 





processing of System Two (Toplak et al., 2011). These findings are in line with 
Kahneman’s (2011) lazy monitoring performed by System Two. Toplak et al. (2011) 
warned that while the intuitive processing of System One may be useful it can also be 
dangerous due to the propensity to oversimplify problems and underestimate risk.  
Ferreira et al. (2006) investigated heuristic problem-solving skills to understand 
what actions might encourage System Two engagement. Using modified versions of 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) heuristic problem set, Ferreira et al. (2006) found that 
providing priming instructions to participants helped them to resist System One intuitions 
and engage System Two reasoning. Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2010) defined priming as an 
unconscious process that occurs when a current stimulus increases the availability (recall) 
of past associations. Increased use of System Two resulted in significantly improved 
performance on the heuristic problems (Ferreira et al., 2006).  
OB can result in dangerous neglect of risks (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012; Rhee et al., 
2012). OB leads one to assess situations in self-serving ways (Rhee et al., 2012). This 
fundamental underestimate of risk can enhance perceived invulnerability to negative 
events and lead to inappropriately low levels of safeguarding behaviors related to IS 
(Rhee et al., 2012). OB is a protective measure to protect the self, and reduce both 
anxiety and stress (Rhee et al., 2012). In a study of IS perceptions of technology 
executives, Rhee et al. (2012) found that they perceived security risks, but that OB 
allowed them to conclude that their organizations were at a much lower risk of security 
breach than other organizations. Rhee et al. (2012) suggested IS training is key to 
reducing OB and improving security practices within organizations. OB can also cause 





example, one may believe they are not at risk of intrusion and therefore not adequately 
protect personal privacy (Acquisti, 2004). In the present research, OB was studied to 
evaluate if it could be blinding UXA to the true threats facing their servers. Pfleeger and 
Caputo (2012) suggested OB reduces ISP compliance behavior but can be minimized by 
making SETA personally relevant to the learner. 
CB and OB are closely related and can significantly influence decision making 
(Kahneman, 2011). With CB, one gives greater validity to information that supports 
rather than contradicts one’s beliefs (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012; Sternberg, 2004). Tsohou 
et al. (2015) found that CB may lead individuals to believe that hackers are not 
sophisticated or inappropriately assess the security threats caused by nation states and 
organized crime. Kahneman (2011) identified CB as a System One heuristic and it is 
therefore easily activated when making decisions. System Two must be engaged to 
override CB but in most situations, individuals do not devote the cognitive energy to 
disprove their strongly held beliefs (Kahneman, 2011). The exaggeration of events in the 
news can reinforce CB and result in faulty assumption of risks-discounting risks with 
higher probabilities over risks that are more easily recalled (Kahneman, 2011). The 
prevalence of news related to Windows server breaches and vulnerabilities may 
erroneously confirm for the UXA that their servers are not at risk and they may discount 
any evidence to the contrary. Pfleeger and Caputo (2012) suggested that providing “an 
arsenal of evidence” may be necessary to counter confirmation biased thinking (p. 606). 
To judge the frequency or probability of an event an individual may assess the 
availability of associations related to the event (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012; Tversky & 





to estimate a probability based on the ease that one recalls occurrences of a similar event, 
termed the AH (Kahneman, 2011; Kliger & Kudryavtsev, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). In assessing how the AH influenced individual’s judgment of risks, Pachur et al. 
(2012) found that the AH significantly influenced perceived risk. Since a question about 
frequency is difficult to answer, an easier question is substituted (i.e., how easily can 
examples of the event be recalled) (Kahneman, 2011). If examples come to mind easily, 
the frequency is estimated to be high and if examples are difficult to imagine the 
frequency is assumed to be low (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). System One does not 
typically have the means to properly apply probability theory and the reliance on 
availability as an assessment of actual probability can lead individuals to faulty 
evaluations of risk (Kahneman, 2011). If UXA employed the AH they may be incorrectly 
assessing a lower security risk to their servers because they more easily recall data 
breaches, security alerts, or reported fixes associated with Windows servers. Without a 
correct assessment of potential risks, the UXA may not have perceived the true threat 
severity or threat vulnerabilities to their servers. This bias can potentially result in 
insufficiently secured servers, leaving them at higher risk of breach. Pfleeger and Caputo 
(2012) suggested that developing SETA that is vivid and provides personally relatable 
examples of breaches may improve ISP compliance behavior. 
Kahneman’s (2011) work has had significant influence on the finance industry in 
researching investment decisions, but using his concepts in the IS area, has been limited. 
Heuristics and biases associated with the dual-process theory are applicable to the IS 
realm given that they may influence UXA decisions. System One’s automatic and 





System One tends to best-guess answers to questions with available data even when that 
data is not completely relevant to the posed question (Pennycook et al., 2013; West et al., 
2012). Kahneman (2011) referred to this as the shotgun effect. Another potential area of 
concern is the way that System One deals with ambiguities and competitive hypotheses 
eliminating options before cognitive awareness (Kahneman, 2003). When System Two is 
not actively monitoring System One, to assess the validity of the decisions, errors may 
occur (Kahneman, 2011; Toplak et al., 2011). Building on Kahneman’s (2011) heuristics 
and biases work in assessing risk, this study investigated how cognitive heuristics and 
biases influenced UXA decisions regarding security threat appraisal, coping appraisal, 
CA-SE, and CA-RE. Security risks and threat vectors in IS continue to evolve (Caballero, 
2013). It is crucial to have competent and engaged UXAs that acknowledge the security 
threats and work diligently to mitigate the risks to their servers (Caballero, 2013).  
Based on the prior research noted above, simple unconscious acceptance of 
System One responses may cause UXA to underestimate risks and vulnerabilities facing 
their servers. By better understanding what heuristics impact how decisions are made, 
what biases may result, and learning how to encourage System Two processing, 
organizations may be better prepared to manage their administrators and reduce security 
risks (Kahneman, 2011; Pennycook et al., 2013; West et al., 2012). 
Protection Motivation Theory 
PMT is frequently used to understand compliance with ISPs and security 
procedures (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Safa et al., 2015; Siponen et al., 2014). PMT was 
initially proposed by Rogers (1975) to help understand how health behaviors were 





that influenced behavioral change include environmental data (verbal persuasion and 
observational learning) and intrapersonal data (personality and prior experience). These 
sources are evaluated through a cognitive mediation process that assesses the threat and 
coping potential which leads to adaptive or maladaptive coping behaviors (Rogers & 
Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Threat appraisal includes the positive factors of extrinsic and 
intrinsic rewards offset by negative factors of the TA-PS and TA-PV to potential threats 
(Posey et al., 2015; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Vance et al., 2012). Coping appraisal 
is an assessment of how the individual can cope with, adapt to, and change behavior to 
avoid the danger (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Vance et al., 2012). The factors related 
to coping appraisal include an individual’s CA-SE and CA-RE (Posey et al., 2015). CA-
RE is an evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed behavior to reduce the 
probability of the negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Vance et al., 2012). 
CA-SE is the belief that one is capable of the adaptation necessary to mitigate the 
negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). TA-PS is an evaluation of the potential 
physical, psychological, social, or economic harm an individual expects may occur 
(Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). TA-PV is an assessment of probability a negative event 
will occur if no changes are made to the individual’s behavior (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 
1997; Vance et al., 2012). Fear influences the evaluation of severity and vulnerability and 
indirectly influences behavioral intention (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Siponen et al. 
(2014) found TA-PS of threat and TA-PV to be positively correlated with ISP compliance 
intention. Appropriate threat appraisal can be manifest through increased knowledge and 
awareness of IS risks, vulnerabilities, and organizational policies and procedures 





2014). Coping appraisal can be also be positively influenced by ISKS and awareness 
(Safa et al., 2015; Siponen et al., 2010). Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1997) noted that 
there are numerous cognitive heuristics and biases that can influence both appraisal 
processes in the PMT model. Cognitive heuristics can lead to cognitive biases and 
influence daily decision-making without our awareness (Kahneman, 2011). As such, it is 
important to understand how heuristics and biases influenced the threat appraisal of UXA 
and design awareness and training programs that encourage System Two processing. If 
threats are perceived as “Windows problems” the precognitive choice to resist ISP 
implementation on UNIX servers may put the organization at considerable risk.  
In a study of home computer users, Hanus and Wu (2016) evaluated how 
awareness, a potential antecedent of desktop security behavior, influenced user’s security 
actions. Hanus and Wu (2016) extended PMT by defining the multi-dimensional 
construct of awareness (threat awareness and countermeasure awareness) to understand 
how awareness may influence desktop security behaviors. The goal of this study was to 
determine if threat awareness and countermeasure awareness, as antecedents of PMT, 
influence desktop security behavior (Hanus & Wu, 2016). Hanus and Wu (2016) 
demonstrated that research into the antecedents of PMT can provide a clearer picture into 
security behavior. Hanus and Wu (2016) identified both threat awareness and 
countermeasure awareness as key points for training to improve desktop security 
behavior. Hanus and Wu (2016) acknowledged that there may be a hidden variable that 
influences the relationship between threat awareness and TA-PV that has not been 
discovered through existing research. Hanus and Wu (2016) demonstrated how PMT can 





training and knowledge management within an organization (Bauer et al., 2017; Dang-
Pham et al., 2017).  
Bélanger et al. (2017) in a study of early adopter password compliance, found that 
perceived threat severity and perceived threat vulnerability were positively related to 
attitude toward ISP change. Organizational triggers and ISP awareness had a positive 
correlation with attitude and intention to comply (Bélanger et al., 2017). Interestingly, 
Bélanger et al. (2017) found that subjective norm and CA-SE did not significantly 
influence intention to conform to ISP for early adopters. The inclusion of perceived threat 
severity and perceived threat vulnerability from PMT was crucial to understanding the 
antecedents to attitude and intention (Bélanger et al., 2017).  
Posey et al. (2015), investigated the impact of SETA programs on PMT. 
Specifically, Posey et al. (2015), evaluated constructs frequently unused when applying 
PMT to IS contexts, including response costs, intrinsic and extrinsic maladaptive 
behaviors, and fear. The goal of the research by Posey et al. (2015) was to fully test PMT 
in an IS context adding SETA as an antecedent and organizational commitment as a 
moderating variable to better understand IS behavior. SETA was positively correlated 
with both perceived threat severity and perceived CA-RE indicating that SETA programs 
are an effective way of encouraging IS behavior (Posey et al., 2015). Appropriately 
designed SETA programs can help reduce the human IS risk to organizational assets (Van 
Vuuren, 2016; Whitman & Mattord, 2012).  
Safa et al. (2015) conducted research to identify the factors that influence user’s 
IS conscious behavior with antecedent factors of IS awareness, organizational policy, 





IS risk (Safa et al., 2015). The study found that by increasing a user’s awareness of risks 
and vulnerabilities, improvements in attitude and IS conscious behavior can be achieved 
(Safa et al., 2015). Additionally, engaging users in the process of securing their systems, 
and educating them regarding potential threats improves threat appraisal and CA-SE and 
positively influences IS conscious behavior (Safa et al., 2015). Knowledge sharing and 
collaboration are key components of this model in terms of IS awareness, organizational 
policy (and communication), involvement, engagement, and behavior (Safa et al., 2015). 
Vance et al. (2012) suggested that developing SETA programs that make participants 
aware of cybersecurity threats, the importance of ISP compliance, and the role that 
employees play in maintaining the security and integrity of organizational data will help 
to improve proper threat appraisal, coping appraisal, CA-SE, and CA-RE. Accordingly, 
the present research developed a SETA workshop, an ISC, and six security update emails 
that make UXA aware of threats and risks to encourage proper evaluation of CA-SE and 
threat appraisal. 
One of the challenges in ISP compliance studies that use PMT noted by Boss et al. 
(2015) is the focus on intention rather than actual behavior. Boss et al. (2015) found few 
studies had been conducted that evaluated actual secure behaviors (Boss et al., 2015). 
Intention frequently differed from actual implementation of security controls (Boss et al., 
2015). Boss et al. (2015) conducted four field experiments to evaluate PMT in the context 
of IS and found that the strength of the fear appeal significantly influenced compliance 
intention and behavior. The present research used security scans and other tools to verify 






Information Security Policy Compliance 
Although organizations spend considerable money on IS technology, users are 
still a major source of failures that result in IS breaches costing organizations substantial 
financial loss (Safa et al., 2016). ISPs elucidate the required security processes employees 
must follow to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational IT 
resources (D’Arcy & Lowry, 2019; Van Vuuren, 2016). ISPs include formalized 
procedures, guidelines, and technical controls that employees must follow to meet 
organizational security requirements (Cram et al., 2017; Lowry & Moody, 2015). The 
human aspects of IS must be understood to reduce the risk of IS breaches (Van Vuuren, 
2016). Users’ ignorance, apathy, resistance, or mischievous nature may result in human 
error and allow IS breaches to occur (Bélanger et al., 2017; Safa et al., 2016). 
Compliance with ISP can help to mitigate IS risk (Ifinedo, 2014). Employee 
noncompliance with ISP remains as a threat to organizational IS (Siponen et al., 2014). 
Given the critical nature of organizational data and the significance of human behavior in 
protecting data, developing an understanding of what factors encourage and discourage 
ISP compliance may help to protect organizations (Bélanger et al., 2017; Carlton & Levy, 
2015; Van Vuuren, 2016).  
Researchers have developed many theoretical models to understand ISP 
compliance. Siponen et al. (2014) combined PMT, the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(TRA), and Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) to develop an integrated theory that 
better explains end user ISP compliance intention. They found that awareness of security 
vulnerabilities and risks improved ISP compliance intention (Siponen et al., 2014). 





in the IS context (Blythe et al., 2015; Crossler et al., 2013).  
Safa et al. (2016) sought to identify the factors that influence ISP attitude toward 
compliance and found that ISKS, collaboration, intervention, commitment, and personal 
norms all significantly influenced attitude toward compliance and behavioral intention 
(Safa et al., 2016). Like Siponen et al. (2014), a key limitation of the study conducted by 
Safa et al. (2016) was that they only evaluated behavioral intention not actual IS 
compliance behavior.  
Many studies have assessed ISP compliance intention using surveys (Dang-Pham 
et al., 2017; Ifinedo, 2014; Safa et al., 2016; Yoo et al. 2018). Using this method to assess 
actual ISP compliance behavior is suspect due to the potential for social desirability 
biased self-reporting (Crossler et al., 2013; Redmiles et al., 2017). Crossler et al. (2013) 
suggested several potential techniques to minimize this risk including scenarios, 
hypothetical situations, longitudinal studies, and field experiments. Assessing compliance 
intention using a subjective, self-reported survey, while easier for the researcher, does not 
afford a true assessment of compliance behavior (Blythe et al., 2015). An objective 
measure of compliance is more challenging but can afford a better understanding of 
actual ISP compliance (Blythe et al., 2015). Given these risks, it is preferred to study 
actual IS behavior rather than relying on self-reported intention to comply to develop 
valid and reliable behavioral models (Crossler et al., 2013). The present study 
operationalized the UXA’s actual security compliance behavior via quantifiable measures 
that were determined via Tenable Nessus dashboard data, Splunk data, or 
programmatically via script. 





server vulnerabilities (Fashoto et al., 2018; Haber & Hibbert, 2018). Vulnerability scans 
can identify weaknesses in systems and applications so that systems administrators can 
eliminate or mitigate them thereby reducing risk of breaches (Fashoto et al., 2018; 
Samtani et al., 2016). The types of information gathered by scans include errors in 
design, implementation, coding, or configuration that can be exploited by threat actors 
(Haber & Hibbert, 2018). Passive scans can be used to listen to network traffic and intuit 
conclusions about systems actively communicating on the network (Haber & Hibbert, 
2018). These external scans, however, are limited in the amount of data they can collect 
about servers and can provide erroneous results (Brotherston & Berlin, 2017; Tenable, 
2019). Active scans can be credentialed or uncredentialed and actively access the target to 
assess potential vulnerabilities (Asadoorian, 2010; Helms et al., 2017; Jetty & Rahalkar, 
2019; Meyers & Jernigan, 2018). Uncredentialed scans mimic what attackers may see as 
exploitable vulnerabilities, but they identify significantly less of an asset’s true 
vulnerabilities (Brotherston & Berlin, 2018; Haber & Hibbert, 2018). A credentialed 
vulnerability scan uses valid user credentials to authenticate to a server and preform 
commands to gather detailed information about the server (Asadoorian, 2010; 
Brotherston & Berlin, 2017; Helms et al., 2017). Credentialed scans allow for detailed 
server and application patch analysis, as well as a thorough evaluation of user, password, 
and directory settings (Asadoorian, 2010). Credentialed scans can also assess 
configuration settings, identify local software exposures, detect malware, and perform 
database testing (Meyers & Jernigan, 2018; Tenable, 2019). In a study comparing 
credentialed and uncredentialed scans Fashoto et al. (2018) found credentialed scans 





scans provide a more complete picture of the vulnerabilities and the attack surface of the 
target servers (Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019). Additionally, credentialed scans can perform 
more tests and provide more accurate results (Tenable, 2019). Haber and Hibbert (2018) 
suggested that vulnerability scanning should be performed on all servers within an 
organization due to the risk an attacker can breach one server and move laterally 
throughout an enterprise’s network.  
Tenable Nessus is one of the most popular enterprise vulnerability assessment 
tools available (Helms et al., 2017; Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019; Meyers & Jernigan, 2018; 
Samtani et al., 2016). Nessus can perform safe scans, intrusive scans, policy compliance 
tests, detailed patch audits, client-side software vulnerability testing, service discovery, 
port discovery, password checking, database authentication testing, and provide 
remediation information (Asadoorian, 2010; Tenable, 2019). Nessus has 80,000+ plugins, 
written in Nessus Attack Scripting Language, that can analyze server configurations and 
identify vulnerabilities (Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019; Samtani et al., 2016). Each plugin 
contains information on the specific vulnerability, remediation actions, and an algorithm 
for testing for the vulnerability (Tenable, 2019).  
Nessus can classify vulnerabilities using the Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System (CVSS), which includes a base score, temporal metric, and exploitability metric 
(Haber & Hibbert, 2018; Tenable, 2019). CVSS is a common severity rating system for 
classifying IS threats (Brotherston & Berlin, 2017). The CVSS base score includes 
ratings of vulnerabilities based on access complexity, access vector, privileges required, 
and authentication method (Haber & Hibbert, 2018). CVSS temporal metrics include the 





The CVSS exploitability metric indicates the maturity of the vulnerability and indicates if 
it is unproven, proof of concept, functional, or high (Haber & Hibbert, 2018; Jetty & 
Rahalkar, 2019). The resulting CVSS rating is a score from one to 10 indicating the risk 
the vulnerability presents (Haber & Hibbert, 2018; Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019). Quantitative 
CVSS scores can be translated into standardized qualitative severity ratings (First.org, 
n.d.). A CVSS score from 0.1 to 3.9 represents a low severity rating, from 4.0 to 6.9 
represents a medium, 7.0 to 8.9 represents a high, and 9.0-10.0 is critical (First.org, n.d.). 
By performing credentialed vulnerability assessments, Tenable Nessus can 
identify the security vulnerabilities on target servers (Tenable, 2019). Creating a baseline 
assessment of a server can help to delineate server and configuration changes made by 
administrators between the successive scans (Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019). In the present 
study, Tenable scans, Splunk scans, and scripts were run prior to the SETA workshop, 
ISC, and security update emails to establish a baseline on key elements that were 
presented during the training. Three months following completion of the workshop, ISC, 
and security update emails another round of scanning was run to assess actual security 
changes implemented on participant’s servers.  
Summary 
Based on a review of the literature, there are several notable gaps that this study 
investigated. First, research on ISP compliance has focused primarily on end-user 
compliance intention (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Dang-Pham et al., 2017; Hanus & 
Wu, 2016; Ifinedo, 2012; Safa et al., 2016). It was crucial, however, to understand the 
determinants of server administrator ISP compliance behavior to better ensure the 





Second, this study focused on formal knowledge sharing arrangements from the security 
knowledge-sharing framework developed by Flores et al. (2014). Specifically, this 
research investigated how a SETA workshop, designed specifically for UXA, affects 
ISKS, use of heuristics and biases, and ISP compliance behavior. Concentrating on this 
specific user group for education was unique and helped to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
workshop that encouraged collaboration, knowledge sharing, and use UXA related 
scenarios. Third, cognitive heuristics can lead to biased decision making and biased 
evaluation of IS threats and risks (Kahneman, 2011; Pachur et al., 2012; Rhee et al., 
2012; Toplak et al., 2011; Tsohou et al., 2015). The inappropriate use of heuristics may 
prevent UXA from correctly assessing the risks to their servers, which may reduce ISP 
compliance behavior. SETA programs can be an effective means of reducing bias and 
improving security behaviors (Rhee et al., 2012; Wash & Cooper, 2018). It was crucial to 
learn how to reduce the use of cognitive heuristics to minimize biased decisions. Fourth, 
PMT has been established as an effective model for evaluating ISP compliance intention 
and behavior (Boss et al., 2015; Johnston et al., 2015). SETA programs have positively 
influenced threat appraisal and coping appraisal (Posey et al., 2015). They have also been 
established as precursors of compliance intention and behavior (Boss et al., 2015; 
Siponen et al., 2014). While Posey et al. (2015) integrated SETA and PMT, their focus 
was limited to end-user behavioral intention. Also, Posey et al. (2015) did not include the 
influences of heuristics, and biases on SETA effectiveness. Finally, while behavioral 
intention is frequently taken as an indicator of behavior, it was noted by Crossler et al. 
(2013), that actual behavior may not follow reported intention due to biased self-





implementation of security controls. Comparing baseline and post-intervention security 
scans allowed the present research to analyze security measures implemented by UXA 
and this afforded unique insights into the effectiveness of the training in terms of actual 
implementation of security controls and ultimately ISP compliance behavior. This 
research was needed as implementing mandated security and compliance with 
organization ISP is key to the successful protection of healthcare organizational assets, 









 This chapter presents the research design, instrument development, approach, 
population, sampling, data collection, and data analysis used to assess the influence of the 
SETA workshop, ISC, and security update emails on UXAs use of cognitive heuristics, 
biases, and ultimately ISP compliance behavior. Additionally, reliability and validity of 
the instrument was addressed. 
Research Design 
This quantitative research was conducted in a pretest and posttest design. 
Participants completed the survey (Appendix A) prior to and following the intervention 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). They participated in the new SETA workshop and an ISC 
(Appendix B). Bauer et al. (2017), in a study of ISP compliance at banks, found that 
developing a comprehensive, multi-modal IS awareness program was key to successfully 
establishing an IS culture in an organization. Caballero (2013) also found that combining 
multiple formats for SETA (i.e. computer-based training, simulators, phishing email 
campaigns, face-to-face training) into highly customized, job specific job programs was 
key to increasing secure behaviors.  
The SETA workshop focused on increasing awareness of cyber risks, 
vulnerabilities, and presented specific security recommendations for UXA’s servers 
(Beuchelt, 2017a; Inshanally, 2018; US Department of Health and Human Services, 





used to prioritize the top 12 security strategies that were relevant to server administration. 
This document prioritized IS risk based on the likelihood, risk, and potential 
organizational impact. Specifically, the ISRMP identified the following critical server 
management areas: patch management (operating system, microcode, and third-party 
apps), vulnerability analysis (extensive Tenable and Accunetix scanning), privileged 
account and access management (password requirements and multifactor authentication), 
centralized log management (Splunk), and developing administrator’s digital forensics 
skills. 
The SETA workshop was conducted online via a secure Zoom meeting and 
included IS team members, and UXA within the organization. A total of 50 UXA from 
multiple departments participated. Six additional individuals participated including the 
CISO, the director of Engineering Services, as well as several network security team 
members and two database administrators. The workshop encouraged connection, 
collaboration, discussion, and ISKS between the participants (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 
2010). The overarching goal of this workshop was to improve UXA ISP compliance 
behavior. This was accomplished by increasing participant awareness of the current state 
of cyber-attacks, the costs associated with data breaches, the growing list of software 
vulnerabilities, types and motivations of perpetrators, and how to best mitigate cyber 
vulnerabilities for their servers. The security workshop introduced UXA to available 
reports and online resources that they can use to increase and maintain their awareness of 
the current state of cyber threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. The workshop demonstrated 
the need for constant monitoring of vulnerabilities and ultimately the vital need to secure 





to several penetration testing tools including nmap, Wireshark, and the Metasploit 
Framework. By learning to utilize tools used by penetration testers, the workshop and 
ISC provided UXAs additional resources that can be used to test and secure their servers 
effectively which may increase ISP compliance behavior. The material for the workshop 
was reviewed by the organization’s CISO for content. Modifications to the content were 
made based on the feedback from the CISO to further align the material with the 
cybersecurity goals of the organization and tailor the material to the unique role of UXAs.  
The learning objectives for the SETA workshop were: By the end of this 
workshop, the participants will:  
1) Help maintain  by:  
a. Discussing the scope and impact of data breaches, 
b. Learning about key websites that provide critical and timely information 
about software and hardware vulnerabilities, 
i. Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (Verizon, 2019), 
ii. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (n.d.), 
iii. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil 
Rights Breach Portal, 
iv. National Vulnerability Database. 
c. Identifying different types of cyber attackers and their motivations, 
d. Learning about cyber-attacks made against our organization, 
e. Discussing the cost of a HIPAA breach, 
f. Discussing our implementation of Defense in Depth 





ii. Security Event/Information Management (SIEM), 
iii. Identity and rights management, 
iv. Anti-phishing campaigns, 
v. Advanced endpoint protection, 
vi. Threat intelligence, 
vii. Behavioral analytics, 
viii. Penetration testing, 
ix. Cyber forensics. 
2) Help participants mitigate security risk for their servers by: 





iv. Escalate privilege, 
v. Lateral movement, 
vi. Anti-forensics,  
vii. Denial of service, 
viii. Data exfiltration. 
b. Discussing the types of cyber attackers 
i. Cyber criminals – identity theft and financial fraud with goal of 
monetary gain, 





iii. Brokers – uncover vulnerabilities in software or systems and sell 
the information, 
iv. Insiders – employees, partners, and contractors motivated by 
perceived wrong, 
v. Competitors – individuals and organizations seeking to gain 
competitive advantage, 
vi. Cyberterrorists – disable and disrupt network or computing 
infrastructure, 
vii. Organized crime – highly funded, high-level of skill, seek financial 
gain, 
viii. Hacktivists – political, social, or principle-based agenda, 
ix. State-sponsored attackers / nation state – highly funded and skilled, 
intelligence gathering or service disruption, focus is government 
interests. 
c. Identifying the top threats and risks facing our organization’s servers, 
i. Key threats and vulnerabilities  
1. Compromised credentials and privilege escalation, 
2. Web service exploitation, 
3. Server vulnerabilities that permit remote code execution, 
4. Cryptography weaknesses, 
5. Deserialization, 
6. Scripting, 





ii. Key exploits facing servers 
1. Buffer and stack overflows, 
2. Memory corruption, 
3. Race conditions, 
4. SQL injection. 
d. Identifying 12 activities, settings, and tools participants can use to improve 
the safety and security of their servers, 
i. Minimize services / disable unwanted services / limit open ports to 
reduce vulnerabilities and attack vectors, 
ii. Remove unnecessary software to reduce the number of 
vulnerabilities and potential attack vectors, 
iii. Keep Linux/UNIX kernel and other software as up to date as 
possible, 
iv. Ensure strong password policies and account management, 
v. Kernel hardening to protect against attacks, 
vi. Configure the server’s local firewall, 
vii. Disk security – file integrity checking, file system encryption, 
viii.  Configure SSH security settings, 
ix. Implement Security Enhanced Linux, 
x. Configure centralized log management, 
xi. Perform monthly vulnerability scans on servers, 
xii. Run Malware detection software to detect worms, viruses, and 





e. Learning about available enterprise tools and other locally administered 
tools participants can use for vulnerability analysis and security 
monitoring. 
3) See how to perform basic penetration testing and server analysis using common 
tools by: 
a. Using nmap for enumeration, scanning, and vulnerability analysis on 
servers, 
i. Ping scan, 
ii. Version scan, 
iii. Vulnerability scan. 
b. Using Wireshark for network traffic analysis for security monitoring and 
problem resolution, 
i. Search and filter options, 
ii. Protocol inspection, 
iii. Live network traffic capture, 
iv. Offline network traffic analysis 
c. Using the Metasploit Framework in action and its utility to identify, 
enumerate, and exploit a server 
i. Reconnaissance & Scanning/Enumeration, 
ii. Exploitation demo: 
1. VSFTPD, 
2. Ssh, 






4) Access a cloud-based Cyber lab to: 
a. Get hands-on experience using nmap and the Metasploit Framework 
(MSF) in a secure, cloud-based virtual environment, 
b. Identify, enumerate, breach, and exploit a Linux VM using MSF tools, 
c. Compete to find the most flags on the Linux target machine. 
5) Connect with other UNIX administrators to increase knowledge sharing and 
collaboration: 
a. Joining a new Microsoft Team’s Team for UXA in the organization. 
The ISC immediately followed the workshop provided hands on experience using 
security tools in an environment that was both remote and secure. The module utilized 
Linux VMs and consisted of challenges associated with locating, enumerating, and 
exploiting a server. EDURange (2019) provides cloud-based resources for security 
education of students and researchers. A new EDURange scenario was developed as part 
of this study and provided a secure, remote, cloud-based environment where the UXA 
performed penetration testing. Providing hands-on security experience has been found to 
increase participant engagement, improve retention, and encourage ISP compliance 
behavior (Bauer et al., 2017; Caballero, 2013).  
For the ISC module, two Linux VMs were instantiated for every 10 participants: a 
participant VM (meta_nat) and a target metasploitable3 server (metasploitable) (Figure 
2). The private IP addresses for these servers were 10.0.37.6, and 10.0.20.4 respectively. 
The public IP address, which is the gateway into the environment, varied and was defined 





email with the login information needed to access the ISC. This included the public 
network address, as well as a unique user id and password. Additionally, participants 
received an instruction sheet (Appendix C) that provided some materials from the 




The learning objectives for the ISC module are: By the end of the ISC, the 
participants will: 
1) be able to perform network reconnaissance, server enumeration, port and service 
enumeration using nmap to identify a vulnerable Linux server on an isolated 
network, 
2) be able to use the Metasploit framework on a Linux VM, 
3) be able to identify a relevant exploit to use to gain command line access to a 
Linux server, 
4) be able to locate, download, and hash Capture the Flag (CTF) target files. 
For this module, participants scanned the network segment using nmap to perform 
a ping sweep and identify the target server. Participants then used a nmap version scan to 





(metasploitable). Next, participants used the Metasploit framework to search for and 
identify potential exploits for the target VM. Finally, participants exploited a vulnerability 
and breached the Metasploitable VM. Once participants gained access to the VM they 
located, downloaded, decoded, and hashed CTF target files.  
Following the workshop, every three weeks, UNIX security update emails were 
sent to each participant (Appendix D). A total of four UNIX security update emails were 
sent to participants during the study. These emails provided an update regarding recently 
identified vulnerabilities, relevant CERT alerts, recent breach announcements, as well as 
an invitation to join the new Microsoft Teams group set up for collaboration. In August, 
two additional emails were sent to provide UXAs additional information about Tripwire 
and Rootkit Hunter applications. These emails included installation, configuration, and 
testing information to expose the UXAs to these tools that were presented during the 
workshop. The goals of the security update emails were to maintain current cybersecurity 
awareness, increase security knowledge sharing, and reinforce security recommendations 
made during the workshop.  
Finally, three months after the workshop, an email was sent to the participants to 
complete the online survey. Additionally, the participants servers were reanalyzed to 
quantify the changes made by the UXA during the study and evaluate the effectiveness of 
the workshop, ISC, and UNIX security update emails.  
Instrument Development and Validation 
The survey instrument was developed based on prior research and augmented 
with researcher-developed questions for the AH, CB, and OB. Questions for CA-SE, CA-





used by Safa and Von Solms (2016), Moqbel and Bartelt (2015), Ifinedo (2012, 2014), 
Hanus and Wu (2016), Rhee et al. (2012), Siponen et al. (2014), and Safa et al.(2016). As 
a courtesy, a request was sent to each of the researcher teams asking permission to 
modify and use their questions in the present research. All acknowledged the request and 
provided their permission to modify and use their questions in the present research survey 
(Appendix E).  
The survey was pilot tested (Appendix F) with sixteen individuals who evaluated 
the flow of the survey, the wording of the questions, as well as the reliability and validity 
of the instrument. The experts consisted of four professors with doctoral degrees, nine 
doctoral student researchers, and four IS field experts. The reviewers’ backgrounds 
included the fields of IS, information systems, IT, decision science, UNIX administration, 
and information assurance. Participant reviewers used Qualtrics to analyze the survey and 
provide feedback. Based on their responses, several modifications were made. Regarding 
survey flow, the number of survey blocks was reduced, a progress bar was added, and the 
back button was removed. Regarding the CB questions, the instruction was modified, the 
time for responses was increased, and the format of the choices was changed. Regarding 
content, several questions were removed, and several questions were modified for clarity 
as well as consistency. Finally, one additional question was added for TA-PV. The final 
survey consisted of 25 questions and was administered to participants online using the 
Qualtrics Survey tool. Questions 1-23 used a seven-point Likert scale: strongly disagree 
(1), disagree (2), somewhat disagree (3), neither agree nor disagree (4), somewhat agree 
(5), agree (6), strongly agree (7). The selection of a seven-point Likert with a central 





used in SEM as an approximation of an interval measurement. Table 1 provides a detailed 
listing of the constructs used in the research model, the indicators used in the survey, the 
question numbers associated to each indicator in the survey, and the sources of the survey 
items. The demographic question related to age was based on Super’s career stages ages 
of exploration, establishment, mid-career, late-career, and decline (Gothard et al., 2001). 
Table 1 
 







SE1 1 Ifinedo (2014) 
SE2 2 Ifinedo (2014) 
SE3 3 Ifinedo (2014) 
CA-RE 
RE1 4 Ifinedo (2012) 
RE2 5 Ifinedo (2012) 
RE3 6 Ifinedo (2012) 
TA-PV 
PV1 7 Hanus and Wu (2016) 
PV2 8 Siponen et al. (2014) 
PV3 9 Ifinedo (2012) 
PV4 10 Based on reviewer feedback 
TA-PS 
PS1 11 Siponen et al. (2014) 
PS2 12 Hanus and Wu (2016) 
PS3 13 Siponen et al. (2014) 
ISKS 
ISKS1 14 Safa et al. (2016) 
ISKS2 15 Safa et al. (2016) 
ISKS3 16 Safa et al. (2016) 
OB 
OB1 17 Rhee et al. (2012) 
OB2 18 Rhee et al. (2012) 
OB3 19 Rhee et al. (2012) 
AH 
AH1 20 Researcher developed 
AH2 21 Researcher developed 
AH3 22 Researcher developed 
AH4 23 Researcher developed 
CB CB1 24 Researcher developed, based on Fischer et al. 
(2011). 
Demographic AGE 25  





et al. (2014), references to “computer” were changed to “servers” to reflect the focus on 
UXAs servers. The AH and conformation bias questions were time-limited to encourage 
use of Kahneman’s (2011) System One processing and limit use of System Two’s more 
thorough analysis. These techniques are similar to the ones used by Finucane et al. (2000) 
as well as Gertner et al. (2016). Confirmatory bias was tested using a fictional scenario, 
like the technique of Fischer et al. (2011). Table 2 identifies the constructs of the model, 
the survey questions, Qualtrics survey number, and the hypotheses tested for each. The 
difference in the Qualtrics survey number is due to text dialogs, design flow, and timing 
questions which do not appear to the participant. 
Table 2 
 
Constructs and Hypotheses 
  
Construct Survey questions Hypothesis 
CA-SE 1-3 H8a 
CA-RE 4-6 H8b 
TA-PV 7-10 H7b 
TA-PS 11-13 H7a 
ISKS 14-16 H1, H2, H3 
OB 17-19 H5a, H5b, H5c, H5d 
AH 20-23 H4a, H4b 
CB 24 H6a, H6b, H6c, H6d 
Actual UXA Compliance  n/a H7a, H7b, H8a, H8b 
Age 25  
Reliability and Validity 
 Ifinedo (2012) evaluated composite reliability, convergent validity, and 
discriminant validity for the instrument questions. Composite reliability for all items 
exceeded the recommended statistical measure of 0.7 (Ifinedo, 2012). Convergent 
validity was tested by Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and all items exceeded the 0.5 





square root of AVE being greater than the cross correlations (Ifinedo, 2012). Again, all 
items were found to meet this requirement.  
 Siponen et al. (2014) tested convergent validity, internal consistency, and 
composite reliability. For convergent reliability they evaluated factor loading and all 
items exceeded 0.69 (Siponen et al., 2014). All items scored greater than the statistical 
cutoff of 0.5 for variance extracted (Siponen et al., 2014). To test internal consistency, 
Cronbach’s α was used, and all items exceeded 0.6 (Siponen et al., 2014). For composite 
reliability, all items exceeded the cutoff of 0.7 (Siponen et al., 2014). Finally, 
discriminant validity was tested via inter-item correlations and all were below the 
statistical cutoff of 0.9 (Siponen et al., 2014). 
 Hanus and Wu (2016) tested the reliability of their items using Cronbach’s α and 
all measured greater than 0.7. Convergent validity was tested using AVE and all items 
exceeded the 0.5 statistical requirement (Hanus & Wu, 2016). Discriminant validity was 
tested using cross loadings and Fornell-Larcker criterion and all exceeded the statistical 
requirements for inclusion (Hanus & Wu, 2016). 
 Safa et al. (2016) evaluated convergent validity, internal consistency, and 
discriminant validity for their model’s items. Factor loading was used to evaluate 
convergent validity and all items above the 0.5 statistical cutoff were included (Safa et 
al., 2016). Internal consistency was tested with Cronbach’s α and all items exceeded 0.7 
(Safa et al., 2016). Discriminant validity was tested using inter-item correlations and all 
were below the 0.9 statistical cutoff (Safa et al., 2016). Additionally, all variances 
exceeded the recommendation of 0.5 (Safa et al., 2016). Finally, the square root of the 






Rhee et al. (2012) tested their instrument for reliability, convergent validity, and 
discriminant validity. Reliability was assessed by identifying the composite reliability 
(0.908) and AVE (0.925) both of which exceeded the standard cutoff of 0.7 and 0.5 
respectively (Rhee et al., 2012). Convergent validity was tested by evaluating all item 
loadings, which all exceeded 0.73 (Rhee et al., 2012). Finally, discriminant validity was 
verified by using the square root of all AVEs and comparing them to the correlations 




Threat appraisal is an evaluation of the UXA TA-PS and TA-PV to IS threats 
(Posey et al., 2015; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). TA-PV and TA-PS may be 
influenced by cognitive heuristics, which may be influenced by an increased knowledge 
and awareness of IS risks and vulnerabilities (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Guo et al., 
2011; Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Siponen et al., 2014). TA-PS and TA-PV were assessed 
via three survey questions each adapted from Ifinedo (2014) and Hanus and Wu (2016).  
Coping Appraisal 
Coping appraisal is an assessment of how the UXA perceives that they can cope 
with, adapt to, or mitigate the IS risk (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Coping appraisal 
considers the UXA’s IS CA-SE and IS CA-RE (Posey et al., 2015). CA-RE is an 
assessment of how effective the proposed behavior can reduce the probability of the 





the changes needed to mitigate the risk (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). CA-SE and CA-
RE were assessed by three questions each that were adapted from Ifinedo (2014) and 
Hanus and Wu (2016).  
Cognitive Heuristics 
The cognitive heuristics that were evaluated included the AH, OB, and CB. The 
use of these heuristics can influence UXA estimation of risk and vulnerability associated 
with their UNIX servers (Kahneman, 2011; Pachur et al., 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Additionally, OB, and CB may influence UXA coping appraisal. The AH was 
measured by four questions that ask participants to evaluate vulnerability and 
exploitability of UNIX and Windows servers (Kahneman, 2011; Kliger & Kudryavtsev, 
2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). OB was assessed using three questions from Rhee et 
al. (2012). Confirmatory bias was tested using a fictional scenario, similar to the 
technique of Fischer et al. (2011) where participants are presented a scenario, asked to 
make an initial decision, then provided six confirming and six disconfirming bits of 
additional information they can choose to review, and then asked to choose again. The 
level of CB was determined by subtracting the number of disconfirming choices selected 
from the confirming choices selected (Fischer et al., 2011; Gertner et al., 2016).  
ISP Compliance Behavior 
UXA ISP compliance behavior was assessed by analyzing six percentages for 
specific security implementations for all the UNIX servers managed by each UXA. 
Percentages are frequently used for analyzing and presenting security metrics as they are 
easily interpretable and can clearly indicate positive or negative change (Brotby & 





the data points collected and the associated PLS-SEM coding. 
Table 3 
 
ISP Behavioral Data Points  
Data point PLS-SEM Code 
Percentage of administrator's servers sending data to centralized 
log management system. COMPL1 
Percentage of administrator's servers with centrally recorded 
Tenable Nessus data. COMPL2 
Percentage of administrator's servers blocking telnet/ftp ports 
(TCP/UDP 21, 23) and remote services ports (TCP/UDP 512-514). COMPL3 
Percentage of an administrator's servers using multi-factor 
authentication. COMPL4 
Percentage of an administrator's servers that have had recent 
software updates. COMPL5 
The percentage of administrator's servers sending data to centralized log 
management system (COMPL1) was determined from a report provided by the IS team’s 
Splunk administrator. This report identified all servers, UXAs, on-call groups, and 
projects for all servers sending data to the Splunk log management servers. Servers were 
associated with the specific UXA and percentages were determined based on CMDB 
data. The percentage of administrator's servers with centrally recorded Tenable Nessus 
data (COMPL2) was determined by using the organization’s Tenable Splunk dashboard 
filtered by each UXA. The dashboard provides a listing of the Tenable hosts and hosts not 
in a scan group for each administrator. Counts were input into an Excel spreadsheet and 
percentages computed for each UXA. The percentage of administrator's servers blocking 
telnet, ftp, and remote services ports (COMPL3) was determined by running a script that 
programmatically performed nmap scans on the specific ports for each server identified 
in the CMDB for each UXA. The script indicated the servers that were processed, as well 





filtered indicate the presence of a firewall or other filter securing the port (NMAP.ORG, 
2019). This script was run in batches of 100 servers to minimize the network impact. 
Again, servers were associated with the appropriate UXA based on the CMDB. The 
percentage of an administrator's servers using multi-factor authentication (COMPL4) was 
determined by identifying all UNIX servers registered with PAM RADIUS secrets in the 
organization’s multifactor authentication database. These data, made available by the IS 
team, indicated server, IP address, managing group, as well as the associated PAM 
RADIUS secrets. Server hostnames were matched to the corresponding UXA to tally a 
total and determine the percentage. The percentage of an administrator's servers that have 
had recent software updates (COMPL5) was determined using two methods. For all 
Linux servers, the organization’s Splunk Linux Inventory Dashboard was modified to 
provide a listing of kernel packages installed on the Linux servers. This database was 
queried prior to the workshop as a baseline and then again 90 days after the workshop. 
For IBM AIX servers a script was developed which queried the server’s installed 
software and determined dates for all installed software packages. Servers were 
associated with specific UXAs and percentages were calculated for each UXA. Data 
points were collected for each UXA prior to and 90 days following the workshop and 
recorded in an Excel spreadsheet. Using security scans, security reports, and 
authenticated scripts to identify the security measures implemented by UXA following 
the SETA workshop afforded unique insights into the effectiveness of the training in 
terms of actual implementation of security controls and ISP compliance behavior. 
Population and Sampling 





up of all UXA in the organization. Email invitations were sent to all potential participants 
inviting them to participate in the workshop (Appendix H). Reminder emails were sent to 
individuals that had not responded (accepted or declined) the invitation. Individuals that 
chose to participate received an email link for informed consent (Appendix I). Once 
informed consent was received a link to the Qualtrics survey was emailed to participants. 
Reminder emails were sent to individuals to complete the survey. The 60 individuals 
participated in the SETA workshop via a secure Zoom meeting. The workshop lasted 2.5 
hours and focused on increasing cybersecurity awareness and cyber skills related to 
UNIX servers in a healthcare organization.  
 The day of the workshop, individual emails were sent to each participant 
providing them login information and for the ISC (Appendix J). After completion of the 
workshop, participants were introduced to the EDURange environment, instructed how to 
access it, and were provided with login information related to the ISC. Participants began 
connecting to the EDURange scenario and started the ISC, which was available for five 
hours following the workshop. This scenario provided participants a hands-on experience 
using tools introduced in the workshop (nmap and Metasploit) to identify, enumerate, and 
exploit the vulnerable Linux VM in the EDURange platform. At the request of several 
participants, the ISC was restarted and made available to the participants the following 
day so that they could continue. Finally, at the request of several additional participants, 
the ISC was restarted again one month after the workshop to allow participants to 
continue to utilize the platform. 
 After the workshop, security update emails were sent to the participants to 





emails were sent at week 1, 4, 7, and 10 following the workshop. The content of the 
updates included information about newly identified vulnerabilities, CERT alerts, 
organizational breach updates, external breach reports, InfraGard updates, relevant 
security news, and an invitation to participate in the newly created Microsoft Teams 
collaborative group. The focus of these updates was to continue to increase UXA 
awareness of the vulnerabilities and how best to mitigate risk for their servers. 
Three months after the workshop, an email was sent to all participants requesting 
they complete the Qualtrics survey a second time. Reminder emails were sent to 
individuals to complete the second survey. Additionally, security implementation data 
were collected for all server associated with each UXA to quantify the changes made 
during the study. 
The population was made up of the UXA in a major university and hospital 
system in the mid-Atlantic United States. The organization manages more than 1000 
UNIX physical and logical servers located in four data centers in two states as well as the 
District of Columbia. The UXA are responsible for the servers running enterprise wide 
applications including the electronic medical record system, pathology labs, radiology, 
Web services, IS servers, student information systems, precision medicine systems, 
document management system, change control systems, as well as numerous 
departmental systems that house PHI and PII. Presently there are 60 UXA across the 
organizations.  
Sampling Method   
A listing of all active UXA was obtained from the IS manager within the 





the workshop.  
Study Participants 
The UXA’s in the organization are made up of individuals with a wide variety of 
technical experience and educational background. The workshop included sixty 
participants. Thirty participants identified primarily UNIX server administrators. Some 
(12) participants identified as split responsibility for both UNIX and Windows servers. 
Four participants identified themselves as Windows-only server administrators; seven 
workshop participants did not have any responsibility for servers; seven individuals did 
not complete all the study protocols. These 18 participants were removed from the study. 
A total of 42 participants completed all the study protocols. One participant was female, 
and 41 participants were male (Table 4). This is not unusual given the gender imbalance 
noted in IT (Gorbacheva et al., 2019). Most participants were aged 45-65 (52.4%). 
Remaining ages included 35-44 (26.2%), 25-34 (16.7%), and 66+ (2.4%) (Table 5). 
Regarding education attainment for the participants, 26.2% have graduate degrees, 50.0% 
have bachelor’s degrees, 11.9% have associate degrees, and 11.9% have some college but 
no degree (see Table 6). 
Table 4  
  
 
Participant Gender (N=42) 
Gender Count Percentage 
Male 41 97.60% 






Table 5  
  
 
Participant Age (N=42) 
Age Count Percentage 
17-24 1 2.40% 
25-34 7 16.70% 
35-44 11 26.20% 
45-65 22 52.40% 




Participant Education (N=42) 
Age Count Percentage 
High school 0 0% 
Some college (no degree) 5 11.90% 
Associates degree 5 11.90% 
Bachelor’s degree 21 50.00% 
Graduate degree 11 26.20% 
 
Data Collection 
Two types of data were collected. First, the survey instrument was used prior to 
and 90-days following the intervention. The survey request was sent via email and was 
administered online using Qualtrics. The survey consisted of 25 questions and measures 
the following constructs: CA-SE, CA-RE, TA-PV, TA-PS, ISKS, AH, OB, and CB. The 
second set of data points were an analysis of security controls implemented on each 
UXA’s servers. Security scans and scripts were run on all UNIX servers associated with 
each participant prior to and three-months following the workshop and ISC. Jaquith 
(2007) recommended quarterly analysis of security metrics as they provide necessary 
precision for a time series-based analysis of security implementations. Quarterly analysis 





implemented by each UXA. 
Survey results were downloaded from Qualtrics into a spreadsheet. UXA were 
assigned a unique ID and all results associated with that UXA were coded with that 
unique ID. These codes helped to ensure anonymity of responses while still allowing for 
the connection of the ISP compliance behavior data points to the specific UXA by the 
researcher. The compliance data were collected for all servers managed by each UXA and 
entered into the study spreadsheet. 
Data Analysis 
Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) has been used 
extensively to test complex models in IS (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Ifinedo, 2012; Rhee et al., 
2012; Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Safa et al., 2016). PLS-SEM has characteristics that 
demonstrate its utility in the present research including acceptance of small sample sizes, 
no assumption of data normality, variety of scales of measurement, and ability to handle 
complex models (Hair et al., 2017). Hair et al. (2017), indicate that at a significance level 
of 5% with maximum of three arrows pointing toward a construct (Threat Appraisal), a 
minimum R2 of 0.25 requires a 33-participant sample size and a minimum R2 of 0.50 
requires 14 participants (p. 26). PLS-SEM evaluated and inner model or structure using 
path coefficients and an outer model, also termed the measurement model, with the 
factors used to represent the latent variables (Hair et al., 2017). PLS-SEM allowed for the 
examination of the paths of the model as well as the relationships between the variables 
(Hanus & Wu, 2016; Safa & Von Solms, 2016). SmartPLS 3.2.8 was used to perform 
analyses of the data. SmartPLS provided reports of the following: Cronbach’s α, average 





for testing the outer and inner models (Hair et al., 2017). Figure 3 is an illustrated initial 
layout of SmartPLS for the proposed model. 
The measurement model was assessed for internal consistency reliability, 
indicator reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2017). The 
structural model was assessed for collinearity among the constructs, relevance and 
significance of the path coefficients, predictive relevance, predictive model selection, and 
goodness-of-fit (Hair et al., 2017). Internal consistency reliability was evaluated with 
Cronbach’s α. Values greater than 0.60 indicated internal consistency reliability for all 
new constructs while established constructs should have values greater than 0.70 (Hair et 
al., 2017). Composite reliability was assessed with ρ. Levels greater than 0.70 indicated 
composite reliability. Indicator reliability was assessed by using the outer loadings 
provided by SmartPLS. The indicators outer loading indicates the correlation between the 
construct and the specific indicator. The explained variance was calculated by squaring 
the outer loading and results should be larger than 0.7 to show indicator reliability (Hair 
et al., 2017). 
Convergent validity was assessed using the Average Variance Extracted (AVE). 
The AVE is a grand mean made up of the squared loadings for all the indicators 
associated with the specific construct (Hair et al., 2017). AVE was calculated for each 
construct using the indicator loadings, squared, and then averaged. Hair et al. (2017) 
indicated that each construct should have AVE >= 0.50. Outer loading relevance was 
tested by evaluating the outer loading scores from SmartPLS. For values >= 0.70 the 
indicator was retained (Hair et al., 2017). For outer loadings between 0.40 and 0.70 the 





composite reliability (Hair et al., 2017). For outer loadings below 0.40 the reflective 
indicator was removed from the model (Hair et al., 2017). Discriminant validity was 
calculated to determine if the constructs are conceptually and statistically distinct (Hair et 
al., 2017). To assess discriminant validity of the reflective measurement models, 
Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) was used. Henseler et al. (2015) found HTMT to be 
more effective in identifying problems with discriminant validity than the more popular 
Fornell-Larcker criterion. The threshold suggested by Kline (2011) is 0.85. 
To analyze the structural model, the model was evaluated for collinearity, the 
significance and relevance of the relationships in the structural model were assessed, and 
the predictive relevance of the model was assessed (Hair et al., 2017). Collinearity was 
assessed using the variance inflation factor (VIF) (Hair et al., 2017). VIF values was used 
to determine if a critical level of collinearity occurred. VIF values below 5 or better 
below 3 indicate that the level of collinearity is acceptable (Hair et al., 2017). Path 
coefficients were evaluated to determine their significance and relevance (Hair et al., 
2017). The types of effects analyzed included the direct effects, indirect effects, and total 
effects. Path coefficients range from -1 to 1. Significance of the effects were evaluated 
using bootstrapping (Hair et al., 2017). Finally, the predictive relevance of the model was 
assessed by analyzing the out-of-sample and in-sample predictions (Hair et al., 2017). In-
sample prediction, or explanatory power, was assessed using the entire dataset less a 
holdout sample, to estimate the model and predict observations using the coefficient of 
determination (R2) and effect size (Hair et al., 2017). R2 values range from 0 to 1 where 
below 0.25 is weak, 0.5 is moderate, and .75 is substantial (Hair et al., 2017). The effect 





another construct (Hair et al., 2017). An effect size value from 0.02 to 0.15 is considered 
weak effect, from 0.15 to 0.35 is a moderate effect, and greater than 0.35 is considered a 
strong effect (Hair et al., 2017). Out-of-sample prediction, or predictive power, was 
assessed to predict observations in a holdout sample using blindfolding-based Q2 (Hair et 
al., 2017). In blindfolding the model is computed iteratively while systematically 
omitting some of the data points (Hair et al., 2017). Model estimates that are created 
using the sample data are used to predict the omitted data (Hair et al., 2017). Predictive 
relevance is determined by assessing the predictive error (Hair et al., 2017). Q2 results 
from 0.02 to 0.15 indicates weak predictive power, values between 0.15 and 0.35 
indicates moderate predictive power, and values greater than 0.35 indicates strong 
predictive power (Hair et al., 2017). 
Figure 3 
SmartPLS Model Layout 
 
Comparisons of pre-intervention and post-intervention statistics were completed 





before and after comparison, the samples were dependent on one another (Terrell, 2012). 
Microsoft Excel’s Statistics package was used to compute the critical t values used to 
determine if the compliance metrics were statistically different between the pre-workshop 
analysis and the analysis performed 90-days after the workshop. Additionally, descriptive 
statistics (mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) were calculated for all the 
constructs.  
Format for Presenting Results 
Based on the results of the statistical analyses, a report was developed and 
presented as chapter four of the dissertation report (Terrell, 2016). The analyses included 
narrative form, diagrams, and tables related to survey administration, survey questions 
and responses, demographics of participants, pre and post intervention server analyses 
and results, workshop feedback/analysis, ISC feedback/results, PLS structural and 
measurement model analysis, hypotheses testing results, and proposed answers to the 
research question. The data included, where applicable, quantitative descriptive statistics. 
The PLS-SEM structural analysis included data related to the collinearity assessment, 
relevance and significance of path coefficients, predictive relevance, and goodness of fit. 
The PLS-SEM measurement model data included a report of the convergent and 
discriminant validity, internal consistency reliability, indicator reliability, and composite 
reliability. PLS-SEM data were presented via diagram, table, and narrative to explain the 
results. Other quantitative data were presented in tabular form. Finally, chapter five 
provides conclusions based on the analysis, a summary of implications for UXA SETA 







 Required resources fell into three categories: administration, people, and 
technology. Administratively, the study proposal was defended, and IRB requests were 
submitted to both institutions. The IRB review process at the workshop site took almost 
six weeks of revisions. Support from the C-Suite for the research was already secured. In 
terms of people, participation of a diverse set of UXA across the organization was 
required. Technology requirements included access to Qualtrics for survey 
administration, development of and access to EDURange for the ISC, SmartPLS for PLS-
SEM statistical analyses, participants access to networked computers, access to the 
organization’s configuration management database, access to the organizations Tenable 
servers, access to the Splunk dashboards, access to the MFA database, and the ability to 
run scripts and scans on the UXA’s servers. A new EDURange scenario was developed, in 
coordination with the EDURange team that consisted of an ISC module to provide hands-
on SETA for UXA participants. 
Summary 
 This quantitative study was conducted in a pretest and posttest experimental and 
control group design and evaluate the effectiveness of a SETA workshop, ISC, and 
periodic security update emails on the ISP compliance of UXA. The survey instrument 
was developed based on prior validated instrument questions augmented with newly 
designed questions related to the use of cognitive heuristics and biases. The survey was 
completed by participants prior to and following the workshop and ISC. Compliance 
behavior was assessed using security scans and evaluation of specific metrics directly tied 





data and evaluate the structural and measurement model proposed. Dependent t-tests 
were used to analyze the behavioral data to evaluate the potential differences between 










This chapter provides the data analyses of the pre-workshop survey and 
behavioral metrics, as well as the post-workshop survey and behavioral metrics. The 
survey and server analyses results were analyzed in two phases. The theorized model and 
indicators were entered into SmartPLS. Once data were collected for the pre-workshop 
survey and compliance metrics, they were entered into SmartPLS. Initial evaluation of 
the measurement model and structural model were completed on the pre-workshop data. 
After 90 days, the post-workshop survey data and compliance metrics were collected and 
a second SmartPLS analysis was performed. Additionally, descriptive statistics were 
performed to evaluate the changes between the pre-workshop and post-workshop 
compliance metrics to determine if significant changes were made in behavior as a result 
of the intervention. The results of these analyses are indicated below. Following the data 
analyses, findings and a summary close out this chapter of the dissertation report. 
Data Analysis 
The process for performing an analysis of a new model, as outlined by Hair et al. 
(2017), included the following steps: creation of the structural model, creation of the 
measurement models for each construct, collection/examination of data, estimation of the 
PLS path model, assessment of the (reflective) measurement model, and finally 
assessment of the structural model. The model, based on prior research, was created in 





spreadsheet. AC security metrics were collected from scripts, Tenable Nessus, Splunk, 
and organizational data. Results for these data points were aggregated and stored in a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The compliance data were merged with the survey data to 
provide a single comma delimited file for input into SmartPLS. Preliminary evaluation of 
the data using a consistent PLS algorithm indicated several unexpected results. A deeper 
dive into the data showed that there were several individuals whose responses were 
significantly different from others in the sample data. Through conversations with those 
participants it was discovered that several participants were Windows server 
administrators not UXAs. Since the focus of this study was on the unique UXA 
cognitions, the Windows server administrators were removed from the data. The 






Pre-workshop PLS-SEM Analysis Results 
 
 
The pre-workshop measurement model was assessed for internal consistency 
reliability, indicator reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 
2017). The structural model was assessed for collinearity among the constructs, as well as 
relevance and significance of the path coefficients (Hair et al., 2017).  
Internal consistency reliability was evaluated with Cronbach’s α. Values greater 
than 0.60 indicated internal consistency reliability for all new constructs while 
established constructs should have values greater than 0.70 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Hair et 





RE, CA-SE, CB, ISKS, OB, and TA-PS achieved the required cutoffs for new constructs 
and existing constructs (Table 7). The AH, and TA-PV, however, failed to meet the 
Cronbach’s α cutoff. Three TA-PV survey questions were derived from Hanus and Wu 
(2016), Siponen et al. (2014), and Ifinedo (2012) as well as one question that was 
developed based on the recommendation of a pilot-tester. It is theorized that, while the 
four questions seemed to be pertinent and collectively represent this construct for the 
current study, taken individually there were inconsistencies that resulted in the lower 
Cronbach’s α than had all of the survey question come from a single instrument. The AH 
survey questions were developed for this study. VIF and HTMT were evaluated and all 
the indicators met collinearity constraints. Clearly, however, the questions associated with 
AH need to be reevaluated.  
Table 7  
  
Pre-workshop Cronbach's α (N=42) 










Composite reliability of the pre-workshop data was assessed with ρ. Levels 
greater than 0.70 indicated composite reliability for established constructs while values 
greater than 0.60 are acceptable for exploratory research (Henseler et al., 2016; Wong, 
2019). AC, AH, CA-RE, CA-SE, CB, ISKS, OB, and TA-PS met ρ significance levels 





theorized that pulling single questions from different scales may have resulted in the 
failure of TA-PV to meet demonstrate composite reliability. 
Table 8  
  












Convergent validity was assessed using the AVE. The AVE is a grand mean made 
up of the squared loadings for all the indicators associated with the specific construct 
(Hair et al., 2017). The AVE was calculated in SmartPLS (Table 9). Six constructs met 
the AVE level of significance CA-RE (0.585), CA-SE (0.774), CB (1.00), ISKS (0.571), 
OB (0.612), and TA-PS (0.79). AH and TA-PV did not meet the critical cutoff for 
significance. To further assess AVE, the bootstrapped AVE was calculated for each 
construct (PLS algorithm max number of iterations: 5000; bootstrapping settings: 
complexity: complete bootstrapping, samples: 5000, significance: 0.05, test type: one 
tailed) (Hair et al., 2017). As noted in Table 10, the bootstrapped AVEs for all constructs 





Table 9  
  











Table 10      
      
Pre-workshop Bootstrapped AVE (N=42)     
Construct Original Sample M SD t  p  
AH 0.442 0.453 0.065 6.818 < 0.001 
CA-RE 0.585 0.549 0.118 4.968 < 0.001 
CA-SE 0.774 0.764 0.085 9.052 < 0.001 
ISKS 0.571 0.563 0.108 5.274 < 0.001 
OB 0.612 0.607 0.062 9.812 < 0.001 
TA-PS 0.79 0.776 0.086 9.139 < 0.001 
TA-PV 0.397 0.408 0.067 5.924 < 0.001 
 
Discriminant validity was calculated to determine if the constructs are 
conceptually and statistically distinct (Hair et al., 2017). To assess discriminant validity 
of the reflective measurement models, Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) was used. 
Henseler et al., (2015) found HTMT to be more effective in identifying problems with 
discriminant validity than the more popular Fornell-Larcker criterion. The HTMT table 
was evaluated to determine if the correlations within values are greater than the 
correlations across the model (Henseler et al., 2015). Threshold values should be 0.85 
(Kline, 2011; Wong, 2019) or a more liberal cutoff of 0.90 can be used (Gold et al., 
2001). Based on the results from SmartPLS, the HTMT values for all constructs met the 





Table 11         
         




CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AH                 
CA-RE 0.49               
CA-SE 0.452 0.837             
CB 0.489 0.103 0.237           
ISKS 0.354 0.773 0.733 0.262         
OB 0.623 0.539 0.554 0.311 0.652       
TA-PS 0.265 0.487 0.236 0.373 0.371 0.179     
TA-PV 0.409 0.563 0.431 0.345 0.494 0.37 0.474   
 
 
To analyze the pre-workshop structural model, the model was evaluated for 
collinearity, as well as the significance and relevance of the relationships (Hair et al., 
2017). Collinearity was assessed using the VIF (Hair et al., 2017). Constructs with high 
collinearity indicate that there is a high degree of redundancy and correlation between 
two or more predictor variables (Hair et al., 2017). VIF values below five indicate that 
the level of collinearity is acceptable (Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). Table 12 from 
SmartPLS shows that all constructs met the statistical cutoff for collinearity. The highest 
VIF values was for CA-RE->AC (3.099) indicating there is a degree of correlation 
between the indicators but that they do not reach the level where statistical significance 





Table 12          
          
Pre-workshop Inner VIF (N=42)      
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH               1.619 1.619 
CA-RE 3.099                 
CA-SE -1.491                 
CB     1.115 1.115       1.339 1.339 
ISKS   1     1   1     
OB     1.115 1.115       1.36 1.36 
TA-PS -1.207                 
TA-PV -3.418                 
 
Path coefficients were evaluated to determine their significance and relevance 
(Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). The types of effects analyzed included the direct effects, 
indirect effects, and total effects. Path coefficients range from -1 to 1. The direct effect 
was determined using the path effect between linked constructs. Path coefficients provide 
an indication of how much a dependent variable will change based on an independent 
variable. For a one standard deviation change of the independent variable the dependent 
variable will change x (path coefficient) standard deviations (Hair et al., 2017). With 
regard to AC, CA-SE had the highest positive impact (1.272), and TA-PS was also 
significant (0.705) (Table 13). TA-PV (-1.073) and CA-RE (-0.784) had significant 
negative effects on AC. With respect to the three evaluated cognitive heuristics and 
biases, the AH had a significant negative impact on TA-PV (-1.050), while OB (0.538), 
and CB (0.534) had significant positive impacts on TA-PV. This implies that the greater 
the use of the AH results in a greater sense of invulnerability. Interestingly, based on the 
pre-workshop results, the use of confirmation bias and OB increase TA-PV. TA-PS was 
negatively influenced by CB (-0.481) and positively influenced by OB (0.292) and AH 





perceived threat awareness and TA-PS. The positive path coefficient between OB and 
TA-PS implies that when the bias is used, TA-PS is increased slightly. CA-RE is most 
positively influenced by OB (0.608) and is negatively influenced by CB (-0.246). This 
seemed logical given that the use of OB implied higher level of belief of invulnerability 
and this could extend to the perception that CA-RE was high as well. The negative 
relationship between CB and CA-RE (-0.246), indicated that individuals who are using 
CB tend to believe their ability to respond to security risks is reduced. CA-RE is most 
highly impacted by OB (0.573) and negatively impacted by CB (-0.047). Again, this 
seemed appropriate since the use of OB would artificially inflate the sense of CA-SE of 
the UXAs. OB was most highly positively influenced by ISKS (0.639). This evaluation 
was done prior to the workshop and it seems logical that a positive sense of information 
sharing results in a greater degree of optimism about the security of one’s UNIX servers. 
CB was also positively influenced by ISKS (0.236). Since, when wielding CB, one is 
looking for information that supports your strongly held beliefs, this scoring was not 
surprising. There was only a minimal positive influence of ISKS on the AH (0.068). The 
use of the AH relates to the sense of how easily one recalls information related to a 
specific question. These results indicated that increased ISKS can result in minimal 










Table 13          
          
Pre-workshop Path Coefficients (N=42)      
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH               0.031 -1.05 
CA-RE -0.784                 
CA-SE 1.272                 
CB     -0.246 -0.047       -0.481 0.534 
ISKS   0.068     0.236   0.639     
OB     0.608 0.573       0.292 0.538 
TA-PS 0.705                 
TA-PV -1.073                 
 
Indirect effect was evaluated by looking at additional paths between constructs 
through at least one other construct (Table 14). The most significant positive indirect 
effect was on the AH on AC (1.149). The use of CB had a significant negative effect (-
0.778) on AC. OB had a small negative effect (-0.120) on AC. ISKS had a small negative 
effect on AC but a positive effect on TA-PV, CA-SE, CA-RE, and TA-PS (in order of 
effect). It seemed logical that ISKS would have a positive effect on CA-RE, CA-SE, TA-
PS, and TA-PV given that security education generally increases participants ability to 
identify and respond to risks and vulnerabilities. The negative influence of ISKS on AC 
was puzzling and was theorized to be less relevant given the ISKS intervention had not 





Table 14          
          
Pre-workshop Indirect Effects (N=42)      
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH 1.149                 
CA-RE                   
CA-SE                   
CB -0.778                 
ISKS -0.183   0.33 0.355       0.075 0.399 
OB -0.12                 
TA-PS                   
TA-PV                   
 
Specific indirect effects were analyzed from SmartPLS (Table 15). The most 
significant negative specific indirect effects on compliance included: OB->TA-PV->AC 
(-0.577), CB->TA-PV->AC (-0.573), OB->CA-RE->AC (-0.476), ISKS->OB->TA-PV-
>AC (-0.369), CB->TA-PS->AC (-0.339), ISKS->OB->CA-RE->AC (-0.305). The most 
significant positive specific indirect effects on compliance included: AH->TA-PV->AC 
(1.127), OB->CA-SE->AC (0.728), ISKS->OB->CA-SE->AC (0.465). In terms of other 
specific indirect effects ISKS->OB->CA-RE (0.389), ISKS->OB->CA-SE (0.366), and 
ISKS->OB->TA-PV (0.344) were all significant. The indirect effects indicate that CB, 





Table 15  
  
Pre-workshop Specific Indirect Effects (N=42) 





















ISKS->CB->CA-RE  -0.058 
ISKS->OB->CA-RE  0.389 
ISKS->CB->CA-SE  -0.011 
ISKS->OB->CA-SE  0.366 
ISKS->AH->TA-PS  0.002 
ISKS->CB->TA-PS  -0.113 
ISKS->OB->TA-PS  0.186 
ISKS->AH->TA-PV  -0.071 
ISKS->CB->TA-PV  0.126 
ISKS->OB->TA-PV  0.344 
 
The total effect was analyzed based on the results of the SmartPLS run (Table 16). 
The most significant positive influencers on AC were CA-SE (1.272), AH (1.149), and 
TA-PS (0.705). CA-SE and TA-PS are known to have a positive relationship with 
compliance intention but the finding that AH is a significant influencer is novel to the 





influencers of AC included TA-PV (-1.073), CA-RE (-0.784), CB (-0.778), ISKS (-
0.183), and OB (-0.120). CA-RE and CB may be explained due to the use of the bias 
skewing the UXAs belief that they need to comply with security directives. TA-PV’s 
strong negative relationship may be due to UXAs perceiving the threat and feeling 
overwhelmed an unable to make significant changes to mitigate the threat. 
Table 16          
          
Pre-workshop Total Effects (N=42)       
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH 1.149             0.031 -1.05 
CA-RE -0.784                 
CA-SE 1.272                 
CB -0.778   -0.246 -0.047       -0.481 0.534 
ISKS -0.183 0.068 0.33 0.355 0.236   0.639 0.075 0.399 
OB -0.12   0.608 0.573       0.292 0.538 
TA-PS 0.705                 
TA-PV -1.073                 
 
 OB had a significant effect on CA-RE (0.608), CA-SE (0.573), TA-PV (0.538), 
and TA-PS (0.292). Since OB is an unwarranted belief that one is not in danger it seemed 
logical that this bias should influence CA-RE, CA-SE, TA-PV, and TA-PS. CB had a 
significant negative effect on AC (-0.778), TA-PS (-0.481), and CA-RE (-0.246). Since 
CB may lead UXAs to only see information that supports their strongly held opinions it is 
not surprising that increases in CB result in less compliance, less TA-PS, and less CA-
RE. ISKS had a positive influence on OB (0.639), TA-PV (0.399), CA-SE (0.355), CA-
RE (0.330), and CB (0.236) and a minimal positive effect on TA-PS (0.075) and AH 
(0.068). These findings are in line with prior research that found that ISKS led to 
increased TA-PV, CA-SE, and CA-RE (Bélanger et al., 2017; Hanus & Wu, 2016; Posey 





plays in the model. CB had a significant positive influence on TA-PV (0.534). This may 
be caused by the increased use of the bias resulting in an invalid estimate of risk and an 
increase in TA-PV. CB had a negative influence on AC (-0.778), TA-PS (-0.481), CA-RE 
(-0.246), and CA-SE (-0.047). This indicated that, when the use of CB increased, 
compliance behavior, TA-PS, CA-RE, and CA-SE were all reduced. As noted earlier, this 
bias may blind the UXA to the risks facing them. AH had a positive relationship with AC 
(1.149) and TA-PS (0.031) as well as a negative influence on TA-PV (-1.050). The 
negative influence on TA-PV indicates that the greater the use of the heuristic the lower 
the perceived danger facing the UXA. The positive relationship between AH and AC 
(1.149) may indicate that the increase in security knowledge and awareness improved AC 
behavior. Clearly, based on the pre-workshop analysis, the increased use of AH resulted 
in increased compliance. 
The significance of the path coefficients was evaluated using SmartPLS 
bootstrapping. This technique, in PLS, generates t statistics for both outer and inner 
models (Wong, 2019). The statistics were evaluated to determine if the path coefficients 
of the inner model were significant. The significant paths are indicated in Table 17 and 
included CB->TA-PS, ISKS->OB, OB->CA-RE, and OB->CA-SE. 
Table 17      
      




M SD t p 
CB->TA-PS -0.378 -0.365 0.154 2.454 0.007** 
ISKS->OB 0.594 0.596 0.123 4.81 <0.001*** 
OB->CA-RE 0.458 0.451 0.186 2.47 0.007** 
OB->CA-SE 0.453 0.458 0.127 3.559 <0.001*** 






The effect size (f2) is used to determine how one construct contributes to the 
explaining power of another construct (Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). The effect sizes 
were computed using the PLS algorithm with quality criteria set to f-square (Table 18). 
An effect size value from 0.02 to 0.15 is considered weak effect, from 0.15 to 0.35 is a 
moderate effect, and greater than 0.35 is considered a strong effect (Hair et al., 2017). 
Strong positive effects included AH->TA-PV (2.522), CB->TA-PV (0.788), OB->TA-PV 
(0.788), ISKS->OB (0.691), OB->CA-RE (0.498), and OB->CA-SE (0.428). Moderate 
positive effects included CA-RE->AC (0.159), and CB->TA-PS and (0.222). Weak 
positive effects included CB->CA-RE (0.082), OB->TA-PS (0.080), and ISKS->CB 
(0.059). Strong negative effects included only CA-SE->AC (-0.869). Moderate negative 
effects included TA-PS->AC (-0.330), and TA-PV->AC (-0.270). As this evaluation was a 
baseline and done prior to the workshop and ISC it is not surprising that there were strong 
negative effects for CA-SE, TA-PS, and TA-PV on AC.  
Table 18          
          
Pre-workshop Effect Size (N=42)       










AC                   
AH               0.001 2.522 
CA-RE 0.159                 
CA-SE -0.869                 
CB     0.082 0.003       0.222 0.788 
ISKS   0.005     0.059   0.691     
OB     0.498 0.428       0.08 0.788 
TA-PS -0.33                 
TA-PV -0.27                 
 
Blindfolding was used to test predictive relevance using the Stone-Geisser values 





evaluate the model’s ability to estimate/predict remaining points (Hair et al., 2017). To 
interpret blindfolding results, the Stone-Geisser’s value (Q2) between 0.02 and 0.15 
indicated weak predictive power, between 0.15 and 0.35 indicated moderate predictive 
power, and greater than 0.35 indicated strong predictive power (Hair et al., 2017). CA-
RE, CA-SE, and OB all had moderate levels of predictive power (Table 19). CB had 
weak predictive power. Other constructs predictive power were below 0.02 indicating 
little predictive power.     
Table 19    
    
Pre-workshop Predictive Power (N=42) 
Construct Q²_predict Predictive Power  
CA-RE 0.175 Moderate  
CA-SE 0.209 Moderate  
CB 0.035 Weak  
OB 0.278 Moderate  
 
Following the workshop, ISC, and security update emails, the participants were 
asked to complete the survey a second time and data associated with their servers were 
collected. Ninety days were afforded to the UXAs to make changes to their servers in 
compliance with the ISP and by the direction of material in the workshop. The same 
model was used for the post-workshop analysis, but new responses were downloaded 
from Qualtrics and collected via script, Tenable Nessus, Splunk, or organization 
databases. Data were stored in Excel spreadsheets and aggregated together for input into 
SmartPLS. 
The measurement model was assessed for internal consistency reliability, 
indicator reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2017). The 





and significance of the path coefficients (Hair et al., 2017). The results of the SmartPLS 
analysis with resulting R2 and path coefficients for the post-workshop survey and data 
points can be seen in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 
Post-workshop PLS-SEM Analysis Results 
 
 
Internal consistency reliability was evaluated with Cronbach’s α. Constructs 
which demonstrated internal consistency reliability by way of Cronbach’s α included AH 
(0.781), CA-RE (0.760), CA-SE (0.915), ISKS (0.663), OB (0.764), and TA-PS (0.913) 
(Table 20). Like the pre-workshop data analysis, the TA-PV did not meet the cutoff 





single questions from three different instruments to develop the questions used in this 
survey. 
Table 20   
   
Post-workshop Cronbach's α (N=42) 
Construct Cronbach's α  
AH 0.781  
CA-RE 0.76  
CA-SE 0.915  
CB 1  
ISKS 0.663  
OB 0.764  
TA-PS 0.913  
TA-PV 0.416  
 
Composite reliability of the post-workshop data was assessed with ρ. Levels 
greater than 0.70 indicated composite reliability for established constructs while values 
greater than 0.6 are acceptable for exploratory research (Henseler et al., 2016; Wong, 
2019). The following constructs indicated composite reliability by virtue of the ρ scores: 
AC (1.0), AH (0.810), CA-RE (0.795), CA-SE (0.932), CB (1.0), ISKS (0.679), OB 
(0.801), and TA-PS (0.986) (Table 21). Again, like the pre-workshop analysis, TA-PV did 
not meet the minimum criteria for ρ. It was theorized that the same situation, having 






Table 21   
   
Post-workshop ρ (N=42) 
Construct ρ  
AC 1  
AH 0.81  
CA-RE 0.795  
CA-SE 0.932  
CB 1  
ISKS 0.679  
OB 0.801  
TA-PS 0.986  
TA-PV 0.55  
 
Convergent validity was assessed using the AVE. The AVE is a grand mean made 
up of the squared loadings for all the indicators associated with the specific construct 
(Hair et al., 2017). The AVE from the initial SmartPLS run indicated that the following 
constructs met AVE requirements (> 0.5): AH (0.505), CA-RE (0.677), CA-SE (0.856), 
CB (1.0), ISKS (0.602), OB (0.677), and TA-PV (0.849) (Table 22). TA-PV (0.332) was 
the only construct that did not meet the AVE requirement. This may again be caused by 
the indicator question selection. The bootstrapped AVE was also calculated for each 
construct using SmartPLS (Table 23). All constructs were found to have significant AVEs 
with p-values < 0.001 which indicates that convergent validity was achieved. 
Table 22   
   
Post-workshop AVE (N=42) 
Construct AVE  
AH 0.505  
CA-RE 0.677  
CA-SE 0.856  
CB 1  
ISKS 0.602  
OB 0.677  
TA-PS 0.849  





Table 23      
      




M SD t p 
AH 0.505 0.541 0.108 4.691 <0.001*** 
CA-RE 0.677 0.675 0.052 13.132 <0.001*** 
CA-SE 0.856 0.857 0.041 20.631 <0.001*** 
ISKS 0.602 0.595 0.07 8.644 <0.001*** 
OB 0.677 0.681 0.063 10.693 <0.001*** 
TA-PS 0.849 0.847 0.049 17.156 <0.001*** 
TA-PV 0.332 0.369 0.065 5.115 <0.001*** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
Discriminant validity was calculated for the post-workshop data to determine if 
the constructs were conceptually and statistically distinct (Hair et al., 2017). To assess 
discriminant validity of the reflective measurement models, HTMT was used. Threshold 
values should be 0.85 (Kline, 2011) or a more liberal cutoff of 0.90 (Gold et al., 2001) 
can be used. The HTMT values for all constructs met the desired cutoff indicating 
discriminant validity (Table 24). 
Table 24         
         
Post-workshop HTMT (N=42)       
Construct AH CE-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AH                 
CA-RE 0.181               
CA-SE 0.123 0.707             
CB 0.198 0.207 0.028           
ISKS 0.317 0.789 0.508 0.181         
OB 0.209 0.796 0.64 0.114 0.692       
TA-PS 0.196 0.305 0.18 0.065 0.404 0.35     
TA-PV 0.491 0.564 0.316 0.335 0.372 0.545 0.398   
 
To analyze the post-workshop structural model, the model was evaluated for 





al., 2017). Collinearity was assessed using the VIF (Hair et al., 2017). VIF values were 
used to determine if a critical level of collinearity has occurred. VIF values below 4.0 
indicate that the level of collinearity is acceptable (Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). For the 
post-workshop structural model all constructs were below the critical value (4.0) (Table 
25). 
Table 25          
          
Post-workshop VIF (N=42)     
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH               1.059 1.059 
CA-RE 3.72                 
CA-SE 2.05                 
CB     1.012 1.012       1.038 1.038 
ISKS   1     1   1     
OB     1.012 1.012       1.039 1.039 
TA-PS 1.158                 
TA-PV 2.398                 
 
 Path coefficients were evaluated to determine their significance and relevance 
(Hair et al., 2017). Direct effects, indirect effects, and total effects were analyzed. AH has 
a negative impact on TA-PS (-0.154) and a small positive impact on TA-PV (0.008) 
(Table 26). CA-RE has a positive impact on AC (0.422). Prior research has demonstrated 
that CA-RE is related to behavioral intention (Vance et al., 2012). The present research, 
however, demonstrated that CA-RE was associated with AC behavior. CA-SE had a 
negative impact on AC (-0.363). This was unexpected since CA-SE has been found to 
have a positive impact on behavioral intention (Vance et al., 2012). One possible 
explanation is that the UXA with high CA-SE feel it is unnecessary to make additional 
changes to their servers to prevent security breaches. CB has a small negative impact on 





diminished slightly. CB also positively influences TA-PV (0.153), TA-PS (0.121), and 
CA-SE (0.052). These path coefficients indicate a weak positive relationship between CB 
and the TA-PV, TA-PS, and CA-SE. ISKS has a strong positive impact on OB (0.697) and 
a smaller positive influence on AH (0.210). As ISKS increases, OB and AH are positively 
impacted. ISKS also has a negative impact on CB (-0.172). This indicates that by 
increasing ISKS there is a negative influence on the use of CB. OB has a positive 
influence on CA-RE (0.794), CA-SE (0.639), and TA-PS (0.338). As OB increases, CA-
RE, CA-SE, and TA-PS increase. OB also has a strong negative impact on TA-PV (-
0.751). This indicates that as OB increases the TA-PV decreases. TA-PS and TA-PV have 
a negative impact on AC (-0.196 and -0.128 respectively).  
Table 26           
           
Post-workshop Path Coefficients (N=42)    
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH               -0.154 0.008 
CA-RE 0.422                 
CA-SE -0.363                 
CB     -0.109 0.052       0.121 0.153 
ISKS   0.21     -0.172   0.697     
OB     0.794 0.639       0.338 -0.751 
TA-PS -0.196                 
TA-PV -0.128                 
 
Total indirect effects were evaluated to assess the impact of interim constructs. 
Notably, ISKS had positive impacts on CA-RE (0.572), CA-SE (0.436), TA-PS (0.182), 
and AC (0.117) (Table 27). This indicated that as ISKS increases CA-RE, CA-SE, TA-PS, 
and AC behavior increase. ISKS also had a strong negative impact on TA-PV (-0.548). 
Given that additional knowledge may afford the UXA new skills needed to protect their 





determined to have a small positive indirect effect on AC (0.029). This may be due to 
slightly larger indirect specific effect AH->TA-PS->AC (0.030) versus the smaller 
negative indirect effect AH->TA-PV->AC (-0.001). CB was found to have a small 
negative impact on AC (-0.108). This value is very low and indicated the weak influence 
that the bias may have on compliance behavior. This may be due to the accumulation of 
slight specific indirect effects CB->CA-RE->AC (-0.046), CB->CA-SE->AC (-0.019), 
CB->TA-PS->AC (-0.024), and CB->TA-PV->AC (-0.02). Finally, OB was reported to 
have a small positive influence on AC (0.133). It is interesting that, as the use of OB 
increases there is a small increase in AC.  
Table 27          
          
Post-workshop Indirect Effects (N=42)      









AC                   
AH 0.029                 
CA-RE                   
CA-SE                   
CB -0.108                 
ISKS 0.117   0.572 0.436       0.182 -0.548 
OB 0.133                 
TA-PS                   
TA-PV                   
 
The most significant positive specific indirect effects included ISKS->OB->CA-
RE (0.554), ISKS->OB->CA-SE (0.445), OB->CA-RE->AC (0.335), ISKS->OB->TA-
PS (0.236), and ISKS->OB->CA-RE->AC (0.233) (Table 28). The most significant 
negative specific indirect effects included ISKS->OB->TA-PV (-0.524), OB->CA-SE-





Table 28  
  
Post-workshop Specific Indirect Effects (N=42) 

























ISKS->AH->TA-PS  -0.032 
ISKS->CB->TA-PS  -0.021 
ISKS->OB->TA-PS 0.236 
ISKS->AH->TA-PV  0.002 
ISKS->CB->TA-PV  -0.026 
ISKS->OB->TA-PV  -0.524 
 
Due to the presence of mediating latent variables, the total effects must be 
computed. Total effects were computed using SmartPLS (Table 29). AH had a small 
positive influence on AC (0.029) and TA-PV (0.008). Also, AH had a small negative 
influence on TA-PS (-0.154). CA-RE had a moderate impact on AC (0.422). This result 





(Vance et al., 2012). CA-SE had a moderate negative effect on AC (-0.363). This result 
was puzzling as prior research had found that CA-SE was associated with compliance 
intention (Safa et al., 2015; Vance et al., 2012). CB had small negative effects on AC (-
0.108) and CA-RE (-0.109). This seems logical since the use of this bias negatively 
impacts compliance and CA-RE. CB had a positive effect on CA-SE (0.052), TA-PS 
(0.121), and TA-PV (0.153). ISKS had strong positive effect on OB (0.697), CA-RE 
(0.572), CA-SE (0.436). ISKS had a weak positive effect on AH (0.210), TA-PS (0.182), 
and AC (0.117). This indicated that knowledge sharing improved TA-PS and AC. ISKS 
had a strong negative effect on TA-PV (-0.751) and a weak negative effect on CB (-
0.172). The benefit of ISKS, in terms of CA-RE and CA-SE, is in line with prior research 
(Vance et al., 2012). The negative influence of ISKS on the use of CB demonstrates the 
value of training in reducing the use of CB. The significant negative effect of ISKS on 
TA-PV (-0.548) indicated that the knowledge sharing helped to reduce the vulnerability 
the UXA perceived. Clearly, in this situation, knowledge was power. OB had a strong 
positive effect on CA-RE (0.794) and CA-SE (0.639). Additionally, OB had a moderate 
positive effect on TA-PS (0.338) and a weak positive effect on AC (0.133). Given that 
OB tends to make on feel invulnerable it is logical that the CA-RE and CA-SE are 





Table 29          
          
Post-workshop Total Effects (N=42)     
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH 0.029             -0.154 0.008 
CA-RE 0.422                 
CA-SE -0.363                 
CB -0.108   -0.109 0.052       0.121 0.153 
ISKS 0.117 0.21 0.572 0.436 -0.172   0.697 0.182 -0.548 
OB 0.133   0.794 0.639       0.338 -0.751 
TA-PS -0.196                 
TA-PV -0.128                 
 
The significance of the path coefficients was evaluated using bootstrapping in 
SmartPLS. This technique, in SmartPLS, generates T-statistics for both outer and inner 
models (Wong, 2019). The paths that had significant p-values included ISKS->OB 
(<0.001), OB->CA-RE (<0.001), OB->CA-SE (<0.001), and OB->TA-PS (0.017) (Table 
30). Based on these results it was reasonable to conclude that the workshop had a 
significant influence on the use of OB and that OB significantly influenced RE, SE, and 
PS.   
Table 30      
      




M SD t p 
ISKS->OB 0.511 0.521 0.141 3.631 <0.001*** 
OB->CA-RE 0.638 0.647 0.103 6.197 <0.001*** 
OB->CA-SE 0.549 0.548 0.119 4.626 <0.001*** 
OB->TA-PS 0.326 0.309 0.154 2.12 0.017* 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
The effect size (f2) was evaluated to determine how one construct contributed to 





were computed using SmartPLS (Table 31). Strong positive effects included OB->CA-RE 
(1.839), OB->TA-PV (1.412), ISKS->OB (0.945), and OB->CA-SE (0.675). Clearly, OB 
was a significant influencer in the model. Weak positive effects included OB->TA-PS 
(0.130), CA-SE->AC (0.076), CA-RE->AC (0.056), AH->TA-PS (0.027), CB->CA-RE 
(0.035), CB->TA-PV (0.059), ISKS->AH (0.046), ISKS->CB (0.031), and TA-PS->AC 
(0.039).  
Table 31          
          
Post-workshop Effect Size (N=42)      
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH               0.027 0.000 
CA-RE 0.056                 
CA-SE 0.076                 
CB     0.035 0.004       0.017 0.059 
ISKS   0.046     0.031   0.945     
OB     1.839 0.675       0.13 1.412 
TA-PS 0.039                 
TA-PV 0.008                 
 
Blindfolding was used to test predictive relevance using the Stone-Geisser values 
(Wong, 2019). Constructs with significant predictive power are indicated in Table 32. 
Constructs found to provide moderate predictive power included CA-RE (0.265), CA-SE 
(0.231), and OB (0.164). TA-PS (0.044) was found to have weak predictive power in the 
post-workshop model.  
Table 32   
   
Post-workshop Predictive Power (N=42) 
Construct Q² Predictive Power 
CA-RE 0.265 Moderate 
CA-SE 0.231 Moderate 
OB 0.164 Moderate 





The next step in the analysis of the data was to perform SmartPLS Multigroup 
Analysis (PLS-MGA). Both datasets were merged, and a group identifier column was 
added to differentiate before-workshop and after-workshop data. The same model was 
used for the multigroup analysis. The measurement model was assessed for internal 
consistency reliability, indicator reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity 
(Hair et al., 2017). The structural model was assessed for collinearity among the 
constructs, as well as relevance and significance of the path coefficients (Hair et al., 
2017). The combined groups model with R2 and path coefficients can be found in Figure 
6. 
Figure 6 






Internal consistency reliability for the multigroup model was evaluated with 
Cronbach’s α. Constructs which demonstrated internal consistency reliability by way of 
Cronbach’s α include AH (0.631), CA-RE (0.711), CA-SE (0.881), ISKS (0.675), OB 
(0.731), and TA-PS (0.883) (Table 33). Like both the pre-workshop and post-workshop 
data analysis, the TA-PV did not meet the cutoff criteria (0.444 versus 0.70).  
Table 33  
  
Multigroup Cronbach's α (N=84) 










Composite reliability of the post-workshop data were assessed with ρ. The 
following constructs indicated composite reliability by virtue of the ρ scores AC (1.0), 
AH (0.819), CA-RE (0.758), CA-SE (0.882), CB (1.0), ISKS (0.756), OB (0.775), and 
TA-PS (0.924) (Table 34). Again, like the pre-workshop and post-workshop analyses, TA-





Table 34  
  












Convergent validity of the multigroup model was assessed using the AVE. 
Constructs that met the cutoff for AVE included AH (0.506), CA-RE (0.632), CA-SE 
(0.807), ISKS (0.596), OB (0.649), and TA-PS (0.805) (Table 35). TA-PV did not meet 
the cutoff for AVE potentially due to the use of individual questions from three different 
surveys. The bootstrapped AVE was also calculated for each construct using SmartPLS 
(Table 36). All constructs were found to have significant AVEs with p-values < 0.001 
which indicates that convergent validity was achieved. 
Table 35  
  














Table 36      
      




M SD t p 
AH 0.506 0.495 0.056 9.071 <0.001*** 
CA-RE 0.632 0.628 0.052 12.191 <0.001*** 
CA-SE 0.807 0.808 0.045 17.759 <0.001*** 
ISKS 0.596 0.59 0.059 10.126 <0.001*** 
OB 0.649 0.647 0.043 14.919 <0.001*** 
TA-PS 0.805 0.783 0.105 7.636 <0.001*** 
TA-PV 0.26 0.296 0.036 7.143 <0.001*** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
Discriminant validity was calculated for the multigroup data to determine if the 
constructs were conceptually and statistically distinct (Hair et al., 2017). To assess 
discriminant validity of the reflective measurement models, HTMT was used. The HTMT 
values for all constructs met the desired cutoff indicating discriminant validity (Table 37). 
Table 37         
         
Multigroup HTMT (N=84)    
Construct AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AH                 
CA-RE 0.261               
SA-SE 0.269 0.776             
CB 0.515 0.191 0.106           
ISKS 0.33 0.768 0.621 0.143         
OB 0.222 0.676 0.608 0.109 0.654       
TA-PS 0.212 0.386 0.174 0.153 0.387 0.226     
TA-PV 0.58 0.315 0.228 0.542 0.228 0.357 0.348   
 
To analyze the multigroup structural model, the model was evaluated for 
collinearity, as well as the significance and relevance of the relationships (Hair et al., 
2017). Collinearity was assessed using the VIF (Hair et al., 2017). For the post-workshop 





Table 38          
          
Multigroup VIF (N=84)        
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH               1.237 1.237 
CA-RE 1.782                 
CA-SE 1.645                 
CB     1.001 1.001       1.238 1.238 
ISKS   1     1   1     
OB     1.001 1.001       1.002 1.002 
TA-PS 1.112                 
TA-PV 1.038                 
 
 Path coefficients were of the multigroup model were evaluated to determine their 
significance and relevance (Hair et al., 2017). The most significant influencer of AC was 
TA-PV (-0.864) (Table 39). CA-SE had a positive impact on AC (0.149). CB had a 
positive impact on TA-PV (0.628). As ISKS and security updates increased awareness 
and it seems logical that it would increase the perceived vulnerabilities facing the UXA. 
ISKS had a weak positive impact on AH (0.121), CB (0.098), and a strong positive 
influence on OB (0.499). OB had a weak positive impact on TA-PS (0.196), CA-SE 
(0.500), and CA-RE (0.539). Again, training and education may have increased the 
UXA’s optimism about their ability to protect their servers. This would be reflected in 
increased CA-RE, CA-SE, and TA-PS. The negative influence of OB on TA-PV (-0.205) 
may indicate that the workshop and security emails increased awareness of the 





Table 39          
          
Multigroup Path Coefficients (N=84)     
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH               -0.093 0.07 
CA-RE -0.107                 
CA-SE 0.149                 
CB     -0.169 -0.085       -0.12 0.628 
ISKS   0.121     0.098   0.499     
OB     0.539 0.5       0.196 -0.205 
TA-PS 0.049                 
TA-PV -0.864                 
 
Total indirect effects were evaluated to assess the impact of interim constructs 
(Table 40). AH had a weak negative influence on AC (-0.065). This weak influence may 
be due to the increased knowledge of the significant vulnerabilities facing the UXAs and 
their perception of impotence in mitigating the risks. CB had a strong negative impact on 
AC (-0.543). It is logical that an increased use of CB has a substantial negative impact on 
compliance behavior. ISKS had a weak positive influence on AC (0.040), TA-PS (0.074), 
and a moderate influence on CA-RE (0.252), and CA-SE (0.241). The workshop and 
security updates increased awareness and increased the UXAs compliance, and belief that 
they can respond effectively to the risks. ISKS did have a weak negative influence on TA-
PV (-0.032). As noted previously, this reduced TA-PV may be due to the UXAs being 
introduced to tools and actions they can do to reduce the vulnerabilities facing their 
servers. Finally, OB had a moderately positive influence on AC (0.204). UXAs optimism 





Table 40          
          
Multigroup Indirect Effect (N=84)     
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH -0.065                 
CA-RE                   
CA-SE                   
CB -0.543                 
ISKS 0.04   0.252 0.241       0.074 -0.032 
OB 0.204                 
TA-PS                   
TA-PV                   
 
The most significant positive specific indirect effects included ISKS->OB->CA-
RE (0.269), and OB->TA-PV->AC (0.177) (Table 41). The most significant negative 
specific indirect effects included CB->TA-PV->AC (-0.543), ISKS->OB->CA-SE (-





Table 41  
  
Multigroup Specific Indirect Effect (N=84) 





















ISKS->CB->CA-SE  -0.017 
ISKS->OB->CA-RE  0.269 
ISKS->CB->CA-SE -0.008 
ISKS->OB->CA-SE  0.249 
ISKS->AH->TA-PS  -0.011 
ISKS->CB->TA-PS  -0.012 
ISKS->OB->TA-PS  0.098 
ISKS->AH->TA-PV  0.009 
ISKS->CB->TA-PV  0.062 
ISKS->OB->TA-PV  -0.102 
 
Due to the presence of mediating latent variables, the total effects were computed. 
Total effects for the multigroup model were computed using SmartPLS (Table 42). AH 
had a weak negative total effect on AC (-0.065) and TA-PS (-0.093) as well as a weak 
positive total effect on TA-PV (0.070). These minor effects may be due to increased 





emails. CA-RE had a negative influence on AC (-0.107). This is contrary to other 
research that found CA-RE to be a positive influencer of behavioral intention (Vance et 
al., 2012). UXAs may, in believing their response effectiveness is high, decided there was 
no need to implement suggested security changes. CA-SE had a positive impact on ACH 
(0.149). This is in line with prior research on CA-SE and behavioral intention (Safa et al., 
2016; Vance et al., 2012). CB had a strong negative influence on AC (-0.543), a moderate 
negative influence on CA-RE (-0.169), and weak negative impact on CA-SE (-0.085), 
and TA-PS (-0.120). Logically, as CB increases, there may be increased resistance to the 
implementation of security controls and guidelines. The moderate and weak negative 
influences on CA-RE, and CA-SE imply that the bias may reduce the UXAs belief in 
their ability to respond to IS risks. The negative influence of CB on TA-PS (-0.120) 
indicates that as UXAs increase their use of this bias it has a negative effect on their TA-
PS of an IS breach. Last, the positive impact of CB on TA-PV (0.628) indicated that the 
increased use of this bias may lead to increased levels of TA-PV. ISKS had a strong 
positive influence on OB (0.499), moderate positive influence on CA-RE (0.252), CA-SE 
(0.241), and weak positive influence on AH (0.121), TA-PS (0.074), and AC (0.040). 
ISKS had a weak negative impact on TA-PV (-0.032). Each of these findings, for the 
established constructs, were in line with prior research on ISKS (Posey et al., 2015). The 
positive effect of ISKS on OB, AH, and CB demonstrated that the workshop and security 
updates did have an impact on the participants. The strong influence of ISKS on OB may 
indicate, based on the questions, that they perceive themselves as more resilient and able 
to cope with the IS risks facing them. OB had strong positive total effects on CA-RE 





(0.196). Finally, OB had a moderate negative effect on TA-PV (-0.205). It seemed logical 
that increased optimistic bias resulted in increased CA-RE and CA-SE for the UXA. The 
positive impact of OB on AC and TA-PS indicated that the increased use of the bias did 
ultimately result in increased behavioral compliance. Lastly, the negative relationship 
between OB and TA-PV indicated that the increased use of this bias may lead to reduced 
TA-PV. TA-PS had a weak positive effect on AC (0.049). This finding is in line with prior 
research that tied TA-PS to behavioral intention (Bélanger et al., 2017; Posey et al., 2015; 
Siponen et al., 2014). Finally, TA-PV had a strong negative effect on AC (-0.864).  
Table 42          
          
Multigroup Total Effects (N=84)      
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH -0.065             -0.093 0.07 
CA-RE -0.107                 
CA-SE 0.149                 
CB -0.543   -0.169 -0.085       -0.12 0.628 
ISKS 0.04 0.121 0.252 0.241 0.098   0.499 0.074 -0.032 
OB 0.204   0.539 0.5       0.196 -0.205 
TA-PS 0.049                 
TA-PV -0.864                 
 
The significance of the path coefficients for the multigroup were evaluated using 
bootstrapping in SmartPLS (Table 43). The paths that had significant p-values included 
CB->TA-PV (<0.001), ISKS->OB (<0.001), OB->CA-RE (<0.001), OB->CA-SE 
(<0.001), OB->CA-SE (<0.001), OB->TA-PS (0.047), OB->TA-PV (0.022), and TA-PV-
>AC (<0.001). These results indicated that ISKS and OB had significant impact on the 





Table 43      
      




M SD t  p 
AH->TA-PS -0.093 -0.082 0.146 0.634 0.263 
AH->TA-PV 0.07 0.082 0.107 0.661 0.254 
CA-RE->AC -0.107 -0.1 0.087 1.235 0.108 
CA-SE->AC 0.149 0.152 0.096 1.542 0.062 
CB->CA-RE -0.169 -0.167 0.122 1.378 0.084 
CB->CA-SE -0.085 -0.085 0.12 0.702 0.241 
CB->TA-PS -0.12 -0.099 0.154 0.78 0.218 
CB->TA-PV 0.628 0.606 0.121 5.197 <0.001*** 
ISKS->AH 0.121 0.119 0.158 0.769 0.221 
ISKS->CB 0.098 0.094 0.113 0.867 0.193 
ISKS->OB 0.499 0.509 0.085 5.834 <0.001*** 
OB->CA-RE 0.539 0.545 0.081 6.647 <0.001*** 
OB->CA-SE 0.5 0.507 0.072 6.956 <0.001*** 
OB->TA-PS 0.196 0.187 0.117 1.678 0.047* 
OB->TA-PV -0.205 -0.201 0.102 2.006 0.022* 
TA-PS->AC 0.049 0.028 0.082 0.592 0.277 
TA-PV->AC -0.864 -0.843 0.117 7.394 <0.001*** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001  
 
The effect size (f2) was evaluated to determine how one construct contributed to 
the explaining power of other constructs (Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). Strong positive 
effects included TA-PV->AC (3.142), CB->TA-PV (0.602) (Table 44). Moderate positive 
effects included: OB->CA-RE (0.423), OB->CA-SE (0.334), and ISKS->OB (0.331). 
Weak positive effects included OB->TA-PV (0.079), CA-SE->AC (0.059), CB->CA-RE 





Table 44          
          
Multigroup Effect Size (N=84)       
Construct AC AH CA-RE CA-SE CB ISKS OB TA-PS TA-PV 
AC                   
AH               0.007 0.008 
CA-RE 0.028                 
CA-SE 0.059                 
CB     0.041 0.010       0.013 0.602 
ISKS   0.015     0.010   0.331     
OB     0.423 0.334       0.041 0.079 
TA-PS 0.009                 
TA-PV 3.142                 
 
Blindfolding was used to test predictive relevance using the Stone-Geisser values 
(Wong, 2019). AC (0.352) had strong predictive power in the model (Table 45). CA-SE 
(0.185) had moderate predictive power. OB (0.146) and TA-PV (0.086) had weak 
predictive power in the multigroup model.  
Table 45   
   
Multigroup Predictive Power (N=84) 
Construct Q² Predictive Power 
AC 0.352 Strong 
AH 0.002   
CA-RE 0.149 Weak 
CA-SE 0.185 Moderate 
CB -0.006   
OB 0.146 Weak 
TA-PS 0.016   
TA-PV 0.086 Weak 
 
Descriptive Statistic Analysis  
To assess changes in the use of AH, OB, and CB, the pre- and post-data for each 
variable were aggregated and t-statistics were computed for each. For AH, the four 





the three variables pre-workshop and post-workshop were compared with paired t-tests. 
Finally, for CB, the single variable was compared pre-workshop and post-workshop with 
a paired T-Test. This process allowed for a single paired t-test to be performed for each 
latent variable. The results (Table 46) indicated that AH (t=3.914, p<0.001) and CB 
(t=7.723, p<0.001) had a significant change from before the workshop to after the 
workshop. The mean for AH went from 4.667 to 4.155 indicating that the AH was not as 
impactful post-workshop. Similarly, the CB mean changed from 2.095 to 0.333 which 
indicated a significant reduction in the use of CB. OB, however, did not show a 
significant change from pre-workshop to post-workshop (t=-2.353, p=0.010). Figure 7 
provides a graphical representation of the before intervention and after intervention 
means for the three cognitive heuristics and biases constructs. 
Table 46    
    
Cognitive Heuristics and Biases Descriptive Statistics 




Before Mean 4.667 5.56 2.095 
Before Variance 1.745 1.238 2.283 
After Mean 4.155 5.802 0.333 
After Variance 1.796 1.024 0.423 
Observations 168 126 42 
Pearson Correlation 0.188 0.415 0.265 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0 
df 167 125 41 
t  3.914 -2.353 7.723 
P(T<=t) one-tail <0.001*** 0.01* <0.001*** 
t Critical one-tail 1.654 1.657 1.683 







Cognitive heuristics and biases with M and σ 
  
Finally, to assess the changes in AC behavior, paired t-tests were run on all pre- 
and post-workshop compliance indicators (Table 47). All five compliance indicators 
demonstrated significant change from pre- to post-workshop. It was interesting to note 
that the most frequently implemented security changes were ones that the UXA had 
complete control over including the following: server patching, local firewall 
implementation, and MFA implementation. The two lowest scoring behavioral changes 
were for security changes that required interfacing with the organization’s IS team 
(Tenable Nessus and Splunk implementations). Figure 8 provides a graphical 
representation of the means for each of the compliance indicators before and after the 
















Table 47      
      
Compliance T-Test Results (N=42)    
  COMPL1 COMPL2 COMPL3 COMPL4 COMPL5 
Before Mean 8.149 23.817 18.668 19.708 23.462 
After Mean 14.575 70.770 81.081 63.961 94.697 
Before Variance 419.159 1410.759 678.934 536.833 489.736 
After Variance 722.818 1346.618 867.276 1610.410 123.446 
Pearson Correlation 0.824 0.423 0.239 0.462 -0.250 
df 41 41 41 41 41 
t   2.721 7.625 11.779 7.989 17.014 
P (T<=t) one-tail 0.005** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 
t Critical one-tail 1.683 1.683 1.683 1.683 1.683 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001   
   
Figure 8 
Compliance metrics with M and SE 
 
Findings 
For hypotheses H1-3, the paired t-statistics were used to assess significance. To 
test hypotheses H4a-H8b the data from the PLS-MGA multigroup bootstrapped path 
analysis results were used to assess path significance. Hypotheses that were accepted 














H6d, H7a, H8a, and H8b were rejected. These results indicated that the workshop, ISC, 
and security update emails did have a significant impact on the use of AH, and CB but 
not OB.  
Table 48    
    
Hypotheses responses 
Hypothesis t p Accept/Reject 
H1: ISKS -> AH 3.914 <0.001*** Accepted 
H2: ISKS -> OB -2.353 0.01 Rejected 
H3: ISKS -> CB 7.723 <0.001*** Accepted 
H4a: AH -> TA-PS 0.634 0.263 Rejected 
H4b: AH -> TA-PV 0.661 0.254 Rejected 
H5a: OB -> TA-PS 1.678 0.047* Accepted 
H5b: OB -> TA-PV 2.006 0.022* Accepted 
H5c: OB -> CA-SE 6.956 <0.001*** Accepted 
H5d: OB -> CA-RE 6.647 <0.001*** Accepted 
H6a: CB -> TA-PS 0.78 0.218 Rejected 
H6b: CB -> TA-PV 2.006 <0.001*** Accepted 
H6c: CB -> CA-SE 0.702 0.241 Rejected 
H6d: CB -> CA-RE 1.378 0.084 Rejected 
H7a: TA-PS -> AC 0.592 0.277 Rejected 
H7b: TA-PV -> AC 7.394 <0.001*** Accepted 
H8a: CA-RE -> AC 1.235 0.108 Rejected 
H8b: CA-SE -> AC 1.542 0.062 Rejected 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
Summary 
The goal was to empirically assess the effect of a focused SETA workshop, an 
ISC, and periodic security update emails on UXAs’ knowledge sharing, use of cognitive 
heuristics, biases, threat appraisal, coping appraisal, and ISP compliance behavior. To 
accomplish this, participants completed a survey prior to the intervention. Additionally, 
AC behavior data points were collected from script, Tenable Nessus, Splunk, and 
organizational databases. The pre-workshop data were evaluated using SmartPLS to 





significance of path coefficients in the model. Ninety days following the workshop, ISC, 
and security emails, participants completed a post-workshop survey, and AC data points 
were collected again. This post-workshop data were evaluated in SmartPLS. Following 
those two analyses, a multigroup analysis was completed using the merged before and 
after data. This analysis provided the significant path coefficients that were used to 
answer hypotheses H4a-H8b. T-Tests were used to evaluate changes in AC, OB, and CB 
to answer H1-H3. Based on these analyses, eight hypotheses were accepted, and nine 





Chapter 5  
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Overview 
 This chapter includes conclusions that were drawn from the data analysis 
followed by a discussion about the study’s limitations, strengths, and weaknesses. Next, 
implications of this research on organizational security training are discussed. Finally, 
recommendations for future research are identified. This chapter closes with a concise 
summary of the study. 
Conclusions  
The goal was to empirically assess the effect of a focused SETA workshop, an 
ISC, and periodic security update emails on UXAs’ knowledge sharing, use of cognitive 
heuristics, biases, threat appraisal, coping appraisal, and ISP compliance behavior.  
Based on the t-statistical analysis, the use of AH and CB were significantly influenced by 
the security workshop, ISC, and security update emails. This finding is encouraging as it 
implied that changes in IS behavior can be accomplished through IS training. 
Unfortunately, OB did not meet the statistical cutoff for significance. It did, however, 
have a statistically significant influence on TA-PS, TA-PV, CA-SE, and CA-RE. It is 
possible that a larger sample size might have increased the significance and demonstrated 
how OB was influenced by ISKS. Based on the PLS multigroup analysis, OB and CB did 
have significant effects on TA-PS, TA-PV, CA-SE, and CA-RE. 
In the post-group analysis, CA-SE had a negative impact on AC (-0.363). This 





intention (Vance et al., 2012). One possible explanation is that the UXA with high CA-SE 
feel it was unnecessary to make additional changes to their servers to prevent security 
breaches. Also, in the post-group analysis, TA-PS and TA-PV had a negative impact on 
AC (-0.196 and -0.128 respectively). While these values are not very strong it is curious 
to note that increased TA-PS or TA-PV resulted in reduced compliance. It was possible 
that this was due to the increased awareness of the potential problems that the UXA must 
mitigate resulting in a sense of being overwhelmed and throwing up their hands in defeat. 
Also, in the post-group analysis, it was interesting that, as the use of OB increases there is 
a small increase in AC. This may be due to the substantial specific indirect effect (0.335) 
from OB->CA-RE->AC. The negative relationship of OB and TA-PV (0.751) seems 
appropriate since OB makes one feel invulnerable. The positive effect of OB on TA-PS 
(0.338) may be due UXA feeling optimistic regarding the possibility their servers may be 
breached but still understanding that a breach would be severe for the organization and 
the individual.  
In the multigroup analysis, the most significant influencer of AC was TA-PV (-
0.864). Two considerations that may have resulted in this strongly negative relationship. 
First, the UXAs may have been overwhelmed by the vulnerabilities facing them which 
could resulted in a failure to implement security measures. Another consideration could 
be problems associated with the survey questions used. As noted earlier, Cronbach’s α 
and ρ were below statistical requirements for the four TA-PV questions. AH had a small 
negative influence on TA-PS (-0.093) and a small positive influence on TA-PV (0.070). 
CA-RE had a negative influence on AC (-0.107). This is contrary to other research which 





Vance et al., 2012). CA-SE had a positive impact on AC (0.149). This is in line with prior 
research where individual CA-SE was positive related to compliance intention (Safa et 
al., 2016; Siponen et al., 2014, Vance et al., 2012). CB had a negative influence on CA-
RE (-0.169), CA-SE (-0.085), and TA-PS (-0.120). This may be due to the education and 
alerts challenging the CB and resulting in reduced CA-RE, CA-SE, and TA-PS. ISKS had 
a weak positive impact on AH (0.121), CB (0.098), and a strong positive influence on OB 
(0.499). The workshop and security updates may have increased participant’s alertness to 
vulnerability reports in the news which may have resulted in increased availability of 
incidents. The strong positive impact of ISKS on OB may indicate that the education 
raised awareness of tools and methods of securing their servers. This is a positive change 
as it indicates that the education does help UXAs increase awareness and improve the 
security of their servers. TA-PS had a weak positive influence on AC (0.049). It seems 
logical that increased TA-PS of the impact of a breach would positively influence 
compliance behavior. TA-PV had a strong negative impact on AC (-0.864). As mentioned 
earlier, this may be due to a sense of being overwhelmed by the number of vulnerabilities 
and risks facing the UXAs and their deciding that they unable to make the changes 
needed. This result may also be due to the problems related to the survey questions for 
TA-PV. Finally, for the multigroup analysis, TA-PV had a strong negative effect on AC (-
0.864). This may be attributed to the problems associated with the questions previously 
mentioned, it may be the result of UXA’s being overwhelmed by the work facing them, or 
it could be related to the independent, free-thinking nature of UXA’s in resisting control 
by the organization (Markowitz, 2016).   





reported behavioral intention. These metrics allowed for an assessment of actual security 
changes made by the UXAs following the workshop, ISC, and security update emails. It 
was encouraging that all the behavioral metrics analyzed showed significant change 
between pre-workshop and post-workshop analysis. COMPL3 (local firewall) and 
COMPL5 (patching) had the highest degree of change based on the t-statistics. 
Interestingly, these two actions were actions the UXA could take on their own with no 
interaction with the IS team. COMPL2 (Tenable) and COMPL4 (MFA) required minor 
interaction with the IS team in that the UXA had to request their servers be registered. 
This request was usually performed via an email sent to the IS team requesting the 
servers be added. After that, however, no interaction with the security team was necessary 
and security scans could be run and viewed by the UXA at their leisure. COMPL1 
(centralized log management), demonstrated the lowest change in behavior between pre-
and post-workshop. This metric required sending server log data to the IS team via syslog 
forwarding. That means that the interaction level, effort required, and data exposure were 
significantly higher than the other metrics. This level of data sharing may not have been 
desirable to the UXAs outside of the central IT organization which could account for this 
metric being the lowest compliance change. Additionally, changes that involved the IS 
team, may have been limited by the 90-day period of the study. Although quarterly 
analysis of security metrics was recommended by Jaquith (2007) that time period may 
not have allowed for the significant number of requests and project load that the IS team 
experienced after the security workshop. Project delays may have resulted in reduced 
compliance scores. With additional time, allowing for the project implementation delays 





degree of change. 
One of the greatest challenges facing this study was the number of participants. 
UXAs across the institution tend to be very isolated within their own fiefdoms where they 
maintain complete control. The workshop had 60 individuals that participated but 
investigation showed that some were not UXAs, and a few were managers and directors 
that did not administer any servers. This discovery dropped the total participant count to 
42 UXAs. While this number still met the levels recommended by Hair et al. (2017) for a 
PLS-SEM analysis, it may have limited the statistical analyses and generalizability of the 
results.  
It was noted in the data analysis that the four TA-PV questions did not reach 
significance levels for Cronbach’s α, ρ, and AVE. The questions was pulled from work by 
Hanus and Wu (2016), one question was from the work of Siponen et al. (2014), one 
question was from the work of Ifinedo (2012), and a final question was developed based 
on the recommendation of a pilot-tester. While the questions were deemed sufficient by 
pilot testers, it appears that the four questions did not combine into reliable indicators for 
the TA-PV construct. The AH survey questions were developed for this study and 
reviewed by the SME pilot-testers. While VIF and HTMT evaluated all the AH indicators 
as meeting collinearity constraints, the Cronbach’s α was still below the statistical 
requirement. Last, several participants indicated that there was some confusion regarding 
the CB question used in the survey. Due to the confusion, the description associated with 
the question was clarified for the post-workshop survey. At that point, however, the 
participants had already experienced the question which may have impacted the choices 





After the workshop, the ISC was instantiated and made available to participants to 
allow them to use Metasploit to breach a vulnerable Linux VM. Unfortunately, only 38% 
of the participants completed the server breaching exercise in the four hours following 
the workshop. The following week several participants asked for the ISC to be restarted 
for a few hours, but this only resulted in an additional 4% increase in participation in the 
Metasploit lab. If the ISC could have remained running 24/7 for the weeks following the 
workshop, UXA would have had significantly more opportunity to use the Metasploit lab. 
Unfortunately, due to the cost of running the scenario in AWS, it was not deemed possible 
to run the lab continuously. Finally, had the workshop been in-person as initially planned 
it would have been easier to encourage participation in the ISC. Unfortunately, due to 
COVID-19, the work sites had been closed and remote training was required.  
Implications 
 This study demonstrated the influence of security training and knowledge sharing 
on the use of cognitive heuristics and biases of a unique group of systems administrators. 
UXA have sometimes been generalized by IS teams as cowboys and renegades. In the 
institution where the study was performed the UXAs are spread out geographically and 
organizationally. Many participants managed a handful of servers with minimal 
interaction with the IS team. The security workshop brought together many of these 
individuals from across the institution to help them become aware of the vulnerabilities 
facing UNIX servers and the risks associated with not implementing security. 
Additionally, the workshop introduced participants to the key actions they can implement 
and the tools they can use to protect their UNIX servers. The post-workshop security 





guidance on how to implement security tools discussed in the workshop. The goal of the 
post-workshop security updates was to maintain security awareness and encourage the 
implementation of security controls. The feedback from participants regarding the content 
of the workshop and security updates was consistently positive. The interaction of the 
participants in the new Microsoft Teams channel was also encouraging. Clearly, from an 
organizational perspective, institutions that have UXAs need to provide security 
awareness training that is relevant and provides the UXAs the knowledge and tools they 
need to improve the security of UNIX servers. Additionally, there seems to be a desire for 
a sense of community even among the distributed UXAs in the organization. The periodic 
emails asking for other UXAs’ advice and the use of the Teams channel demonstrated that 
shared knowledge helped everyone secure their servers. Last, the IS team needs to try to 
approach UXAs to help them integrate into the organizations overall IS strategy. At the 
organization studied, the IS team is largely focused on the threats and vulnerabilities 
facing Windows servers. This lack of UNIX focus by the IS team leaves some UXAs 
feeling overlooked and underappreciated and could lead to dangerous levels of non-
compliance. The workshop, ISC, and security update emails demonstrated the value for 
UXAs to connect with the IS team. Additionally, it helped show the importance of 
embracing IS tools that protect the organization.       
Recommendations 
 Several recommendations can be made to further this line of research. First, 
increasing the number of participants would increase the statistical relevance of the study 
and could potentially demonstrate the impact that OB has on actual security compliance 





doing this research across organizations might be necessary. This would, however, 
introduce the new challenge of gathering the behavioral metrics on servers in different 
organizations. It is possible that a scoring script could be developed that runs on all the 
participant’s servers and they send the results to the researcher. Second, setting up the 
ISC on premise would allow it to remain operational for the weeks following the 
workshop potentially increasing participation. The hope in completing the ISC was to 
demonstrate to the UXA how easy it was to breach a vulnerable Linux VM using 
Metasploit. Unfortunately, the limited availability of the ISC seemed to reduce 
participation. Third, modifying the TA-PV questions to come from a single, reliable, and 
validated survey instrument may resolve the Cronbach’s α and ρ problems associated 
with this study’s TA-PV indicator questions. Fourth, it might be helpful to do additional 
testing of the AH questions in an attempt to improve their reliability and validity. Fifth, 
performing this study as a longitudinal study over a longer period of time may allow for 
additional implementation of security controls. Finally, performing this study with both 
Windows administrators and UXAs might afford an opportunity to assess the differences 
between the two groups in terms of their perceptions of security, vulnerability, severity, 
and overall security strategy they each employ.    
Summary 
The implementation of security controls is crucial to the defense of computing 
systems (Siponen et al., 2014; Tsohou et al., 2015). Organizations are at risk if employees 
do not follow ISPs and breaches occur (HIPAA Journal, 2020; Ponemon Institute, 2019; 
Yoo et al., 2018). Many organizations’ servers are Windows based, but a significant 





processing power, reliability, security, and clustering technology (Bajgoric, 2006; 
Beuchelt, 2017a; Hussain et al., 2015). Linux servers represent more than 70% of the web 
servers used on our planet (W3Techs, 2020). While many vulnerabilities and breaches 
involve Windows servers and applications, the proliferation of Linux and UNIX servers 
and their use for back-end databases make them tempting targets for attackers (Newman, 
2019; Shrivastava, 2018). Unfortunately, due to the open nature of Linux and UNIX 
systems, they have a significant number of known vulnerabilities and must be patched 
and properly secured to mitigate risk (CVE Details, 2020). The problem is that some 
UXAs fail to completely implement organizational ISP due to the use of cognitive 
heuristics and biases that lead them to perceive lower threat levels facing Linux and 
UNIX servers (Siponen et al., 2014; Tsohou et al., 2015). This failure may leave their 
servers open to systems disruption, loss of proprietary data, cause harm to organizational 
reputation, and create financial loss due to litigation and fines levied against their 
organizations (Donaldson et al., 2015; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). The goal of this 
research was to empirically assess the effect of a focused SETA workshop, an ISC, and 
periodic security update emails on UXAs’ knowledge sharing, use of cognitive heuristics, 
biases, threat appraisal, coping appraisal, and ISP compliance behavior.  
The following research question guided the investigation: How does a focused 
SETA workshop, ISC, and regular security updates, designed for UXAs, influence their 
ISKS, use of cognitive heuristics and biases, and actual ISP compliance behavior? The 
use of cognitive heuristics and biases can negatively impact threat appraisal and coping 
appraisals (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Being unaware of the risks 





comply with ISPs (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017; Renaud, 2012). 
While generalized SETA programs are useful in organizations for staff-wide training, 
developing a focused SETA programs and ISC, aimed specifically for the job tasks of 
UXA, may improve engagement and ISP compliance behavior (Chen et al., 2018; Ki-
Aries & Faily, 2017). This research helped to develop an understanding of how a SETA 
programs, ISC, and periodic security update emails, influenced UXA use of the AH, OB, 
and CB.  
The research took place in several phases. First, the research problem was 
identified, and a literature review was performed to demonstrate the need and to place 
this research in the existing body of knowledge. Next, a survey instrument was 
developed, based largely on prior research, and tested with a pilot group of subject matter 
experts. After results were returned the survey instrument was modified. The final 
instrument had 25 questions related to the following constructs: CA-SE, CA-RE, TA-PV, 
TA-PS, ISKS, OB, AH, and CB. The compliance metrics were also developed during this 
period. The metrics were based on materials covered during the workshop and reinforced 
through the security update emails. The five data points evaluated included: the 
percentage of an administrator's servers sending data to centralized log management 
system, the percentage of an administrator's servers with centrally recorded Tenable 
Nessus data, the percentage of an administrator's servers blocking telnet/ftp ports 
(TCP/UDP 21, 23) and remote services ports (TCP/UDP 512-514), the percentage of an 
administrator's servers using multi-factor authentication, and the percentage of an 
administrator's servers that have had recent software updates. These data points were 





organization secure secret databases. Scripts were also used to collect some data points 
that were unavailable through Tenable. 
During this period, the security workshop was developed. The goals of the 
workshop were to: 
6) Help maintain cybersecurity awareness by:  
a. Discussing the scope and impact of data breaches, 
b. Learning about key websites that provide critical and timely information 
about software and hardware vulnerabilities, 
i. Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (Verizon, 2019), 
ii. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (n.d.), 
iii. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil 
Rights Breach Portal, 
iv. National Vulnerability Database. 
c. Identifying different types of cyber attackers and their motivations, 
d. Learning about cyber-attacks made against our organization, 
e. Discussing the cost of a HIPAA breach, 
f. Discussing our implementation of Defense in Depth 
i. Firewalls/Intrusion prevention systems (IPS), 
ii. Security Event/Information Management (SIEM), 
iii. Identity and rights management, 
iv. Anti-phishing campaigns, 
v. Advanced endpoint protection, 





vii. Behavioral analytics, 
viii. Penetration testing, 
ix. Cyber forensics. 
7) Help participants mitigate security risk for their servers by: 





iv. Escalate privilege, 
v. Lateral movement, 
vi. Anti-forensics,  
vii. Denial of service, 
viii. Data exfiltration. 
b. Discussing the types of cyber attackers 
i. Cyber criminals – identity theft and financial fraud with goal of 
monetary gain, 
ii. Script kiddies – minimal skills, use available exploit kits, 
iii. Brokers – uncover vulnerabilities in software or systems and sell 
the information, 
iv. Insiders – employees, partners, and contractors motivated by 
perceived wrong, 






vi. Cyberterrorists – disable and disrupt network or computing 
infrastructure, 
vii. Organized crime – highly funded, high-level of skill, seek financial 
gain, 
viii. Hacktivists – political, social, or principle-based agenda, 
ix. State-sponsored attackers / nation state – highly funded and skilled, 
intelligence gathering or service disruption, focus is government 
interests. 
c. Identifying the top threats and risks facing our organization’s servers, 
i. Key threats and vulnerabilities  
1. Compromised credentials and privilege escalation, 
2. Web service exploitation, 
3. Server vulnerabilities that permit remote code execution, 
4. Cryptography weaknesses, 
5. Deserialization, 
6. Scripting, 
7. Malware, fileless malware, and rootkits. 
ii. Key exploits facing servers 
1. Buffer and stack overflows, 
2. Memory corruption, 
3. Race conditions, 





d. Identifying 12 activities, settings, and tools participants can use to improve 
the safety and security of their servers, 
i. Minimize services / disable unwanted services / limit open ports to 
reduce vulnerabilities and attack vectors, 
ii. Remove unnecessary software to reduce the number of 
vulnerabilities and potential attack vectors, 
iii. Keep Linux/UNIX kernel and other software as up to date as 
possible, 
iv. Ensure strong password policies and account management, 
v. Kernel hardening to protect against attacks, 
vi. Configure the server’s local firewall, 
vii. Disk security – file integrity checking, file system encryption, 
viii.  Configure SSH security settings, 
ix. Implement Security Enhanced Linux, 
x. Configure centralized log management, 
xi. Perform monthly vulnerability scans on servers, 
xii. Run Malware detection software to detect worms, viruses, and 
rootkits.   
e. Learning about available enterprise tools and other locally administered 
tools participants can use for vulnerability analysis and security 
monitoring. 






a. Using nmap for enumeration, scanning, and vulnerability analysis on 
servers, 
i. Ping scan, 
ii. Version scan, 
iii. Vulnerability scan. 
b. Using Wireshark for network traffic analysis for security monitoring and 
problem resolution, 
i. Search and filter options, 
ii. Protocol inspection, 
iii. Live network traffic capture, 
iv. Offline network traffic analysis 
c. Using the Metasploit Framework in action and its utility to identify, 
enumerate, and exploit a server 
i. Reconnaissance & Scanning/Enumeration, 
ii. Exploitation demo: 
1. VSFTPD, 
2. Ssh, 
3. Mysql,  
4. Samba. 
9) Access a cloud-based Cyber lab to: 
d. Get hands-on experience using nmap and the Metasploit Framework 
(MSF) in a secure, cloud-based virtual environment, 





f. Compete to find the most flags on the Linux target machine. 
10) Connect with other UNIX administrators to increase knowledge sharing and 
collaboration: 
a. Joining a new Microsoft Team’s Team for UXA in the organization. 
Also during this period, the Linux-based Metasploit scenario was designed, 
created, and tested in the EDURange online AWS environment. Once IRB approval was 
obtained from both organizations, the IS team provided a comprehensive listing of all 
UNIX servers in the institution. This data were analyzed to identify UXAs across the 
institution. All of these UXAs were invited to participate in the workshop and ISC. Forty-
two participants met the study’s requirements and completed all study protocols. In the 
next phase, participants completed the Qualtrics survey.  
Once all pre-workshop data were collected, the 2.5-hour workshop was scheduled 
and held via secure Zoom session due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Sixty individuals 
participated in the workshop but only 42 participants were UXAs and used for this study. 
Immediately following the workshop the ISC was made available to the participants. Due 
to the cost of running the multiple scenarios in AWS, access was only provided for the 
four hours immediately following the workshop. The following week, at the request of 
several participants, the ISC was restarted for one afternoon. Participation in the ISC was 
limited to 42%. Over the next 90-days, six security update emails were sent to 
participants. These emails provided an update regarding recently identified UNIX 
vulnerabilities, relevant CERT alerts, recent breach announcements, an invitation to join 
the new Microsoft Teams group set up for UXA collaboration, as well as guidance on the 





update emails were to maintain current cybersecurity awareness, increase security 
knowledge sharing, and reinforce security recommendations made during the workshop. 
Three months after the workshop, an email was sent to all participants to complete the 
post-workshop survey. Additionally, the participants’ servers were reanalyzed to quantify 
the changes made by the UXA during the study. 
During the analysis phase of the research, the pre-workshop survey results and 
behavioral data points were analyzed using SmartPLS. PLS-SEM has been used 
extensively to evaluate complex models in IS (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Ifinedo, 2012; Rhee et 
al., 2012; Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Safa et al., 2016). Post-workshop survey results and 
behavioral data were also analyzed in SmartPLS. Finally, a multigroup analysis was done 
by combining the data from pre-workshop and post-workshop and creating data groups. 
Each analysis included PLS analysis, reliability and validity tests, bootstrap analysis, and 
blindfolding analysis. The multigroup analysis also included PLS-MGA analysis. For 
hypothesis testing of H1-3, the paired t-statistics were used to assess significance. To test 
hypotheses H4a-H8b the data from the PLS-MGA multigroup bootstrapped path analysis 
results were used to assess path significance. Hypotheses that were accepted were H1, 
H3, H5a, H5b, H5c, H5d, H6b, and H7b. H2, H4a, H4b, H6a, H6c, H6d, H7a, H8a, and 
H8b were rejected. These results indicated that the workshop, ISC, and security update 
emails did have a significant impact on the use of AH, and CB but not OB.  
Additionally, it was noted that all five of the behavioral data points had 
statistically significant increases in IS compliance behavior. Those data points that could 
be done solely by the UXA without the participation of the IS team (local firewall 





those that required action by the IS team (integration with Tenable Nessus, and Splunk 
integration).  
This study demonstrated the need to consider cognitive biases and heuristics when 
evaluating the most effect way to improve ISP compliance. It also demonstrated the 
importance of specialized IS training in the form of a UXA-focused workshop, ISC, and 
security update emails to increase awareness and improve compliance. The ISKS had a 
statistically significant impact on all five of the evaluated UXAs compliance behaviors. 
UXAs use of the AH and CB were influenced by the workshop, ISC, and security update 
emails. While the influence of the ISKS on OB did not reach an acceptable significance 
level, the bias did demonstrate significant impact to all four elements of PMT, namely 
TA-PV, TA-PS, CA-RE, and CA-SE. This research adds to the body of knowledge related 
to specialized SETA program development, the integration of cognitive biases and 
heuristics with the PMT framework, and analysis of actual security behavior to assess 






Information Security Survey Form 
Welcome! 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this UNIX administrator workshop and research 
project! If you are receiving this survey, it means that you have completed and returned 
the informed consent form and are ready to participate in this UNIX security workshop 
and cyber lab.  
 
As a reminder, my name is John McConnell. I am an IT Technical Manager and a 
doctoral candidate in Information Systems in the College of Computing and Engineering 
at Nova Southeastern University. My dissertation chair is Martha Snyder, Ph.D., from 
Nova Southeastern University. My research is a study on UNIX systems administrator 
perceptions about information security, security training, understanding of security risks 
and vulnerabilities, organizational support, and policy compliance. The Institutional 
Review Board approval number for this research project is (JHH Application No.: 
IRB00240988, NSU Application No.: 2020-60). 
 
Completing this survey is an important part of this research project and we appreciate 
your help in completing this survey. No identifying information will be included in the 
research report and your responses will be confidential. It should take no longer than 10 
minutes to answer the questions. Several questions have a time limitation on them. For 
those questions please make your choices as quickly as possible in the time provided. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact John McConnell 
(jmcconn3@jhmi.edu or jm3967@mynsu.nova.edu) or 410-935-5657. You may also 
contact my dissertation chair, Martha Snyder, Ph.D. at smithmt@nova.edu or 954-262-
2074.  
 
For each question, please honestly rate your level of agreement from strongly disagree (1) 
to strongly agree (7).  
 
Please click the link below to begin the online survey.  
 
Q5. I believe I have the expertise to implement preventative measures to stop 
unauthorized people from getting my organization's confidential information stored on 
my servers. 
Q6. I believe I have the skills to implement preventative measures to stop unauthorized 
people from damaging my servers. 
Q7. I believe I can configure my server to provide good protection from software attacks. 
Q8. Enabling security measures on my servers will prevent users from gaining 
unauthorized access to important personal, financial, or patient information. 
Q9. The preventative measures available to me to stop people from gaining access to my 





Q10. Frequently applying security patches on my operating system is an effective way of 
preventing hacker attacks on my servers. 
Q11. My servers could be at risk of having Malware, virus, or similar infection 
Q12. My organization could be subjected to a serious information security threat. 
Q13. I believe that trying to protect my company's servers and information will mitigate 
the risk of illegal access to organizational data. 
Q14. I believe that all computer systems are potentially vulnerable to malicious activity 
and compromise. 
Q15. An information security breach in my organization would be cause serious 
complications for my organization and me. 
Q16. I believe that having my servers infected with malware, a virus, or similar infection 
would cause serious complications for my organization and me. 
Q17. An information security breach in my organization would cause serious 
complications for my organization and me. 
Q18. I frequently share my information security knowledge in my team in order to 
decrease information security risk. 
Q19. I think information security knowledge sharing with my team helps me to 
understand the usefulness of information security policies in my organization. 
Q20. I think sharing information security knowledge is a valuable practice in my 
organization. 
Q21. My organization has the tools in place to mitigate information security threats. 
Q22. My organization executable security practices to mitigate information security 
threats. 
Q23. The likelihood that my servers will be disrupted due to information security 
breaches in the next 12 months is low. 
Q24. On the next screen you will be presented with four questions. You will be limited to 
30 seconds to select your answers. The choices are the same as the previous responses 1-
strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-somewhat disagree, 4-neither agree nor disagree, 5-
somewhat agree, 6-agree, and 7-strongly agree. 
Q25. <Undisplayed timing> 
Q26. I believe Microsoft Windows servers have more vulnerabilities than Linux/UNIX 
servers.  
Q27. I believe there are more security vulnerabilities, alerts, and patches related to 
Microsoft Windows servers than Linux/UNIX servers. 
Q28. I believe a Microsoft Windows server containing Protected Health Information 
(PHI) is likely to be breached. 
Q29. I believe a Linux/UNIX server containing Protected Health Information (PHI) is 
likely to be breached. 
Q30. Scenario Question: Your organization plans on implementing a new web server to 
provide customers’ access to HIPAA protected PHI data. In order to provide the highest 
level of security, would you recommend the web server be implemented on the Microsoft 





Q31. On the next screen you will be presented with additional information you can 
choose to review that you might consider regarding your recommendation. There are 12 
data points that are either pro (in favor of) or con (against) each operating system. You 
must choose at least one item and may choose up to 6 items. You are limited to 20 
seconds to make your selection. Once you make your selection, click the arrow to move 
to the next screen. At that time you will be shown the additional information you 
requested. 
Q32. Please select at least one and no more than six additional pieces of information 
below.  
UNIX/Linux (Pro) UNIX/Linux (Con) Windows (Pro) Windows (Con) 
UNIX/Linux (Con) UNIX/Linux (Pro) Windows (Con) Windows (Pro) 
UNIX/Linux (Pro) UNIX/Linux (Con) Windows (Pro) Windows (Con) 
Q33. <Undisplayed timing> 
The following are displayed based on display logic. Only items selected in Q32 are 
displayed. 
Q34. UNIX/LINUX (Pro) - UNIX/Linux servers can be configured with higher amounts 
of memory and CPUs making them significantly more powerful than Windows servers. 
Q35. UNIX/LINUX (Con) - Porting of applications to UNIX/Linux distributions is not 
the focus of many software companies. 
Q36. UNIX/LINUX (Pro) - There are fewer demands on the hardware due to reduced 
operating systems overhead in UNIX/Linux. 
Q37. UNIX/Linux (Con) - Several professional office programs (i.e. Microsoft Windows, 
Microsoft SharePoint, and Microsoft Visio) do not work with UNIX/Linux. 
Q38. UNIX/Linux (Pro) - Remote function access is integrated into the native operating 
system on UNIX/Linux distributions (shell and terminal). 
Q39. UNIX/Linux (Con) - UNIX/Linux can be more difficult to administer due to its 
command line nature. 
Q40. Windows (Pro) - A Windows server is easier for new systems administrators due to 
the intuitive operations of the graphical user interface. 
Q41. Windows (Con) - The licensing costs for Windows can be high and can increase 
with each user. 
Q42. Windows (Pro) - Windows is compatible with popular Microsoft programs like 
SharePoint, Visio, and Exchange. 
Q43. Windows (Con) - Windows servers are very vulnerable to malware. 
Q44. Windows (Pro) - There are many skilled individuals that can fill Windows systems 
administrator positions. 
Q45. Windows (Con) - The use of mandatory graphical user interface on Windows 
servers results in significant resource utilization for basic operating systems function. 
Q46. Based on the additional information you received, which operating system would 
you suggest for this Web server?  UNIX/Linux  Windows 










Q48. Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey! Your responses will help us 
understand how systems administrator perceive information security, security training, 






UNIX Administrator Interactive Security Challenge 
 
Course Title: UXA Interactive Security Challenge 
 
Delivery Method: Windows or Linux computer and Internet access 
 
Overarching Goal: The overarching goal of this security challenge is to increase 
security awareness and ISP policy compliance by developing skills needed to do network 
and server enumeration to facilitate exploitation of a Linux VM in a segregated, cloud 
environment.  
 
Background: UXAs have the highest privilege levels and access to the vast amount of 
confidential PHI and PII stored on their servers (Beuchelt, 2017b; Kraemer & Carayon, 
2007). They are responsible for operating system installation, configuration, patching, 
user management, monitoring, data backup, implementation of security controls, disaster 
recovery, and testing (Beuchelt, 2017b; Inshanally, 2018; Santara, 2013). SETA programs 
are a means for organizations to minimize the risk of insider caused security failures 
(Burns et al., 2015; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). Users are the weakest link for information 
security and SETA programs can help to reduce the potential attack surface of 
organizations by improving the ability of users to identify and prevent information 
security breaches (Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Gardner & Thomas, 2014). Developing an 
understanding of the tools used to perform penetration testing may clarify the importance 
of securing UNIX servers. 
 
Target Audience: The target audience for this security workshop is organizational 
UXAs. 
 
Length of Course: 2.5 hours 
 
Challenge Description: The goal of the UXA ISC is to develop hands-on skills in 
penetration testing using tools learned during the security workshop. Learning and using 
the tools of a penetration tester will encourage participants to think like the hacker so that 
they develop a security mindset aware of the threats, risks, and vulnerabilities facing their 
servers and organization. By learning about the common tools and how easily one can 
identify and enumerate server vulnerabilities the challenge may encourage the 
development of an information security culture in the UNIX team. The hands-on 
workshop will demonstrate the need for constant monitoring of vulnerabilities and 
ultimately the vital need to secure UNIX servers in the organization to prevent loss. 
Providing an isolated, remote lab environment is an effective training method for systems 






ISC Setup: Two Linux VMs will be instantiated for each participant: a participant VM 
(meta_nat) and a target server (metasploitable). A private subnet will be created between 
the two VMs. Also an Internet-accessible public subnet for logging/communicating with 
EDURange. The metasploitable VM is a metasploitable3 image from Rapid7. 
 
Module Learning Objectives: At the end of this ISC module, the participants will: 
 
1) be able to perform network reconnaissance, server enumeration, port and service 
enumeration using nmap to identify a vulnerable Linux server on an isolated 
network; 
2) be able to run the Metasploit framework on a Linux VM; 
3) be able to identify a relevant exploit to use to gain command line access to a 
Linux server.  
 
Module Setup: For this module, participants will scan the network segment, identify the 
vulnerable server (metasploitable), and enumerate potential exploits. Then participants 
will breach metasploitable using as many exploits they can find. Once participants gain 
access to the VM they will locate, download, decode, and hash CTF target files. Hash 
values will be used in the EDURange scenario grading system to assess completion of the 
module. 
 
Learning Objective 1: Participants will be able to perform network reconnaissance, 
server enumeration, port and service enumeration using nmap to identify a 
vulnerable Linux server on an enclosed, cloud environment. 
 
1) Participants will use the Linux VM (meta_nat).  
2) Participants will use nmap scan to identify servers, open ports, services on ports, 
and OS guesses on servers in the isolated EDURange network segment 
(metasploitable). 
3) Participants will identify potential targets (IP, open ports, and open services) in 
the virtual network. 
 
Learning Objective 2: Participants will learn how to perform a server attack using 
the Metasploit Framework. 
 
1) Participants will locate and start the Metasploit Framework in their VM. 
2) Participants will identify an exploit in the Metasploit framework they will use on 
the target Linux VM (metasploitable).  
3) Using Metasploit the participants will gain login access to the Linux VM.  
4) Once participants gain access to the VM they will locate, download, decode, and 
hash CTF target files. Hash values will be used in the EDURange scenario 







ISC Instruction Sheet 
 
Metasploitable Exercise Guide 
Description 
Metasploitable poses the challenge of identifying a vulnerable server, 
enumerating the services and ports, and using the Metasploit Framework to gain access to 
the server. Finally, you will locate CTF target cards and provide the hashes of the image 
files for scoring.  
Background 
Identifying servers on your network and determining their vulnerabilities is an 
important skill for penetration testers and system administrators. Using tools, like nmap 
and the Metasploit Framework, you can learn about the threats to your servers. The nmap 
tool, or network mapper, is a comprehensive, free, open source network scanning tool. It 
is used by penetration testers, network administrators, and hackers to examine a server. It 
can be used on a single host or a network segment/IP range. Nmap manipulates TCP flags 
to elicit information. By analyzing TCP and UDP probes and comparing them against 
fingerprints of defined responses nmap can:   
• detect/discover live hosts on a network (server/host discovery), 
• identify active UDP and TCP ports (port enumeration)  
• identify software version information for open ports (service discovery) 
• identify operating system information 





The Metasploit Framework is a part of Kali Linux or can be installed separately 
on Windows or Linux/UNIX operating systems. It provides a platform that can be used 
for penetration testing. Metasploit can help to identify, validate, and exploit known 
vulnerabilities in operating systems, applications, and hardware. It can also be used to 
develop new exploits.  
Three key components are: 
• Exploits – the method of exploiting a vulnerability in an asset.  
• Payloads – the code that can be run on a target that has been compromised.  
• Auxiliary modules – the programs that can perform fuzzing, scanning, and 
sniffing.  
Learning Objectives 
At the end of this scenario, the participants will: 
1) be able to perform network reconnaissance, server enumeration, port and service 
enumeration using nmap to identify a vulnerable Linux server on an isolated 
network 
2) be able to run the Metasploit framework on a Linux VM 
3) be able to identify a relevant exploit to use to gain command line access to a 
Linux server 
4) locate and hash any of the following cards: 8 of clubs, 3 of hearts, 2 of spades, 10 
of spades, king of spades, 10 of clubs, 5 of hearts, 5 of diamonds, 9 of diamonds, 







Connect to the NAT VM in EDURange (AWS) using ssh with the user id and 
password you were provided. Once you have gained knowledge about your VM, you 
need to look on the closed network (10.0.*) to find the other VM that is your potential 
target. Use nmap to scan the network and find the available server. Once you have 
identified the server you then need to gain additional information about the server 
including open ports, services running on those ports, versions of software running on 
those ports. Again, you can use nmap to perform all these actions. Once you have detailed 
as much information about the target as possible, you can turn to the Metasploit 
Framework to identify potential exploits and breach the server. 
Typical process: 
1) Gain info about your VM (Linux commands) 
2) Identify the servers on the network segment (nmap ping scan). 
3) Identify the open ports and software versions on the target (nmap version scan). 
4) Search Metasploit for exploits, auxiliary modules, and payloads for the identified 
services. 
5) Attempt to gain access to the target server (MSF, Web/SQL Injection) 
6) Identify other accounts on the system (/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow). 
7) Find a way to escalate privilege to gain root access. 
8) Locate/find the CTF target files. 
9) Perform any work needed on the CTF target files so that you can hash the file 
(md5sum). 






msf5> search ftp 
➢ returns exploits, auxiliary modules, and payloads 
msf5> search mysql 
➢ returns exploits, auxiliary modules, and payloads  
msf5> search ssh_login 
➢ returns auxiliary modules  
Other key MSF commands are: 
msf5 > use auxiliary/scanner/ftp/ftp_version 
➢ If successful, this would set your context to this exploit. You can see that this 
happened by looking at the new prompt. 
 
msf5 auxiliary(scanner/ftp/ftp_version) > show options 
➢ Shows you the options that are available for the specific context 
 
msf5 auxiliary(scanner/ftp/ftp_version) > back 
➢ Change context back one level 
 
msf5> set RHOSTS ip-paddress 
➢ Sets the remote host to be the specific ip-address 
msf5> exploit 
➢ Attempts the current exploit. 
msf5> quit 
➢ Exits msfconsole. 
You can also run some Linux commands while in the msfconsole including: pwd, 





Also, once you are using an exploit that gains you access to a server, you can try 
to run OS commands to get additional information. 
Hints 
Using nmap hints: 
• nmap -sn 10.0.1-50.0-50 
o performs a ping scan on all IPs in the specified range 
o output indicates all IPs that respond to the ping scan and      
o MAC address. 
• nmap -sV 10.0.0.1 
o Output includes port, state, service, version for TCP ports, and MAC 
address. 
• nmap -sT -sV -sC -v -p ports-to-scan --reason --open ip-address 
o Output includes specific ports, states, services, and versions of software 
for TCP ports for the specified ip-address.  
Gaining access hints: 
• FTP is a great avenue for accessing the system and identifying the usernames.  
• For FTP try the payload: cmd/unix/reverse_perl. Also, to get around a permissions 
issue on the server, set SITEPATH /var/www/html/. Get the user list and move on to 
the ssh_login exploit. 
• Using an ssh_login scanner is a great way to attempt passwords to gain access. 
• Use a SQL injection to attack a website on the target using lynx (a text browser). 
Escalation hints: 





• Use the ssh_login scanner’s different options to attempt different passwords (i.e. 
blank passwords, userid=password, etc.). 
• If you get access to the remote system, check to see if you can use sudo to switch 
to root (sudo -s). 
• Get access to the /etc/shadow file to identify password hashes and use John to try 
and hack passwords. 
SQL Injection hints: 
• There are typical attacks that can be used to enumerate the users on the system. 
(And other info if you are diligent!).  
• Incorrectly filtered escape characters (see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SQL_injection): 
This form of injection occurs when user input is not filtered for escape 
characters and is then passed into an SQL statement. This results in the potential 
manipulation of the statements performed on the database by the end-user of the 
application. 
The following line of code illustrates this vulnerability: 
statement = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + userName + "';" 
This SQL code is designed to pull up the records of the specified username 
from its table of users. However, if the "userName" variable is crafted in a 
specific way by a malicious user, the SQL statement may do more than the code 
author intended. For example, setting the "userName" variable as: ' OR '1'='1 
renders one of the following SQL statements by the parent language: 





SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '' OR '1'='1' -- '; 
If this code were to be used in an authentication procedure then this 
example could be used to force the selection of every data field (*) from all users 
rather than from one specific user name as the coder intended, because the 
evaluation of '1'='1' is always true. 
It is also possible to use the UNION SELECT to pull data from database 
tables using (for example): 
' OR 1=1 UNION SELECT null,null,username,password FROM users# 
File work hints: 
• Files may be txt, zip, wav, pcapng. And some may be hidden inside files! Some 
may be hidden in super-secret directories and not named like a card!   
• Some of the files can be hashed as is to get the answer. Some, however, require 
some work. 
• Exfiltrate the files from the target VM to your NAT VM. Then exfiltrated the files 
to your local computer to view the files (to verify if they are viewable without 
modification or require modifications).  
• Use md5sum to get the hash of the file. 
• Tools that might be helpful working on the more difficult files: exiftool, binwalk, 






Security Update Emails 
May UNIX/Linux Security Update  
Good afternoon! 
As we close out May I wanted to share some security updates with you! 
Common Vulnerabilities Update 
We talked about the importance of keeping up awareness about vulnerabilities and 
how frequently they are identified. To that end, I thought I would share how things have 





May 19 34 23 
May 20 40 32 
May 21 62 29 
May 22 138 24 
May 23 25 43 
May 24 2 21 
May 25 9 11 
Impacted software includes Apache, Docker, json, Python, Fedora, Ubuntu, and 
many others. This information is available at:  https://cve.mitre.org/cve/data_feeds.html 
US-CERT-Alert (AA20-133A) Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities 
Take a look at this CERT: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a. 
Interestingly, the most exploited vulnerabilities from 2016-2019 were vulnerabilities that 
were found in 2012 (1), 2015 (1), 2017 (5), 2018 (2), 2019 (1)!  Constant vigilance & 






2020 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report 
The 2020 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report was just published. The 
report analyzed 32,002 incidents and 3,950 confirmed data breaches. 
Key updates relevant to our organization: 
• 58% of breaches featured hacking (stolen credentials, backdoor, exploited 
vulnerability, brute force, or buffer overflow) – up from 52% 
• Misconfiguration rose to almost 40% for top errors allowing a breach 
• 819 incidents and 228 breaches impacted educational institutions 
• 798 incidents and 512 breaches impacted healthcare organizations 
• Servers continue to be the top target for hackers in the educational/healthcare 
segments 
• Top controls suggested for educational/healthcare institutions: implement a 
security awareness program, boundary defense, data protection, and secure 
configurations. 
• Implement a Security Awareness and Training Program (CSC 17) - 
Educate users about malicious attacks and accidental breaches. 
• Boundary Defense (CSC 12) - Not just firewalls, this control includes 
network monitoring, proxies, and multifactor authentication. 
• Data Protection (CSC 13) – Limit data leakage by controlling access to 
sensitive information. Controls in this list include maintaining an 






• Secure Configuration (CSC 5, CSC 11) - Ensure and verify that systems 
are configured with only the services and access needed to achieve their 
function.  
Case of the month 
The importance of disabling services, implementing server-based firewalls, and 
securing ssh (implementing defense in depth) can be seen in this recent headline from the 
news:  https://www.cbronline.com/news/aws-servers-hacked-rootkit-in-the-cloud 
Join the Dialog – Collaborate! 
Join the UNIX/Linux Administrators Microsoft Team to collaborate and 




If you are interested in implementing Tenable, Splunk, Defender ATP, or other 
enterprise tools send an email to the monitoring team and they will contact you! 
Stay safe! 
 
June Security Update 
Greetings! 
I hope this email finds you safe and secure! This email is a follow up to the Linux/UNIX 
Security workshop to give you some additional information about what's going on in the 
world of Cybersecurity and the impact on us as systems administrators/engineers. 
InfraGard FBI Session Info 
On May 29th I attended an InfraGard FBI Session whose topic was Securing the 
Health Sector: Threats to Vaccine Researchers and Manufacturers. The FBI cyber 





COVID 19 research. Targets include academic institutions, biological facilities, 
bioscience industries, medical facilities, university laboratories, scientific 
collaborations. China is using open source information (i.e. news articles, company 
announcements, published research, etc.) to identify potential targets for COVID 
research data. The recommendations made by the FBI in order of priority included: 
1) Timely patching of all systems for critical vulnerabilities  
2) Implementing MFA 
3) Monitor web applications for unusual activity 
4) Perform a network baseline analysis 
If you are interested in being a part of InfraGard go to this website: 
https://www.infragard.org/ 
Server Patch Management 
“In years past, Linux server patch management was often thought of in 
terms of “we don’t patch our servers unless there is a reason to upgrade the 
version for application compatibility.” This philosophy is no longer appropriate 
today because of the downtime that can result from malicious code targeting 
known vulnerabilities on unpatched systems and the concerns around governance 
and regulatory compliance standards such as HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act) and SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Patch management has 
now become an important buzzword in corporate IT organizations and business 
offices.” From: Taking A Proactive Approach to Linux Server Patch Management, 
n.d., https://www.suse.com/media/white-
paper/suse_linux_patch_management.pdf 
Question: Why disable services and add a local firewall? 





administrator. Honestly, I had to think about it and do a little digging. I also asked 
a few “security experts” their thoughts. No security control will be 100% 
effective. There is always a chance that some nefarious individual will find a way 
around a control. Disabling services, like ftp and telnet, is one way to reduce the 
potential attack surface. Adding a local firewall adds an additional layer of 
security to the server. To some that seems like overkill, but the truth is our goal as 
UNIX/Linux systems administrators is to protect our servers and data the best 
way we can. With local firewalls being so easily configurable why not make that 
extra effort? 
New Linux Vulnerabilities 
From 5/26 to 6/14 there were 1053 new vulnerability identified 648 modifications 
to known vulnerabilities!  Vulnerability counts: Linux 5652/137377 (103 new for 
2020), RedHat 11362/137377 (81 new for 2020), Ubuntu 7837/137377 (213 new 
for 2020), and AIX 352/137377 (2 new for 2020). These stats are a clear 
indication of the necessity to patch regularly!      
National Vulnerability Database:  https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search 
10 Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities 
The article, “The Top 10 Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities You Should Know” by 
G. Avner (2019) provides some great information regarding Linux kernel 








Join the Dialog – Collaborate! 
Join the UNIX/Linux Administrators Microsoft Team to collaborate and share 
information amongst your peers in the institutions! 
As always, please email me if you have any questions, comments, suggestions, or 
concerns related to Linux/UNIX security! 
Stay safe! 
July Security Update 
Good morning! 
I wanted to share another update on what is going on with security! 
New ransomware that is targeting Windows and Linux systems 
The main targets of Tycoon are organizations in the software and education industries. It 
is unusual because it is written in Java and deployed as a trojanized JRE. Also it is 
compiled within a Java image file effectively hiding the malicious intention. The article 
continues by reaffirming the importance of applying security patches as soon as possible 
as this can help to prevent ransomware attacks where hackers exploit known 
vulnerabilities. Here is a link to the whole article: 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-new-ransomware-is-targeting-windows-and-linux-pcs-
with-a-unique-attack/ 
Netgear router vulnerability 
Do you have a Netgear router at home?  If so, you might want to be aware of a new 
vulnerability!  Looks like they are hoping for a patch to be released soon. Here’s a link to 







40 Linux Server Hardening Security Tips 
This article provides some key things that Linux/UNIX administrators can do to improve 
security on their servers. Key items (that we also discussed at the security workshop) 
include: 
1) Avoid Using FTP, Telnet, And Rlogin / Rsh Services 
2) Minimize Software to Minimize Vulnerability 
3) Keep Linux Kernel and Software Up to Date 
4) User Accounts and Strong Password Policy 
5) Disable Unwanted Linux Services 
6) Configure Iptables and TCPWrappers based Firewall 
7) Linux Kernel /etc/sysctl.conf Hardening 
Here’s a link to the full article:  https://www.cyberciti.biz/tips/linux-security.html 
Running RedHat/Centos 6 or 7 or Debian 8? 
The Mutagen Astronomy vulnerability has been around for a while (> 10 years). It can 
allow an attacker to gain root access to the target system. Most distributions have issued 
patches, but it is critical that the patch be installed to mitigate this vulnerability. Delays in 
implementing patches (i.e. not keeping software up to date) provides a window for 
malicious attackers to target your servers. Here is a link to the full article: 
https://www.servercentral.com/blog/linux-vulnerabilities-importance-patching/ 
UCSF Pays $1.14M to NetWalker Hackers After Ransomware Attack 
After NetWalker ransomware locked down several servers of its School of Medicine, 





impacted systems. Here is a link to the full article: 
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/ucsf-pays-1.14m-to-netwalker-hackers-after-
ransomware-attack 
National Vulnerabilities Database Dashboard 
Just a quick reminder about the NVD dashboard as a great place to learn about new 
vulnerabilities. Here is a link to the website: https://nvd.nist.gov/general/nvd-dashboard 
Since the workshop on 5/19 the following new vulnerabilities were announced: RedHat: 
37, Ubuntu: 38, AIX: 2, Gentoo: 58, Apache: 18, MySQL: 7, and Cisco: 119. Again, 
emphasizes the need for regular patching and updates! 
SANS Webcast on Securing Containers 
If you join the SANS organization, they regularly have free security related webinars. 
One that I saw that I wanted to pass on was on securing containers.  
https://www.sans.org/webcasts/containers-vulnerability-management-time-step-things-
up-115850 
F5 Vulnerability CVSS 10 
A vulnerability that allows for remote code execution was discovered in F5 BIG-IP 
devices. It is unusual for a vulnerability to get a CVSS score of 10 so I thought I would 
share it with you. Below is a link to the full story: 
https://www.zdnet.com/google-amp/article/f5-patches-vulnerability-that-received-a-cvss-
10-severity-score/ 
Metasploit Lab Opportunity 
If you are interested in getting access to the online lab that lets you try and break into a 





up the lab again for you and leave it up for a week! 
Be safe! 
August Security Update 
Good morning! 
Below is your August security update! 
Garmin hit by ransomware 
On July 23rd, Garmin was hit by a huge ransomware event that resulted in customers 
losing use of their personal devices as well as aviation navigation devices systems going 
offline. Here is a link to one article: https://www.zdnet.com/article/garmin-services-and-
production-go-down-after-ransomware-attack/ 
InfraGard 
On June 21st I participated in a webinar presented by the New York InfraGard team 
regarding cyber threats in the time of COVID. They discussed several recent breaches 
that included passive surveillance followed by sniper strikes—focused on Citrix 
Netscalers and Cisco routers. They emphasized the importance of business continuity 
planning in recovering from breaches and ransomware. Additionally, they said that off-
site, off-line backups have helped several organizations that had their on-line backups 
encrypted by the ransomware too! 
 
InfraGard is a non-profit program by the FBI in partnership with private industry. They 
periodically have web sessions, talks, and conferences that are a great opportunity to 
meet folks and learn about what threats are out there. Attached are a couple of 





National Cyber League 
The NCL has Cyber Games several times a year. It is a great opportunity to think like a 
hacker and learn to use some great tools and applications. The sections included in the 
NCL include cryptography, enumeration and exploitation, log analysis, network traffic 
analysis, open source intelligence, password cracking, scanning, web application 
exploitation, and wireless access exploitation. Prior to the actual game event participants 
are given access to the “gym” to learn about the different areas and what tools might be 
useful answer each question. I have done it several times and always enjoy the challenge. 
You can also get an official Score Card that can give you a picture of your increased 
knowledge each game. Here’s a link to their website: https://nationalcyberleague.org/ 
Centralized Log Management 
During the workshop we talked about the importance of centralized log management in 
analyzing logs if you manage multiple servers. For the enterprise we use Splunk. There 
are, however, several tools that you can use to create your own log management 
environment for the servers you manage. The article below is a good introduction to Elk 
Logstash should you want to create your own: 
https://www.howtoforge.com/tutorial/how-to-setup-elk-logstash-as-centralized-log-
management-server/ 
Number of Patient Records  
According to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights 
Breach Portal the number of patient records that have been lost/stolen since January 1, 







Business Insider reported that hackers are selling more than 15 billion stolen login 
credentials on the dark web. Stolen credentials can sell for anywhere from $1 to $140,000 
depending on the type of account. They continued by recommending that organizations 
and individuals use password manager applications, enable two-factor authentication, 
and regularly change passwords to reduce the risk of stolen credential attacks. The link 
to the full article is below: 
https://www.businessinsider.com/hackers-circulating-15-billion-stolen-logins-on-the-
dark-web-2020-7 
Sharpen your skills 
Did you know that there are multiple Linux OS courses, as well as other Linux Security, 
Kali Linux, and Ethical Hacking classes available to employees through LinkedIn 
Learning and MyLearning?  I am currently taking a great class for the CompTIA Linux+ 
exam. It is important to keep your skills up to date as technologies change!  Below are 
security recommendations from the Linux+ exam course (hopefully a few sound 
familiar!): 
Manage Installed and Running Services 
- Uninstall any software that is not necessary 
- Disable any running services that are not necessary 
- Be diligent on OS security updates 
- Disable insecure services such as FTP, Telnet, and Finger 
- Always run a firewall 





- Use PAM for granular network access 
- Change default service ports 
- Restrict remote logins to trusted hosts 
- Use VPN connections 
RedHat/CentOS BootHole Vulnerability Patch 
You may want to hold off on RedHat and CentOS patching related to the BootHole 
vulnerability. Apparently RedHat and CentOS systems are not booting after application of 
the BootHole patches. The patches were for GRUB and the kernel. The article below 
provides information on how to downgrade the affected packages. 
https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2020/07/red-hat-and-centos-systems-arent-booting-due-
to-boothole-patches/ 
Join the Dialog – Collaborate! 
Join the UNIX/Linux Administrators Microsoft Team to collaborate and share 
information amongst your peers in the institutions!  We have almost 40 administrators 
that have joined the team! 
Study Finalization 
In a few weeks you will be receiving a link to complete the final study survey associated 
with this research project. It is very similar to what you did in April/May.  






Permissions for Use of Survey Questions 
Approval was requested from the researchers that he developed questions that 
were modified and used in the present research. The articles referenced and the author’s 
email responses from the authors are shown below. 
Siponen, M., Mahmood, M. A., & Pahnila, S. (2014). Employees’ adherence to  
 informaton security policy: An exploratory field study. Information &  
 Management, 51(2), 217-224. 
 
Mahmood, M. Adam <mmahmood@utep.edu> 




You have my permission to use the items you mentioned in your email for your 
dissertation. 
 
Dr. Adam Mahmood 
 
Ifinedo, P. (2012). Understanding information systems security policy compliance: 
 An integration of the theory of planned behavior and the protection motivation 
 theory. Computers & Security, 31(1), 83-95. 
 
Ifinedo, P. (2014). Information systems security policy compliance: An empirical study 
 of the effects of socialization, influence, and cognition. Information & 
 Management, 51(1), 69-79. 
 
Princely Ifinedo <pifinedo@gmail.com> 
Sat 11/9/2019 1:27 PM 
 
Dear John P McConnell, 
 










Hanus, B., & Wu, Y. (2016). Impact of users’ security awareness on desktop 
 security behavior: A protection motivation theory perspective. Information 
 Systems Management, 33(1), 2-16. 
 
Bartlomiej Hanus <bartlomiejh@gmail.com> 




No problem, you are welcome to use the aforementioned items in your study. I hope they 





Safa, N. S., & Von Solms, R. (2016). An information security knowledge sharing model 
 in organizations. Computers in Human Behavior, 57(C), 442-451. 
 
Safa, N. S., Von Solms, R., & Furnell, S. (2016). Information security policy compliance      
 model in organizations. Computers & Security, 56, 70-82. 
 
Steven Furnell <S.Furnell@plymouth.ac.uk> 




I’ll leave Nader to give the main authorisation on this, as he was the key author here. 
However, I do not anticipate a problem. 
 






nader sohrabi safa <sohrabisafa@yahoo.com> 




you can use the questions from our two models that we published before with citation in 
your work.  
 
Best Regards 
Dr Nader Sohrabi Safa 





Coventry University, UK 
 
Siponen, M., Mahmood, M. A., & Pahnila, S. (2014). Employees’ adherence to 
 information security policy: An exploratory field study. Information & 
 Management, 51(2), 217-224. 
 
Siponen, Mikko <mikko.t.siponen@jyu.fi> 




It seems to me self-evident that one can use published instrument even without asking a 
permission from the original authors (assuming that one include a proper citation). For 
example, if I wrote paper, and I have 200 references, it seems odd to ask everyone can I 
cite them... 
 
So, I have no problem if you cite (or use) the measures (a normal citation practice 
assumed). 
 





Ph.D., D.Soc.Sc.  
Vice Dean for Research 
Professor of Information Systems 
University of Jyväskylä 
Tel. +358 505588128 
 
Rhee, H., Ryu, Y. U., & Kim, C. (2012). Unrealistic optimism on information 
 security management. Computers & Security, 31(2), 221-232. 
 
Young Ryu <ryoung@utdallas.edu> 








Cheongtag Kim <ctkim@snu.ac.kr> 
Sun 11/10/2019 6:27 PM 
 






Thank you for your interest in our work. In fact, I don't think you need permission to use 
items published in the academic journal. Anyway, I DO give my permission to use items 














Thank you for taking the time to pilot test this survey of UNIX Administrator Cognitive 
Heuristics and Biases. The goal of this instrument is to better understand how perceived 
vulnerability, perceived severity, self-efficacy, response efficacy, information security 
knowledge sharing, confirmation bias, optimistic bias, and the availability heuristic 
influence UNIX administrator’s ISP compliance behavior. Your feedback will help 
ensure the survey instructions and questions are clear and complete. Please set aside at 
least 30 minutes to complete your review.  
 
First, review the research summary provided below. Then proceed to review the survey 
instructions and questions. This survey is divided into nine sections. You will be 
presented the questions as the participant would see them and then you are asked to 
review the questions in each section and provide your feedback. You do not have to make 
selections for the participant questions.  
 
Again, thank you for your time and participation in this important research effort. 
 
Should you have any question, feel free to e-mail me.  
 
Thank you! 






My name is John McConnell. I am a doctoral candidate in Information Systems in the 
College of Computing and Engineering at Nova Southeastern University. I am also an IT 
Technical Manager at Johns Hopkins. My dissertation chair is Martha Snyder, Ph.D., 
from Nova Southeastern University. My research is a study on systems administrator 
perceptions about information security, security training, understanding of security risks 
and vulnerabilities, organizational support, and policy compliance. The Institutional 
Review Board approval number for this research project is (TBD). 
 
You are receiving this survey because you have been identified as a systems 
administrator working with enterprise class servers in your institution. A systems 
administrator is an IT specialist that is responsible for operating system installation, 
configuration, patching, user management, monitoring, data backup, implementation of 






The goal is to understand how security training that is tailored toward your day-to-day 
work helps you effectively secure your servers. 
 
We appreciate your help in completing this survey. Completing it implies your informed 
consent to participating in this research study. No identifying information will be 
included in the research report and your responses will be confidential. It should take no 
longer than 10 to 15 minutes to answer the questions. Several questions have a time 
limitation on them. For those questions please make your choices as quickly as possible 
in the time provided. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact John McConnell 
(jmcconn3@jhmi.edu or jm3967@mynsu.nova.edu) or 410-935-5657. You may also 
contact my dissertation chair, Martha Snyder, Ph.D. at smithmt@nova.edu (954)262-
2074.  
 
For each question, please honestly rate your level of agreement from strongly disagree (1) 
to strongly agree (7). 
 
Expert Info - What feedback do you have regarding the participant's welcome? 
 
Expert Information: Section A - Self-Efficacy 
 
Self-efficacy is the belief that one is capable of the adaptation necessary to mitigate the 
negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).  
 
Q2. I believe I have the expertise to implement preventative measures to stop 
unauthorized people from getting my organization's confidential information stored on 
my servers. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q3. I believe I have the skills to implement preventative measures to stop unauthorized 
people from damaging my servers. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q4. I believe I can configure my server to provide good protection from software attacks. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3. 
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended 
adjustments (or "N/A" if none) 
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for 'Self-Efficacy' 




Q5. Enabling security measures on my servers will prevent users from gaining 





Q6. The preventative measures available to me to stop people from gaining access to my 
organization's servers and data are adequate. 
Q7. Frequently applying security patches on my operating system is an effective way of 
preventing hacker attacks on my servers. 
 
Expert Information: Section B - Response-Efficacy 
 
Response efficacy is an evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed behavior to 
reduce the probability of the negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).  
Q8. Enabling security measures on my servers will prevent users from gaining 
unauthorized access to important personal, financial, or patient information. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q9. The preventative measures available to me to stop people from gaining access to my 
organization's servers and data are adequate. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q10. Frequently applying security patches on my operating system is an effective way of 
preventing hacker attacks on my servers. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3. 
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended 
adjustments (or "N/A" if none) 
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for ‘Response-




Q11. My servers are at risk of having Malware, virus, or similar infection 
Q12. My organization could be subjected to a serious information security threat. 
Q13. I believe that trying to protect my company's servers and information will mitigate 
the risk of illegal access to organizational data. 
Q14. I believe that all computer systems are potentially vulnerable to malicious activity 
and compromise. 
 
Expert Information: Section C - Perceived Vulnerability 
 
Perceived vulnerability is an assessment of probability a negative event will occur if no 
changes are made to the individual’s behavior (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).  
Q11. My servers are at risk of having Malware, virus, or similar infection 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q12. My organization could be subjected to a serious information security threat. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q13. I believe that trying to protect my company's servers and information will mitigate 
the risk of illegal access to organizational data. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 






Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3. 
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended 
adjustments (or "N/A" if none) 
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for ‘Perceived 




Q15. An information security breach in my organization would be cause serious 
complications for my organization and me. 
Q16. I believe that having my servers infected with malware, a virus, or similar infection 
would cause serious complications for my organization and me. 
Q17. An information security breach in my organization would cause serious 
complications for my organization and me. 
 
Expert Information: Section D - Perceived Severity 
 
Perceived severity is an evaluation of the potential physical, psychological, social, or 
economic harm an individual expects may occur (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).  
Q15. An information security breach in my organization would be cause serious 
complications for my organization and me. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q16. I believe that having my servers infected with malware, a virus, or similar infection 
would cause serious complications for my organization and me. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q17. An information security breach in my organization would cause serious 
complications for my organization and me. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3. 
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended 
adjustments (or "N/A" if none) 
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for ‘Perceived 




Q18. I frequently share my information security knowledge in my team in order to 
decrease information security risk. 
Q19. I think information security knowledge sharing with my team helps me to 
understand the usefulness of information security policies in my organization. 








Expert Information: Section E - Information Security Knowledge Sharing 
 
Information security knowledge sharing can help to foster sharing of ideas, experiences, 
tools, and processes to improve security and protect an organization’s information 
systems assets (Flores, Antonsen, & Ekstedt, 2014).  
 
Q18. I frequently share my information security knowledge in my team in order to 
decrease information security risk. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q19. I think information security knowledge sharing with my team helps me to 
understand the usefulness of information security policies in my organization. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q20. I think sharing information security knowledge is a valuable practice in my 
organization. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3. 
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended 
adjustments (or "N/A" if none) 
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for ' Information 




Q21. My organization has the tools in place to mitigate information security threats. 
Q22. My organization executable security practices to mitigate information security 
threats. 
Q23. The likelihood that my servers will be disrupted due to information security 
breaches in the next 12 months is low. 
 
Expert Information: Section F - Optimistic Bias 
 
Optimistic bias leads one to assess situations in self-serving ways (Rhee et al., 2012). 
Optimistic bias is a protective measure to protect the self, and reduce both anxiety and 
stress (Rhee et al., 2012).  
Q21. My organization has the tools in place to mitigate information security threats. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q22. My organization executable security practices to mitigate information security 
threats. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Q23. The likelihood that my servers will be disrupted due to information security 
breaches in the next 12 months is low. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3. 
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended 





Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for 'Optimistic Bias' 




Q24. On the next screen you will be presented with four questions. You will be limited to 
30 seconds to select your answers. The choices are the same as the previous responses 1-
strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-somewhat disagree, 4-neither agree nor disagree, 5-
somewhat agree, 6-agree, and 7-strongly agree. 
Q25. <Undisplayed timing> 
Q26. I believe Microsoft servers have more vulnerabilities than Linux/UNIX servers.  
Q27. I believe there are more security vulnerabilities, alerts, and patches related to 
Windows servers than Linux/UNIX servers. 
Q28. I believe a Windows server containing protected health information (PHI) is likely 
to be breached. 
Q29. I believe a Linux/UNIX server containing protected health information (PHI) is 
likely to be breached. 
 
Expert Information: Section G - Availability Heuristic 
 
To judge the frequency or probability of an event an individual may assess the 
availability of associations related to the event (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Rather than 
taking the time to consider an actual probability it is easier to estimate a probability based 
on the ease that one recalls occurrences of a similar event, termed the availability 
heuristic (Kahneman, 2011; Kliger & Kudryavtsev, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 
I believe Microsoft servers have more vulnerabilities than Linux/UNIX servers.  
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
I believe there are more security vulnerabilities, alerts, and patches related to Windows 
servers than Linux/UNIX servers. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
I believe a Windows server containing protected health information (PHI) is likely to be 
breached. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
I believe a Linux/UNIX server containing protected health information (PHI) is likely to 
be breached. 
Keep  Adjust  Remove 
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3. 
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended 
adjustments (or "N/A" if none) 
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for 'Trust' beyond those 







Expert information: Section H - Confirmation Bias:  
 
Confirmatory bias will be tested using a fictional scenario, similar to the technique of 
Fischer et al., 2011. Fischer et al. (2011) presented a scenario, asked participants to make 
an initial decision, then provided six confirming and six disconfirming bits of additional 
information they can choose to review, and then asked to choose again. The level of 
confirmation bias will be determined by subtracting the number of disconfirming from 




Q30. Scenario Question: Your organization plans on implementing a new web server to 
provide customers’ access to HIPAA protected PHI data. In order to provide the highest 
level of security, would you recommend the web server be implemented on the Windows 
or UNIX/Linux operating system?  
UNIX/Linux  Windows 
 
Q31. On the next screen you will be presented with additional information you can 
choose to review that you might consider regarding your recommendation. There are 12 
data points that are either pro (in favor of) or con (against) each operating system. You 
must choose at least one item and may choose up to 6 items. You are limited to 20 
seconds to make your selection. Once you make your selection, click the arrow to move 
to the next screen. At that time you will be shown the additional information you 
requested. 
Q32. Please select at least one and no more than six additional pieces of information 
below.  
UNIX/Linux (Pro) UNIX/Linux (Con) Windows (Pro) Windows (Con) 
UNIX/Linux (Con) UNIX/Linux (Pro) Windows (Con) Windows (Pro) 
UNIX/Linux (Pro) UNIX/Linux (Con) Windows (Pro) Windows (Con) 
Q33. <Undisplayed timing> 
The following are displayed based on display logic. Only items selected in Q32 are 
displayed. 
Q34. UNIX/LINUX (Pro) - UNIX/Linux servers can be configured with higher amounts 
of memory and CPUs making them significantly more powerful than Windows servers. 
Q35. UNIX/LINUX (Con) - Porting of applications to UNIX/Linux distributions is not 
the focus of many software companies. 
Q36. UNIX/LINUX (Pro) - There are fewer demands on the hardware due to reduced 
operating systems overhead in UNIX/Linux. 
Q37. UNIX/Linux (Con) - Several professional office programs (i.e. Microsoft Windows, 
Microsoft SharePoint, and Microsoft Visio) do not work with UNIX/Linux. 
Q38. UNIX/Linux (Pro) - Remote function access is integrated into the native operating 
system on UNIX/Linux distributions (shell and terminal). 
Q39. UNIX/Linux (Con) - UNIX/Linux can be more difficult to administer due to its 
command line nature. 
Q40. Windows (Pro) - A Windows server is easier for new systems administrators due to 





Q41. Windows (Con) - The licensing costs for Windows can be high and can increase 
with each user. 
Q42. Windows (Pro) - Windows is compatible with popular Microsoft programs like 
SharePoint, Visio, and Exchange. 
Q43. Windows (Con) - Windows servers are very vulnerable to malware. 
Q44. Windows (Pro) - There are many skilled individuals that can fill Windows systems 
administrator positions. 
Q45. Windows (Con) - The use of mandatory graphical user interface on Windows 
servers results in significant resource utilization for basic operating systems function. 
Q46. Based on the additional information you received, which operating system would 
you suggest for this Web server?   
UNIX/Linux  Windows 
 
Expert Information: Section I - Confirmation Bias 
 
Confirmation bias can significantly influence decision making (Kahneman, 2011). With 
confirmation bias, one gives greater validity to information that supports rather than 
contradicts one’s beliefs (Sternberg, 2004). 
 









□ 66 or over 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey! Your responses will help us 
understand how systems administrator perceive information security, security training, 




Do you have any additional feedback for this survey?  
 
Thank you again for taking the time to provide your expert opinion on this survey 
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Invitation to Participate 
Hello! 
 
I am reaching out to invite you to participate in a new UNIX/Linux security workshop 
that is focused on securing servers in the Hopkins enterprise. You were identified as a 
participant because you are a server administrator for Linux or UNIX servers in the 
configuration management database (CMDB). My name is John McConnell and I work 
in IT@JH. I am also a doctoral researcher in information security at NSU.  
 
The goal of the workshop is to provide you with information, resources, tools, and 
practical, hands-on experience to penetration test your own servers and increase security. 
We will discuss the scope and impact of data breaches, cyber attackers and their 
motivations, the top threats facing our servers, vulnerability management, penetration 
testing, and discuss recommendations to help you mitigate risk. Many of the 
recommendations introduced during the workshop are from the draft Linux/UNIX 
security standard that is currently being reviewed by the ICSC. Finally, you will also be 
given the opportunity to perform a penetration test/capture-the-flag challenge on a cloud-
based Linux server using the tools we will cover in the workshop. 
 
You are probably aware of some of the tools and resources we will discuss but my hope is 
that you will walk away from the workshop with some new knowledge and new tools that 
will help you increase both your cyber awareness and your ability to respond effectively 
to mitigate security vulnerabilities.  
 
This workshop is also part of my dissertation (Hopkins IRB: IRB00240988, NSU IRB: 
2020-60) on UNIX/Linux systems administrator perceptions about information security, 
security training, understanding of security risks and vulnerabilities, and organizational 
support.  
 
As this is part of an official study, along with the workshop, there are a few 
administrative items that need to be completed. Your participation includes completion of 
an informed consent form, completion of a short pre-workshop survey, participation in 
the workshop, and an opportunity to exploit a cloud-based Linux server using the 
Metasploit framework. Finally, you will receive an email to complete a short post-
workshop online survey.  
 
As the principal investigator, I will be facilitating the workshop. Darren Lacey, our Chief 
Information Security Office will also be participating. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, and your participation decision will not affect your 






The workshop will be held via a secure Zoom meeting Tuesday, May 19th from 9-11 AM. 
The CTF challenge lab environment will be online from 11-1 PM for those that want to 
try their hand at penetration testing a Linux server using Metasploit.  
 
I hope you find this workshop to be both informative and fun. It will also introduce you, 
virtually, to the other UNIX/Linux administrators in the organization. Finally, I plan to 
create a new Microsoft Teams team called “Hopkins UNIX/Linux Administrators” that 
you can join for future collaboration. 
 
If you want to participate in this free learning opportunity, please simply reply to this 
email and I will reserve a space for you!   
 
I hope you will join me to learn something new and to share your experience with other 
UNIX/Linux administrators! 
 







Combined Inform Consent Form 
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMED CONSENT AND PRIVACY 
AUTHORIZATION FORM 
Protocol Title: UNIX/Linux Administrator Information Security: The Influence of a 
Focused SETA Workshop and Interactive Security Challenge 
JHH Application No.: IRB00240988 
NSU Application No.: 2020-60 
Principal Investigator: John McConnell, jmcconn3@jhmi.edu, 667-208-6303. 
NSU Faculty Advisor/Dissertation Chair: Marti Snyder, Ph. D 
NSU Co-Investigator(s): Yair Levy, Ph. D, Ling Wang, Ph. D. 
You are being asked to join a research study. Participation in this study is 
voluntary. Even if you decide to join now, you can change your mind later. 
1. Research Summary: 
The information in this section is intended to be an introduction to the study 
only. Complete details of the study are listed in the sections below. If you are 
considering participation in the study, the entire document should be discussed with 
you before you make your final decision.  
This research is a study on UNIX/Linux systems administrator perceptions 
about information security, security training, understanding of security risks and 
vulnerabilities, and organizational support. The goal is to understand how security 
training that is tailored toward your day-to-day work helps you improves the security 





2. Why is this research being done? 
  This research is being done to assess the effectiveness of a specialized security 
education training and awareness workshop and hands-on labs on your ability to 
protect and secure your UNIX/Linux servers. It will also assess how the workshop 
influences your perception of information security and organizational support. 
Who can join this study? 
UNIX/Linux systems administrators working with Linux and UNIX servers at 
Johns Hopkins may participate. A systems administrator is an IT specialist that is 
responsible for operating system installation, configuration, patching, user 
management, monitoring, data backup, implementation of security controls, disaster 
recovery, and testing. 
3. What will happen if you join this study? 
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to complete a short pre-
workshop survey, participate in a 2-hour UNIX/Linux focused security workshop, 
and then execute an exploitation attack of a cloud-based Linux server using tools 
demonstrated during the workshop. Finally, after the workshop, you will complete a 
short post-workshop survey. Surveys will be completed via Qualtrics (online). The 
workshop will be completed online via a secure Zoom meeting on 5/19/2020 from 9-
11 AM. The optional cloud-based penetration test will be available online using 
EDURange in AWS and will be available 5/19/2020 from 11 AM to 4 PM. 
How long will you be in the study? 
Your total time participating in this study workshop and cyber lab is two to 





4.  What happens to data that are collected in the study?  
Johns Hopkins and our research partners work to advance science and public 
health. The data we collect about you are important to this effort. If you join this 
study, you should understand that you will not own your research data.  
How will your data be shared now and in the future?  
Sharing data is part of research and may increase what we can learn from each 
study. Often, data sharing is required as a condition of funding or for publishing study 
results. It also is needed to allow other researchers to validate study findings and to 
come up with new ideas. 
No identified data will be shared. De-identified data may be shared with 
research collaborators or publishers of papers. 
We will do our best to protect and maintain your data in a safe way. 
Generally, if we share your data without identifiers (such as your name) no further 
review and approval by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) is needed. If data are 
shared with identifiers, further IRB review and approval may be needed. The IRB 
will determine whether additional consent is required. 
5. What are the risks or discomforts of the study? 
This research study involves minimal risk to you. To the best of our 
knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would 
have in everyday life. You may get tired or bored when we you are completing the 
survey. You do not have to answer any question you do not want to answer. 
6. Are there benefits to being in the study? 





knowledge and awareness of the security threats facing our organization and how best 
to test, evaluate, and secure your UNIX/Linux servers. There is no guarantee or 
promise, however, that you will receive any benefit from this study. 
7. What are your options if you do not want to be in the study? 
If you do not join, your employment/education at Johns Hopkins will not be 
affected. 
8. Can you leave the study early? 
You can agree to be in the study now and change your mind later. If you wish 
to stop, please tell us right away. Leaving the study early will not affect your 
employment/education. If you leave the study early, Johns Hopkins may use or share 
your information that it has already collected if the information is needed for this 
study or any follow-up activities. 
9. How will your privacy be maintained and how will the confidentiality of your 
data be protected?  
We try to make sure that everyone who sees your information keeps it 
confidential, but we cannot guarantee that your information will not be shared with 
others. Only the principal investigator will have access to any identifying data and 
that data will not be shared with anyone in the organization.  
Do you have to sign this Authorization? 
You do not have to sign this Authorization, but if you do not, you may not 
join the study. 
How long will your information be used or shared?  





does not expire.  
What if you change your mind? 
You may change your mind and cancel this Authorization at any time. If you 
cancel, you must contact the Principal Investigator in writing to let them know by using 
the contact information provided in this consent form. Your cancellation will not affect 
information already collected in the study, or information that has already been shared 
with others before you cancelled your authorization. 
How will your information be protected? 
Information we learn about you in this research study will be handled in a 
confidential manner. All responses will be collected in Qualtrics and stored offline at 
the conclusion of the collection period. This data will be available to the principal 
investigator, and the Institutional Review Board. If we publish the results of the study 
in a scientific journal or book, we will not identify you. All data will be kept for 36 
months from the end of the study and destroyed after that time. 
10. What does a conflict of interest mean to you as a participant in this study?  
The researcher running this study is doing this research in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Information Systems. 
The researcher is not, in any way, gaining financially from this research study. 
If you have any questions about this financial interest, please call the Office of 
Policy Coordination 410-361-8667 for more information. The Office of Policy 
Coordination reviews financial interests of researchers and/or Johns Hopkins. 
11. What other things should you know about this research study? 





affect whether you wish to continue to participate. 
What is the Institutional Review Board (IRB) and how does it protect you?  
This study has been reviewed by an Institutional Review Board (IRB), a group 
of people that reviews human research studies. The IRB can help you if you have 
questions about your rights as a research participant or if you have other questions, 
concerns, or complaints about this research study. You may contact the IRB at 410-
502-2092 or jhmeirb@jhmi.edu. Please refer to JHH Application No.: IRB00240988. 
The Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board can be reached toll 
free at: 1-866-499-0790 or IRB@nova.edu. Please refer to NSU Application No.: 
2020-60 
What should you do if you have questions about the study, or are injured or ill 
as a result of being in this study?  
Call or email the principal investigator, John McConnell at 410-935-5657 or 
jmcconn3@jhmi.edu. If you cannot reach the principal investigator or wish to talk to 
someone else, call the IRB office at 410-502-2092.  
12. What does your consent mean?  
Your selecting “I consent to participate in this study” means that you have 
reviewed the information in this form, and you agree to join the study. You will not give 
up any legal rights by signing this consent form.  
 I consent and will participate in this study. 
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